
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

presence, the author suggests that henceforth "opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, [may] be severely circumscribed."

The super powers inhibit each other; Bull argues that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis "scenario" could not recur today; the history of recent crises, notably in the eastern Mediterranean, shows that the United States "acts differently" when Soviet naval forces are present. A more generous international consensus concerning the limits of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, together with impending legal curbs on traditional freedoms on the high seas (to fish, to pollute, to exploit the seabed) impose psychological and political obstacles to the free use of naval power. Bull suggests that Third World nations, in particular, are developing a maritime "territorial imperative," often backed up by inexpensive missile-carrying smallcraft; these threats may deprive the Big Navy of its traditional pervasiveness and purpose.

Technological Surprises

"The Yom Kippur War—In Retrospect"
by Lt. Col. J. Viksne, Royal Australian
Signals Corps, in *Army Journal* (May
1976), Department of Defence, Canberra,
Australia.

Colonel Viskne's detailed analysis of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War argues once again that for every innovation in warfare there is ultimately a countermeasure. In the 1967 Sinai campaign, Israeli tanks ranged far ahead of their artillery support in daring forays against disorganized Arab defenders who lacked effective, portable anti-tank weapons. In 1973, rashly using similar tactics, Israel lost between 40 and 44 percent of its tanks, half of them to Soviet-supplied anti-tank rockets in the hands of Egyptian and Syrian infantry.

A more striking turn-around occurred at sea, where Israeli vessels armed with sea-skimming Gabriel missiles (range 15 miles) overwhelmed Egyptian Komar and Osa-class boats firing Soviet Styx missiles (range 31 miles). Of the 6 Styx missiles fired by the Egyptians during the 1967 fighting, 4 sank the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* and the other 2 sank an Israeli merchantman. In the October 1973 war, Arab naval vessels fired about 50 Styx missiles without scoring any hits largely because the Israelis used metallic "chaff" to confuse enemy radar. Once within range, Gabriel missiles sank at least eight Komar and Osa boats, leaving Israel local command of the sea.

On the other hand, Israeli inability to counter Soviet radar and guidance systems with older, U.S.-built electronic devices resulted in heavy aircraft losses (105—including 6 helicopters), almost half of them to a radar-guided Soviet 23 mm cannon which proved extremely effective against Israeli aircraft diving to evade SA-6 missiles. An added footnote to the 1973 war of technologies—each side admitted to shooting down several of its own planes because of an inability to identify friendly aircraft or exercise control in contested airspace.