

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*The Necessity
Of Helsinki*

"The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?" by Harold S. Russell, in *American Journal of International Law* (Apr. 1976), 2223 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was inevitable, writes Russell, principal U.S. negotiator for the initial "Declaration on Principles" signed in Helsinki August 1, 1975. It was a necessary element in the "process of detente." Failure to conclude an agreement would have raised serious doubts about the viability of detente, something for which neither Washington nor Moscow wished to take the blame. As Russell notes, most U.S. reaction to the final conference document ranged from tepid to frigid; George Ball calling it "a defeat for the West." One criticism is that it constituted a recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe without any real *quid pro quo*. In rebuttal, Russell contends that "the USSR failed in large part to achieve the kind of language it originally sought"; the document, in fact, "does . . . nothing to recognize existing frontiers in Europe."

Indeed, the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union's justification for intervention in sister socialist states, can no longer be invoked without violating the Helsinki Declaration on Principles. Also favoring the West is that section which deals with humanitarian and cultural matters, such as reunification of families and better treatment of journalists. No longer can Eastern nations charge "interference" when such matters are raised, Russell argues.

*Admiral Mahan
Revisited*

"Seapower and Political Influence" by Hedley Bull, in *Adelphi Papers* (Spring 1976), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam St., London WC2N 6AL.

What political purposes does sea power now serve? And, given the current restraints on the use of force by the major nuclear powers, how can sea power be used by the United States or Russia as an instrument of foreign policy in peacetime? For Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), the father of modern naval theory, sea power served two main purposes—protecting commerce and bringing military force to bear in distant waters to help allies or deter enemies. Admiral Mahan's nineteenth century concept of "mastery of the sea," however, may no longer make sense for either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Command of the sea now involves not only the ocean's surface but the subsurface and the air as well. Such mastery, says Bull, professor of international relations at Australia's National University, is likely to be "less absolute, more limited in scope and duration, than in Mahan's day." Although a big navy still seems to provide strategic flexibility (e.g., Polaris submarines), visible strength, and a worldwide

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presence, the author suggests that henceforth "opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, [may] be severely circumscribed."

The super powers inhibit each other; Bull argues that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis "scenario" could not recur today; the history of recent crises, notably in the eastern Mediterranean, shows that the United States "acts differently" when Soviet naval forces are present. A more generous international consensus concerning the limits of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, together with impending legal curbs on traditional freedoms on the high seas (to fish, to pollute, to exploit the seabed) impose psychological and political obstacles to the free use of naval power. Bull suggests that Third World nations, in particular, are developing a maritime "territorial imperative," often backed up by inexpensive missile-carrying smallcraft; these threats may deprive the Big Navy of its traditional pervasiveness and purpose.

Technological Surprises

"The Yom Kippur War—In Retrospect"
by Lt. Col. J. Viksne, Royal Australian
Signals Corps, in *Army Journal* (May
1976), Department of Defence, Canberra,
Australia.

Colonel Viskne's detailed analysis of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War argues once again that for every innovation in warfare there is ultimately a countermeasure. In the 1967 Sinai campaign, Israeli tanks ranged far ahead of their artillery support in daring forays against disorganized Arab defenders who lacked effective, portable anti-tank weapons. In 1973, rashly using similar tactics, Israel lost between 40 and 44 percent of its tanks, half of them to Soviet-supplied anti-tank rockets in the hands of Egyptian and Syrian infantry.

A more striking turn-around occurred at sea, where Israeli vessels armed with sea-skimming Gabriel missiles (range 15 miles) overwhelmed Egyptian Komar and Osa-class boats firing Soviet Styx missiles (range 31 miles). Of the 6 Styx missiles fired by the Egyptians during the 1967 fighting, 4 sank the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* and the other 2 sank an Israeli merchantman. In the October 1973 war, Arab naval vessels fired about 50 Styx missiles without scoring any hits largely because the Israelis used metallic "chaff" to confuse enemy radar. Once within range, Gabriel missiles sank at least eight Komar and Osa boats, leaving Israel local command of the sea.

On the other hand, Israeli inability to counter Soviet radar and guidance systems with older, U.S.-built electronic devices resulted in heavy aircraft losses (105—including 6 helicopters), almost half of them to a radar-guided Soviet 23 mm cannon which proved extremely effective against Israeli aircraft diving to evade SA-6 missiles. An added footnote to the 1973 war of technologies—each side admitted to shooting down several of its own planes because of an inability to identify friendly aircraft or exercise control in contested airspace.