



Brazil

People in the United States, as James Reston once pointed out, will do almost anything for Latin America except read about it. Unless there is a coup in Chile, or Señora Perón flees Buenos Aires, it seems the *Norteamericanos* are not interested. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's two trips to Latin America this year got little attention, although he was visiting an area of growing concern to U.S. business and diplomacy. One of the countries he visited was Brazil, the biggest, most powerful nation to the South, and no longer a "client" of Washington on the world scene. Scholarly research continues to produce new insights into Brazil's history and current affairs. Here, Political Scientist Robert Packenham analyzes contemporary Brazil; and Historian Leslie Rout examines Brazil's 300-year experience with race and slavery, so different from our own.



YANKEE IMPRESSIONS AND BRAZILIAN REALITIES

by Robert A. Packenham

Since 1964, when the military took power for the first time in the twentieth century, two impressions of Brazil have been growing in the United States.

Businessmen and State Department officials, in particular, have seen in Brazil a growing industrial juggernaut, an emerging regional power, a new force in Third World politics, and the strongest pillar of stability and anti-Communism in Latin America.

On the other hand, liberal politicians, journalists, intellectuals, and many religious and humanitarian groups have tended to see a military junta, appalling repression and torture, the erosion of national sovereignty, and a growing gap between rich and poor.

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Each of these images contains elements of truth, and yet each is seriously flawed. Partly this is true because Brazil is constantly changing: today's Brazil is not the same as yesterday's, even in the vast Amazon region or on Rio's spectacular beaches; and tomorrow's Brazil will be something else again. Moreover, as in the United States, there is incredible variety and diversity.

Brazil's population is close to 110 million and growing at a rate of 3 percent per year. Its land area takes up half of South America; it is bigger than the United States minus Alaska. The city of São Paulo, population 8 million, with its skyscrapers and urban sprawl is the biggest industrial center in the southern half of the *world*. Yet in the arid Northeast (population 35 million), estimates of per capita income range from \$50 to \$150 per year, roughly equivalent to that of India.

The population is largely descended from the Indians, the Portuguese settlers, and African slaves. It is one-third "mixed," one-half "European," one-tenth black, with some Japanese immigrants to round it out. Yet with this diversity there is also considerable unity and coherence in terms of the common Portuguese language, Catholic religion, and strong national Luso-Brazilian culture and identification.

The Economic Boom

Between 1968 and 1974, economic growth in Brazil averaged 10 percent per year, one of the highest increases in the world during that period. The growth in GNP slid to 5 percent in 1975; it will probably decline further this year due partly to the oil crisis (Brazil imports 75 percent of its oil). Even so, with its new factories, its urban pollution, traffic jams, and steel mills, Brazil seems to the untutored eye almost ready to join the ranks of the "developed" nations.

How has such phenomenally rapid growth been accomplished? Some of the main elements have been tough wage policies (reducing inflation from over 100 percent per year in 1964 to 30-35 percent today); innovative monetary de-

vices such as "indexing" to compensate for inflation domestically and internationally; strong reliance on free enterprise; hospitality to foreign technology and investment (mainly U.S., West German, Canadian, Swiss) in automaking, food products, pharmaceuticals, machinery; a ban on strikes; emphasis on exports (of iron ore, soybeans, sugar, coffee, shoes); assigning technocrats, not military men, to guide the economy.

This economic "miracle" has primarily benefited the urban middle and upper-middle classes. In 1960, Brazil ranked 14th among 52 nations in terms of "income inequality."* On the basis of 1970 census data, that inequality (as measured by reported wages) has worsened. In 1970 the richest 20 percent of the population got 46 percent of the income and the bottom 20 percent got only 3 percent. Data on urban-rural and regional disparities are less reliable, but all indications are that here, too, inequalities have grown. In the rural areas, the ratio between the income of the richest 10 percent of the population and that of the poorest 10 percent is 15 to 1. In urban areas, the contrast is far greater: 50 to 1. In São Paulo or Rio, a white-collar manager or technocrat with a Ph.D. can earn roughly what his U.S. or West German counterpart earns; but a common laborer earns about 7 percent of what his U.S. counterpart makes.

The Gravest Political Liability

The regime's political repression affects many persons indirectly through intimidation, but directly (through incarceration, torture, and exile) only a very small number, mostly in the urban middle class. Economic inequalities, on the other hand, affect the vast majority of the population—the migrants to the teeming *favelas* (urban slums), the blue-collar class, the back-country peasants. One can argue, therefore, that income inequalities are Brazil's most severe *political* liability.

We know that the size of the pie has grown dramatically: Brazil's GNP was about 250 percent greater in 1975 than in 1957. We also know that the pie is being sliced more unequally; but we do not know for sure if the amount of pie available to each group is less, more, or the same. Studies by the Berkeley economist, Albert Fishlow, a critic of Brazilian policy, and by the Brazilian economist, Carlos Geraldo Langoni, who has tended to support government policies, converge in suggesting

*Less "unequal" were, surprisingly, South Africa, India, Portugal, and Paraguay. More unequal than Brazil were Guatemala, Mexico, the Philippines.

that most social classes have more than they had a decade ago.

But studies by the Intersyndical Department of Socio-economic Statistics and Studies (DIEESE), a union-financed research organization in São Paulo, indicate a 30 percent decrease in the real purchasing power of working groups in 1964–74. Their data also indicate that in 1965 the average blue-collar worker could buy his family's basic monthly food needs with the wages received for 87 hours of work, whereas in 1975 it took 151 hours of work to buy the same.

In sum, the information is contradictory and uncertain. We know the "haves"—the skilled workers, technicians, entrepreneurs—are much better off; and we know that there is some variation among regions and industries in living standards. But as is so often the case, we do not know for sure whether most of the "have nots" are now better or worse off than they were in 1960 or 1964.

Does Growth Mean Inequalities?

President Ernesto Geisel's regime and "Chicago-school" economists (such as Langoni) contend that income concentration is a natural and inevitable consequence of rapid growth at Brazil's stage of development: *crescer é concentrar* ("to grow is to concentrate income"). According to this view, to try to "share the wealth" would reduce the economy's momentum and result only in "dividing the misery." Eventually, it is argued, the new wealth will trickle down.

But many critics, including Fishlow, contend that the striking concentration of Brazil's income could be alleviated if the government defined development in more "social" terms and spent more in the countryside on schools and amenities. To these critics, "trickle down" will never do the job.

Recently, the regime's leaders have taken public cognizance of growing social disparities and have pledged to do something about them. President Garrastazú Médici said in 1970 that "the economy is doing well, but the people are not doing so well." At the beginning of his term in 1974, the current President, Ernesto Geisel, agreed, and has since begun some modest remedies: increased aid to the desperately poor Northeast farm regions, greater outlays for health care and social security, more progressive and strictly enforced taxation. How sustained and effective these measures will be remains to be seen.

Since the 1964 overthrow of João Goulart, a leftish, rather

BRAZIL: A CHRONOLOGY

- 1494 Spain and Portugal divide the world in the Treaty of Tordesillas.
- 1500 Portugal's Pedro Alvares Cabral discovers Brazil.
- 1532 First permanent Portuguese settlement in Brazil.
- 1538 First known shipment of slaves arrives from Africa.
- 1565 Founding of Rio de Janeiro.
- 1695 Gold discovered in Minas Gerais.
- 1727 Introduction of coffee in Brazil.
- 1822 Prince Pedro declares Brazil's independence.
- 1850 Slave trade abolished.
- 1871 Freeing of all children born to slaves.
- 1888 Slavery abolished.
- 1889 The emperor dethroned; the republic established.
- 1917 Brazil declares war on Germany and joins the allies.
- 1930 Revolution brings Getúlio Vargas to power.
- 1937 Establishment of Dictator Vargas's *Estado Novo*.
- 1942 Brazil declares war on the Axis.
- 1945-46 Vargas ousted; democratic constitution promulgated.
- 1960 Brasília designated as the nation's capital.
- 1961 João Goulart becomes President.
- 1964 Goulart deposed by military. Humberto Castelo Branco elected President by a purged Congress.
- 1968 Coup gives Costa e Silva dictatorial power.
- 1969 General Garrastazú Médici named President.
- 1974 General Ernesto Geisel, Médici's choice, elected President.

inept figure, Brazil has been run by a coalition of generals, with most daily decisions delegated to civilian technocrats. Like many other non-Communist regimes in the Third World, Brazil's is an "authoritarian," not "totalitarian," regime. That is, it is characterized by a "ruling mentality," not by a full-blown, highly articulate ideology; by a certain limited pluralism, rather than government penetration of all aspects of social life; and by low public participation, rather than "mass mobilization" (as in Castro's Cuba).

Not Totalitarian, Not Democratic

If Brazil's regime is less than totalitarian, it is also far from democratic. As Harvard's Samuel P. Huntington notes, the key features are:

¶ The ultimate source of power is in the top leadership (that is, the 200 general officers) of the armed forces. This, in effect, is the constituent power of Brazil.

¶ Within the government, power is centralized in the President, who is the dominant influence in the appointment of officials and the shaping of public policy.

¶ On a territorial basis, power is highly centralized in the national executive with state governments being reduced to such a subordinate role that Brazil can no longer be thought of as a federal system in any meaningful sense of the word.

¶ The power of the national executive has also been extended into and over labor unions, employer associations, universities, and other associative and corporate bodies which might become nuclei of political opposition.

¶ Civil liberties are severely restricted; the political rights of many active political figures have been suspended; *habeas corpus* is inoperative; the press is subject to censorship, which is perhaps more exasperating for its unpredictability than for its severity; arbitrary arrests occur; prisoners have been mistreated, tortured, and, at times, killed while in custody.

¶ Political participation is limited, and the organs for participation, the political parties, are weak. The President is formally elected by an electoral college but actually chosen by the top military leaders.

¶ Policy-making is dominated by the bureaucracy—civil and military—with Congress playing a marginal role.

Yet the Brazilian military is not monolithic. Although military leaders tend to unite when their interests are threatened, there are also large fissures within the armed forces. The navy is more conservative than the army or air force; young officers tend to be more radical than older ones; there are four regional military commands whose leaders differ in their commitment to liberal values, nationalism, development, security. Ideologies vary—“authoritarian” versus “liberal” politics, free trade versus protectionism, social conservatism versus “reform” versus “radicalism.”

Not All Generals Are Alike

Nor has the post-1964 “Revolutionary” period been all of a piece. True, the presidents have been generals, but their philosophies and bases of political support have varied.

The first Revolutionary President, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, was a liberal who hoped to return the country to constitutionalism; but when the opposition candidates did well in the October 1965 gubernatorial elections, the *linha dura* (hard-line) faction of the military reacted. Its leaders forced the regime to abolish the existing political party structure and to replace direct popular election of presidents with the (elite) electoral college system.

President Castelo Branco’s successor, General Arturo da Costa e Silva, pledged to “humanize the Revolution.” He did not succeed. In 1967–68, various opposition groups, mainly urban, staged demonstrations; intellectuals and students challenged the government. In December 1968, in what amounted to an internal right-wing coup, the hard-liners forced through a new Institutional Act; it closed down Congress (until 1970), suspended habeas corpus, imposed press censorship, and set the stage for indiscriminate arrests and police harassment. Thus ensued perhaps the most sombre period in Brazil’s political history. Radicalized students and clergy supported Maoist and Castroist splinter groups (without the encouragement of the clandestine Moscow-line Brazilian Communist Party) who staged bank robberies, terrorist bombings, and kidnappings of Western diplomats. The military reacted with midnight arrests and torture; in two years, “order” was restored.

President Garrastazú Médici, who took over in late 1969,

acquired a certain popularity, in part because he shrewdly identified himself with Brazil's popular championship soccer team and led mass celebrations of its victory in the World Cup soccer games in 1970. The first meaningful election since 1965 was held in November 1974, and the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) did well, actually gaining control of three important state legislatures and increasing their minority representation in the federal Congress. More important, Médici's successor, Ernesto Geisel, a military liberal, was able to rebuff pressure to annul the results. In August 1975, however, after a year of this *distensão política* (political relaxation), the hard-liners staged a comeback. They exploited revelations of Communist election activity and of corruption on the part of several legislators to declare an end to *distensão*, a slogan whose future remains in doubt.

The Futility of Torture

Another word on torture. Perhaps as many as 300 persons have been killed, several thousand tortured, several tens of thousands arrested and detained, and millions intimidated by military and civilian police actions. Although it is hard to convince the apprehensive Brazilian Right on this point, the torture no longer serves any purpose; the Brazilian Left, never as well organized as its counterpart in Chile, is today a shambles. As in Portugal under Salazar, the national Communist party is small and deep underground.

In 1969-70, the national leaders may well have encouraged and coordinated the torture. Today the situation is more complicated. At least one cabinet minister has publicly criticized torture, and others, including Commerce Minister Severo Gomes, are known to have tried to stop it. President Geisel is apparently trying to contain the evil. But this is more difficult than it may seem. The four regional army commanders are politically powerful; they supervise crackdowns on dissidents and control the special police. The police appeal to service loyalties and unity in the face of "subversives." "We were here when you needed us [1969-70]," they remind the leadership. They claim their methods are still needed to prevent a new surge of terrorism. Many hardliners agree. By accepting torture as a weapon against their enemies in the past, the regime's leaders unleashed a force now difficult to stop.

The penetration of Brazil by external influences, particularly through foreign investment and loans from the United

States, has also been much criticized. In some important ways, Brazil has indeed become more constrained by the external economic environment. Total foreign investment has trebled since 1964. The foreign debt has increased fivefold. The post-1968 emphasis on exports has contributed to the economic boom but also to dependence on external markets.

However, in other ways, Brazil is much stronger vis-à-vis the outside world than it was in 1964. In 1964, the United States supplied nearly half of the total foreign capital in Brazil; today, the relative share is down to around 30 percent, while the investments coming from countries like France, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada have increased significantly. This diversification of sources of foreign capital means greater bargaining power for Brazil.

Although the private economic sector remains relatively weak, and the foreign-owned multinationals have become stronger, the Brazilian public sector has also become much stronger. Indeed, there are growing complaints from Brazilian businessmen that this "state capitalism" is both inefficient and discouraging to local private investment. The government dominates precisely those elements of the national economy that are most vital for national security and for broader economic development—steel, oil, communications, transport.

A New Strength Abroad

The economic boom, fueled in part by foreign investment, has given Brazil far greater influence on the international scene. The confidence of its leaders and diplomats has never been higher. "No country can escape its destiny," observed the late J. A. de Araújo Castro, a distinguished Brazilian ambassador and former envoy to Washington. "Fortunately or unfortunately, Brazil is condemned to greatness. . . . Small mediocre solutions are neither appropriate nor interesting to Brazil. We have to think big. . . ." Brazil's foreign policy goal, he added, was to "neutralize all external factors which might limit its national power."

One of those external factors has been the United States. Increasingly, there are differences between the United States and Brazil on international matters. Among them:

Brazil supports a national territorial boundary ranging up to 200 miles offshore; the United States has long opposed such extensive jurisdiction.

In the early 1970s, Brazil led the Third World fight against

stronger U.N. population-control policy statements, sought by the United States and the West.

More importantly, Brazil recognized the Soviet-supported faction in the 1975 Angolan civil war, voted in the United Nations with the Arabs to equate Zionism with "racism," and concluded an agreement with West Germany to import atomic power reactors—all moves which the United States sought to prevent.

When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Brazil last February, he was careful not to exert pressure or offend Brazilian leadership. He hailed Brazil's "concern for human rights" and agreed to a system of regular high-level meetings between Brazil and the United States—the only Latin American country so singled out. What the Brazilians gave Kissinger in return for these accolades remains unknown, but their increasingly independent foreign policy continues. The United States finds it now must woo Brazil, not take her support for granted, as in the past.

As it has helped Brazil abroad, so the economic boom, now fading, has helped keep the more radical opposition to the regime from gaining widespread middle-class support. Moreover, despite all the inequalities, thanks to traditional ties of mutual obligation between factory boss and worker, farmer and farmhand, Western-style "revolutionary" class consciousness has yet to develop.

Nor has racial solidarity developed among blacks. What does it mean to be black in Brazil, where slavery was banned less than 100 years ago? In Brazil, with its large mixed population, there are infinite gradations of "color." Brazilians prefer to define race in economic or social terms: "Money whitens the skin," as do education and job status. These gradations soften conflict and curb racial polarization.

But the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid is far blacker than the top; and there is pervasive social prejudice against "people of color" ("*gente de côr*"). With a different history of race relations and patterns of slavery, and lacking the egalitarian traditions of the United States, Brazil is unlikely to undergo a civil-rights struggle like that of blacks in this country. However, increasing industrialization and education are likely to stir new awareness and new demands among have-not blacks and whites alike.



RACE AND SLAVERY IN BRAZIL

by Leslie B. Rout, Jr.

Exactly when the first black slaves were disembarked in Brazil is unknown, but the earliest recorded shipment from Africa to Brazil was made in 1538 by Lopes Bixorda, a slave dealer in the *capitania* [province] of Bahia, eight years after the Portuguese discovery of Brazil. Finally, in response to a petition of Bahian landlords, King João IV of Portugal decreed in 1549 that each planter could import up to 120 slaves. The mass importation of blacks began from that date, and the flow would continue for 300 years.

Slavery in Brazil stemmed from the early perception by the Portuguese of Africans as useful and comparatively inexpensive labor. The Portuguese became acquainted with the black man during the period of Moorish rule (711–1249 A.D.) in Spain and Portugal. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Portuguese had already become the major suppliers of blacks for colonial Spanish America. Once it appeared that the indigenous Indians could not be effectively utilized in the canefields and sugar mills of Bahia and Pernambuco, it was only natural that a proven workman, the sub-Saharan African, would be thrown into the breach. Gradually, black slaves were utilized in an increasing number of diverse occupations, and their numbers grew correspondingly. By 1819, 66 percent of the total population of the *capitania* of Maranhão consisted of enslaved blacks and mulattoes; in Goiás, the figure was 42.5 percent, in Alagoas, 38.3 percent, São Paulo, 32.6 percent, Bahia, 30.8 percent, and Rio Grande do Sul, 30.6 percent. In sum, by the end of the colonial period, African slavery in Brazil had become a *nationwide* phenomenon absolutely essential to the economy.

In contrast, black slavery was introduced in Anglo-Saxon

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North America in 1619, and the previous experience of the Jamestown colonists with African peoples had probably been nonexistent. While it is true that black slaves could have been found in virtually all the 13 colonies prior to 1776, nowhere did the number of bondsmen exceed 30 percent of the aggregate population except in South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and possibly Maryland. Free whites could be found to perform most forms of manual work; forced labor was a critical necessity only on tobacco, rice, and indigo plantations.

Given these contrasts in epoch and socio-economic development, it was only natural that slavery in colonial Brazil and the United States displayed many fundamental differences. Reputable scholars have long sought to compare the two systems of slavery and, even as they noted the differences, have generalized that slavery in Brazil was more humane than its counterpart in the southern United States. Alas, nothing could be further from the truth.

Standards and Prices

If the hapless black came across the Atlantic to Brazil from Portuguese depots in Angola, Moçambique, or Cape Verde, he had usually been baptized and branded to show that the proper excise taxes had been paid. Captives dispatched from Gulf of Guinea stations often had these functions performed only after they had completed the Atlantic passage. In any event, the newly disembarked black man was classified as a *peça da Índia* (piece of India), or some fraction of that ambiguous standard.

The ideal *peça* was a male in good health, somewhere between the ages of 15 and 35, standing five feet, six or seven inches tall. Actual conformity to this standard was rare, and so slave shippers had to fashion more adaptable criteria in offering captives to prospective customers. Two males between the

ages of 35 and 45 came to equal one *peça*, while three youths, 8 to perhaps 15 years old, were the equivalent of two *peças*. Any number of elderly, sick, or deformed slaves might also equal one *peça*. Since the female slaves could not perform the heavy mine and field labor desired, they generally sold for less than males.

Nevertheless, the African slave was not only a human tool or beast of burden; he represented at once both labor and capital. The Brazilian colonial economy was geared to the production of raw materials for Portugal. Colonial initiative in creating iron-making, textile, and gold-manufacturing industries was vetoed by the crown, and since there were virtually no banks, the slave often became the unit of value. Hence, Pascoal de Silva Guimares in eighteenth century Minas Gerais might have had many gold coins, but he was *rich* because he possessed a retinue of 3,000 slaves. The possession of blacks became a hedge against inflation, for the slaves could always be exchanged for some material object.

The newly landed slave was called a *boçal*, a term implying that he spoke no Portuguese. A captive who either understood Portuguese or displayed a familiarity with Lusitanian customs might be labeled a *ladino*, and as such was more valuable. Slaves were also categorized according to their supposed place of origin. Those blacks allegedly emanating from Angola, the mouth of the Congo River, or Moçambique were referred to as *bantus*; these were the slaves most commonly found in Brazil. More highly regarded were those shipped from the Cape Verde-Portuguese Guinea region, while the top quality were healthy captives from Gulf of Guinea ports, commonly referred to as *Minas*.

Throughout the seventeenth century, the price of slaves rose steadily. With the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais about 1695, slave prices spiraled sharply higher; responding to colonial complaint, the Portuguese government placed a ceiling of 160,000 *reis* (or \$ US 200-250) per *peça* on newly landed slaves. This effort at price control was a futile gesture: by 1718, *peças* identified as *Minas* were selling in Rio de Janeiro for up to 360,000 *reis*.

The decline of the gold-mining industry after 1770, plus the preference in European markets for sugar from the Caribbean, were crippling blows to the Brazilian economy. The price of slaves in Pernambuco fell as low as 100,000 *reis* in 1787, but a boom in cotton production and a temporary recovery for Brazilian sugar resulted in partial stabilization around 1800. By 1810

the general price for good quality *peças* was again climbing upward to 300,000 *reis*.

The Variety of Slave Occupations

Pedro de Magalhães de Gandavo, who visited Brazil during the sixteenth century, proffered the following advice to future Portuguese immigrants:

As soon as persons who intend to live in Brazil become inhabitants of the country, however poor they may be, if each one obtains two pairs of one-half dozen slaves . . . he then has the means for sustenance.

Given the three to five million blacks subsequently imported into the colony, it would appear that the Luso-Brazilians took this counsel to heart. No other area of the New World received more slaves. But Magalhães de Gandavo never could have envisioned the multiplicity of occupations in which Africans would be used. Not only were they field hands, domestics, peddlers, miners, bodyguards, skilled laborers, and objects of sexual gratification, but also soldiers, overseers, and thieves. In Minas Gerais, blind whites had their slaves beg for them; both there and in Bahia, females were rented to brothels. In some cases whites lived off the proceeds gathered from renting their blacks to entrepreneurs, and occasionally slaves owned other slaves, thereby obtaining money while laboring for someone else.

The very diversity of labor performed by slaves had a tremendous impact on the kind of tasks free persons in Brazil regarded as fitting. Like the Spaniard, the Portuguese immigrant to the New World felt that he was a *fidalgo*, or "son of somebody." This sentiment made manual labor abhorrent, and as the English writer Robert Southey laconically reported of late eighteenth century Brazil, "never is it seen [that] a white man . . . [will] taken an agrarian instrument in his hands." This disdain for physical exertion extended to modes of personal travel. Only slaves and free colored walked; persons of any social stature either rode horses or were carried about in sedan chairs or hammocks. In the city of Salvador, horse-drawn carts and carriages did not supplant the sedan chair as the favored means of locomotion until 1850.

At no time prior to 1822 did the Brazilian clergy as a group

question the legitimacy of the African slave trade. That the Roman Catholic church in Portuguese America would have done so was unlikely, since the crowned heads of Portugal exercised the powers of *padroado* (patronage) over it, and the slave trade was a state-sanctioned industry. Probably most clergymen agreed that slave labor was absolutely vital, and if the Indian were to be saved, then the African had to suffer.

In 1758, Father Manoel Ribeira da Rocha published a tract condemning the Atlantic slave trade as being "against all divine and human law." But Bishop José Joaquim da Cunha de Azevedo of Bahia published in 1809 a sophisticated justification of both slavery and the Atlantic slave trade, and another priest, Junario de Cunha Mattos, became a tiger in defense of these institutions during the early years of Brazil's political independence. Throughout the colonial era individual clerics and religious orders owned slaves, while agricultural lands owned by the Church produced wealth—thanks to the sweat of their human properties.

A Mélange of Beliefs

What the Church did conceive to be its primary mission was the conversion of the African to Catholic Christianity. Yet, provided in many cases with only a smattering of Christian doctrine, millions of blacks simply intermixed Catholic and African religious beliefs. The African deities (*orishas*) became identified with various Christian saints, and modified in their nature under the influence of fresh waves of slave importations from different sections of sub-Saharan Africa. The emerging mélange of beliefs and practices became known as *macumba* in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, where *bantu* bondsmen seem to have been more numerous. In Bahia and other areas where Yoruba influence predominated, the amalgam of rites was called *candomblé*.

The Luso-Brazilian reaction to *candomblé* and *macumba* varied considerably. Some slave masters permitted the dances and chants which were inevitably a part of the ceremonies, believing that such activities helped make the slave more content with his lot. Others would not allow their slaves to participate, so such services had to be conducted in secret. Particularly in towns, ecclesiastical authorities tried to ensure that the "new Christians" did not relapse into the paganism of their ancestors. Some city councils banned public celebrations (i.e., religious singing, dancing) by all colored persons. It is very

easy to visualize the slave at Mass, the crucifix in one hand and a *fetiché* in his pocket. He was probably not certain which artifact would provide him with the greatest aid and comfort; and given his subordinate social position, there was no reason to take any chances.

Slavery in the Northeast

The history of colonial Brazil's slave-supported economy is a record of shifts from one export product to another. The most important was cane sugar, which was shipped to Europe from 1546 on. Grown first in what is now São Paulo state, sugarcane came to be cultivated primarily on the northeastern seaboard. The *capitanias* of Pernambuco and Bahia became the chief centers, but Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte were also significant producers. Between 1600 and 1700 some 2,925,000 tons of sugar were exported, but during the last quarter of the seventeenth century West Indian sugar began to replace the Brazilian product in European markets. By 1700, prices had fallen as much as 90 percent, and planters in Bahia and Pernambuco began moving their slaves to the gold fields of western Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Mato Grosso. Prices for Brazilian sugar remained low through the eighteenth century until the disruptive slave rebellion in sugar-rich Saint-Domingue (now the Dominican Republic) suddenly sparked a new demand for the Brazilian product in Europe.

Slaves and Sugar

The problems of profit, production, and work regimen suggest that life on a colonial sugar plantation was less than the idyll that some writers have pictured it to be. In Pernambuco, sugar lords estimated that a labor force of at least 100 slaves was necessary for the effective operation of the plantation; and if a reasonable profit was to accrue, this labor force must annually produce about 1,138 pounds of refined sugar. With refined sugar selling for the equivalent (then) of £1 per pound, the larger planters enjoyed high profits and splendid living. A seventeenth century traveler to Brazil was astounded to find one such *senhor de engenho* living on his plantation with all the trappings of oriental pomp. He even ate his meals "to the music of an orchestra of 30 comely negro wenches, presided over by a European bandmaster."

In the sugarcane country, certain labor conditions were

standard. During the harvest season, work began before dawn and, except for two meals, continued long after dark. After the cane was harvested and processed, there were boxes and crates to be made, rum or cane brandy to be distilled, and new fields to be planted. Controversy exists as to the adequacy of the slave's diet, but most scholars agree that manioc bread, corn gruel, perhaps a scrap of salted beef, or a few vegetables was the most field hands could expect to get.

The prevailing philosophy of slave utilization in the northeast sugar country did not encourage benevolence. Fresh shiploads of slaves could easily be obtained from Angolan or Gulf of Guinea stations and shipped to Brazil. Hence, the common practice was to work a slave to the limit of his capabilities, and after he had died, fled, or injured himself severely, buy a fresh replacement. During the eighteenth century an increasing number of *senhores de engenho* took up permanent residence in towns. As a result, the direction of the labor force was in the hands of an overseer, often a mulatto, whose interest in the slaves' welfare was likely to be slight.

More fortunate were the bondsmen living in towns like Salvador, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, or Pôrto Seguro. Here one would find slave porters and stevedores, assorted domestics, prostitutes, and some skilled craftsmen. There were also numerous males and females employed as day-laborers, whose major obligation was to supply their owners with an agreed-upon sum of money. Possessed of some freedom of movement and a choice of jobs unavailable in rural areas, the urban slave was undoubtedly better off than his plantation counterpart. Furthermore, those involved in the money economy (shoemakers, barbers, etc.) had much better prospects for purchasing their liberty than cane cutters or mill hands.

One may conclude that although the field hands (the largest body of captives) were indeed the "hands and feet of the *Senhores de Engenho*," individually they meant as much to the latter as a pair of boots, a horse, or a yoke of oxen.

Slavery in Minas Gerais

Major gold strikes were made in the contemporary states of Minas Gerais (1695), Goias (1715, 1730, 1734), Mato Grosso (1718-19), and western Bahia (1719-20). Production was done almost entirely by manual labor, and after 1770 it declined rapidly; between 1691 and 1820, roughly 926,100 kilograms (1,019 U.S. tons) of gold were reportedly obtained.

When news of the first gold strike in 1695 reached Portugal, thousands of peasants and ne'er-do-wells departed the homeland and joined Brazilian vagrants, plantation owners, and frontiersmen in the mining camps of Minas Gerais. But "the work of the mines was the work of Negroes," and to them went the actual task of digging. Slaves possessed of stamina were especially sought after, and in this regard, captives from the Gulf of Guinea were much preferred to either *bantus* or Indians. Between 1728 and 1748, at least 99,000 blacks were shipped to Salvador from the Guinea Coast and then overland, or by sea (via Rio de Janeiro) to the gold fields. During the eighteenth century over half a million slaves were shipped into the mineral-producing zones of the Brazilian interior.

Digging for gold was a curse for the slave. Those involved in placer mining worked constantly in water, often entirely nude, exposed to the sun, rain, and cold. Those in underground galleries had to contend with changes in temperature, the release of gases, frequent accidents, and various forms of respiratory ailments. The toll in the lives of bondsmen is said to have reached 7,000 annually, a figure which does not seem extreme in the light of observations made by several authors:

In the space of a year, 100 slaves died [in a gold mine in Goias], something which never happened to the [slaves of] plantation landlords. . . . The high death rate of African males in the gold mines was reflected in the new introduction of slaves which was continually being made. . . . The mines, insatiable . . . absorbed all the human mass brought in by the traffic.

Paradoxically, in the absence of a large number of white women, female captives of color here enjoyed unaccustomed opportunities for social and financial advancement. In Brazil the keeping of Negroid mistresses was a common practice; in the gold fields, Luso-Brazilians believed that sleeping with a *Mina* woman brought good luck. Indeed, some priests preached that a Luso-Brazilian committed no sin if he kept slave concubines, and one priest who argued otherwise was run out of town. A royal *alvará* (decree) of 1704 forbade female slaves to wear silk, gold jewelry, or facial makeup, but in Minas Gerais, this decree became still another that was generally honored with noncompliance. The gold rush in eighteenth century Minas Gerais resulted in the death of thousands of male slaves, but

for a while the *mulata* was queen, and a few *mulatas* were able to parlay their physical attractions into freedom and wealth.

The second greatest source of mineral wealth obtained during the eighteenth century was precious stones. Lisbon first sold the diamond monopoly in 1740, and to prevent the smuggling of precious stones out of the diamond district around Tijuco allowed the purchaser to bring in only 600 registered slaves. In the diamond diggings there was supposed to be one overseer for every eight slaves, but no really effective means was discovered to eliminate theft. One diabolical security measure was to force a slave suspected of having swallowed diamonds to engulf large doses of Malaga black pepper, a substance having an awesome purgative effect.

Slavery in Northern and Southern Brazil

In the *capitania* of Grão Pará-Maranhão, Indians constituted the bulk of the servile labor force; thus there were continuing clashes between the Jesuits, who sought to protect the indigenous Indians, and the Luso-Brazilian settlers, who wanted them as laborers. Both the Jesuits and the settlers would have preferred to have had African bondsmen, but sugarcane did not prosper in the region, and neither gold nor precious stones were to be found in the rivers and streams. Under these conditions, Grão Pará-Maranhão whites had little money to buy Africans, and many of those they did obtain were infirm or rebellious souls who could not be sold elsewhere.

The situation did not begin to change significantly until the Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão began making regular slave deliveries in 1755. There had been perhaps 12,000 to 13,000 African slaves landed at Belém (Grão Pará) between 1692 and 1750; by 1782 an additional 30,000 had been disembarked. A few of these saw service as stockmen, cowboys, and domestics, but after 1750 most of them became field hands in the growing coffee and cacao plantations. Here, as elsewhere, slaveholders exhibited an ambivalent attitude toward the health of their properties. In 1792, for example, the idea of vaccinating slaves was rejected because officials in Belém insisted that Negroid skin was too thick to penetrate!

Further south in Maranhão, the Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão was also responsible for economic development, but in this case the produce was not coffee but cotton. By 1818, exports from São Luís reached \$4 million annually, and between 1757 and 1823 at least 42,000 Africans arrived in order to

cultivate the product that made Dixie famous. This sudden prosperity was not without a price; during the eighteenth century Maranhão became known as the place where slaves were most harshly treated. Available information suggests that Sundays were generally days of work. Domestic and favored concubines may have been able to extract extra privileges, "but the greater part [were] treated as slaves, that is, with little to eat and much work." By 1819, 66 percent of Maranhão's population consisted of Negroid slaves, a situation which doubtless heightened white fears and hence contributed to the territory's reputation among blacks as a species of hell on earth.

In the extreme south was the *capitania* of Rio Grande do Sul, a region long considered too cold for Africans. After 1700, a popular practice among slave owners in Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro was to banish rebellious slaves to Rio Grande, which became known as a land of "vile masters and vile slaves." As in Maranhão, economic growth did not commence until late in the eighteenth century. Cattle raising had steadily gained in importance, with Indian or mixed-blood cowboys tending the expanding herds. According to the 1775 census, there were 20,000 inhabitants (not counting hostile Indians), a fourth of whom were black and mulatto slaves working chiefly as domestics and stockmen. After 1780, however, the meat-packing industry in the towns of Pôrto Alegre and Pelotas began growing rapidly, and in two decades Rio Grande became the chief source of salted beef for Brazilian tables. This growth necessitated a rapid augmentation of the number of slaves. By 1814 the *capitania's* inhabitants numbered perhaps 70,655 souls of whom 30.1 percent were slaves, and 90 percent of these were committed to permanent service in the *charqueadas*, or meat-packing plants.

Slavery in Rio Grande do Sul was unique in that the mass of the unfree labor force was urban and industrial. The *charqueada* bondsmen worked a minimum of 12 hours a day, beginning about midnight and ending at noon. The critical factor in the system's harshness was that *charqueada* slaves worked all year round, there being no rainy or slack season that would significantly vary the rhythm of work. Perhaps the worst torture of all was that with slave costs high, the emancipation of *charqueada* workers was relatively uncommon.

According to Caio Prado Júnior, the small number of African slaves originally in Maranhão and Rio Grande do Sul, plus the sudden and rapid influx of a predominantly male slave population, prevented the creation of a mulatto contingent such

as existed in northeastern Brazil. In both places, the Brazilian scholar argues, "the blacks were blacker, the whites whiter," and hence a harsher form of slavery developed. A more plausible explanation is that the affluent white elements in Maranhão and Rio Grande do Sul were conscious of the opulence which had characterized the earlier booms in gold, diamonds, and sugar elsewhere. Increasing demand for meat and cotton signaled the arrival of their opportunity to cash in. To insure their owners' prosperity, the captive laborers had to toil harder and faster. It is little wonder, then, that African slaves wanted no part of Maranhão or Rio Grande do Sul.

Slave Resistance and Rebellion

Naturally, a great number of blacks rebelled against their masters, and intimidating punishments were deemed necessary. A few defiant souls were actually thrown alive into burning furnaces, and the *novena* (nine days of whippings), the thumb screw, the iron collar, the stocks, and metal weights were commonly employed. What some owners discovered, however, was that mental cruelty could produce a kind of servility that physical brutality alone might not. One Bahian planter who could not prevent his slaves from committing suicide finally solved the problem by digging up the bodies of several of those who had killed themselves, and hacking off their limbs. Thereupon he informed the assembled captives that if they chose to end their lives he would also mutilate them, and thus when they were reborn, they would come back minus an arm, hand, or leg.

Slaves, resisting, usually resorted to suicide or, more often, flight. Apprehending fugitives was a serious problem in colonial Brazil. The chief security agent, the *capitão-do-mato* (bush captain), sold his services to a group of slaveholders and received a bounty for each slave recaptured. The *capitão-do-mato* was generally a free black or mulatto—who but a colored person would make the best catcher of another black or mulatto? Furthermore, slave-catching put freed Negroids to work and enlisted them in the system. The *capitães* were known for their relentlessness and cruelty.

A few escaped slaves took up residence in urban areas, where they tried to pass as free persons. Most, however, sought to reach remote settlements of fugitive slaves, or *quilombos*. Easily the most famous and largest of these was Palmares, situated in the present state of Alagoas and established per-

haps as early as 1612. Beginning in 1630, Palmares withstood at least 20 major attacks or sieges by the Dutch, the Portuguese, and Brazilian settlers before succumbing in 1695. At its height, Palmares encompassed some 10 subdivisions, and 20,000–30,000 persons lived within its confines. It would remain the largest independent settlement of blacks in the New World until Haitian sovereignty was recognized in 1804.

Other than Palmares, the largest *quilombos* were established in the mountains and wooded areas near several of the larger towns in Minas Gerais. An estimated 20,000 ex-captives were said to have inhabited these settlements, and they were considered “a plague scattered about the remote areas and without remedy.” Fugitives sallying from these hideouts kidnapped and killed whites and made the roads unsafe. When Lisbon finally agreed to finance a major campaign, Bartolomeu Bueno do Pardo attacked and destroyed a “quasi-kingdom of fugitive negroes” (1757), reportedly returning with 3,900 pairs of ears as proof. Subsequent attacks temporarily removed the *quilombo* menace to white rule in Minas Gerais.

For some slaves, however, the solution was planned rebellion. In both 1719 and 1724 slaves in Vila Rica de Ouro Preto, capital of Minas Gerais, plotted a giant insurrection, but these schemes collapsed because Angolan and Guinea Coast blacks could not agree as to which group would have supreme power after white rule was overthrown. Another conspiracy, formed by slaves in the town of São João del Rei (Minas Gerais) and fugitives from a nearby *quilombo*, called for a surprise attack during church services on Maundy Thursday (April 15), 1756. The execution of both whites and mulattoes was intended, but the conspiracy was discovered and crushed. Several rebellions were also attempted in Maranhão, but the best known was an Afro-Indian revolt which took place in the town of São Thomé in 1773. The rebels were annihilated.

The sugar-growing northeast also was the scene of serious challenges to white authority. In 1807, 1809, 1813, and 1816, Muslim-led slaves made determined efforts to seize local political control. The 1807 plot was scotched by informers, but both the 1809 and the 1813 uprisings resulted in the deaths of white planters and overseers, as pitched battles swirled around the city of Salvador. The 1816 affair began on seven plantations in the sugar-rich Recôncavo district, and reached “frightening proportions” before it was quelled, with hundreds of suspects and prisoners later executed, flogged, or deported to penal colonies in Africa.

The evidence of slave resistance to Luso-Brazilian hegemony should not be construed as proof that all African captives hated their masters or planned to kill them. Some slaves were simply overawed and submitted meekly, while others chose to drown their discontent in alcohol or the mysticism and frenzy of *macumba* or *candomblé*. The lesson is that during the colonial period, a significant number of bondsmen (usually African-born) refused to reconcile themselves to white rule. Their continuing flights, conspiracies, and attacks did not effect a breakdown of the slave system, but it meant that the authorities could not afford to relax.

Emancipation for Individuals

The only significant organizations of colored people that worked to effect the release of slaves were the black and mulatto lay brotherhoods, or *irmandades*, the first of which was founded about 1639. These were religious organizations created to strengthen the spirit of Christianity among persons of African origin, and were divided along racial and even tribal lines. Many *irmandades* assessed their membership an annual sum specifically for the emancipation of members or for the liberation of other deserving bondsmen.

While the work of the *irmandades* stood as the best example of cooperation among Negroid peoples in colonial Brazil, most manumissions were accomplished by self-purchase or through owner benefaction. In the first case, the master and the bondsman agreed upon a price for the latter's freedom, and when this sum was paid the bondsman was awarded a *carta de alforria* (letter of liberation). Most manumissions were gratuitous awards. Trusted retainers, slave concubines, and illegitimate mulatto offspring could often expect liberation in a will, or on a church holiday or a birthday, and a few even received small bequests of land or money.

But Brazilian manumittive customs also had their dark side. Many *cartas de alforria* were given to the sick, the aged, and the crippled, and for these persons release from bondage was a death sentence. If a freedman demonstrated disrespect for his ex-owner, he could be reënslaved. Another common practice was conditional release. For example, a slave would be freed in his master's will, but with the provision that he continue serving the master's heirs for life, or for a specified number of years. Under these strictures, the bondsman was only semi-free; his descendants gained the final step to emancipation.

Many of those released had neither skills nor resources, and were bound to be ravaged by the new realities they had to face. For example, except for barbers and midwives, many slaves with skills found that they could not meet the standards of proficiency required for admittance to craft guilds. Socially, the emancipated found themselves in a state of limbo, for many whites did not recognize the colored person's change in status.

The Status of Free Negroes

When the situation of freed persons of color in colonial Brazil is discussed, the question of *which* persons were freed takes on special relevance. Most *capitanias* did not, unfortunately, separate blacks and mulattoes in their censuses, so our information is limited, but the tremendous disproportion between the numbers of free blacks and free mulattoes requires some explanation. As I noted, white fathers often emancipated their bastard mulatto offspring. Furthermore, any mixed-blood was more likely to be Brazilian-born and acquainted with Luso-Brazilian linguistic and cultural predilections. Thus when opportunities for freedom presented themselves, the mulatto was most likely to be able to exploit them. One scholar has pointed out that among Luso-Brazilians, allowing light-complexioned slaves to perform the same heavy labor as blacks was considered disgraceful, while another has stressed the notion that "a light mulatto . . . even as a slave was more likely to receive acceptance from the white community than a free black man."

Overall, the mass of emancipated mixed-bloods and blacks possessed neither money nor powerful patrons. So society allotted to them the proletarian tasks which no one else desired. By working hard at these occupations and obeying the laws, the optimum most people of color (except for certain paramours) could expect to achieve in their lifetime was the ownership of a few slaves or a small shop. But these goals could not be gained without a good deal of physical exertion, and in colonial Brazil manual labor was performed only by blacks and slaves. Rather than "disgrace" themselves in this regard, an unusual number of freed mulattoes preferred to be vagrants. For many free persons of various skin hues, banditry, diamond smuggling, or other criminal activities were preferable; they offered the prospect of both greater financial gain and avoidance of taxes and militia service.

Legal bars and court decisions were notoriously color-oriented. In Brazil, the ticket to clerical, civil, or administrative

appointments was proof of "cleanliness of blood" (*limpeza de sangue*), and since all persons of African origin were slaves or descendants of slaves, they were inherently "unclean."

The regionally promulgated ordinances most clearly revealed the obsession of the ruling whites with preventing Negroid social ascension. In 1719, the Count of Assumar, chief official in São Paulo and Minas Gerais, prohibited all blacks and mulattoes from owning either slaves or stores. In 1734, the governor of Rio Grande do Norte implored João V to ban mulattoes from holding any office or entering militia service. Nevertheless, it was Dom Luís de Almeida Lavradio, Viceroy of Brazil (1769–77), who approached the ultimate in upholding the principle of white supremacy. He refused to allow mulatto militia officers to approach him to pay their respects, and on the word of some Indians he relieved of command a *capitão-mor* (captain) who was suspected of being a mulatto. Possibly his most extreme act was his deposition of an Indian chief in 1771 for marrying a black woman. In ordering the red man's removal, Almeida Lavradio declared that the marriage was proof of the chief's mental derangement.

Black vs. White vs. Brown

Probably the most famous nonwhites to reach positions of status in colonial Brazil were Antônio Vieira, a Jesuit priest and court advisor; João Fernandes Vieira, a governor in both Paraíba and Angola; and Henrique Dias, a black soldier who was knighted in 1652. Unquestionably of critical importance was the fact that Fernandes Vieira and Dias were the most heroic figures to emerge from the 1645–54 "War of Divine Liberation" against the Dutch in Pernambuco. Both Vieiras were European-born; in any case, no other known mulatto became governor in Brazil, and Dias was the only Brazilian black ever to be knighted. The other acknowledged nonwhites to receive civil appointments were a small group of blacks and mulattoes, chiefly in Minas Gerais, who were granted minor posts primarily because no white man would perform the chores which the jobs entailed. But too many royal dispensations would ultimately have undermined the principle of white supremacy, and such a development was unthinkable.

Acceptable pigmentation plus wealth and influence were necessary for persons who hoped to obtain the *limpeza-de-sangue* document. But how dark one could be and still "pass" varied from region to region.

An incident reported by the Englishman Henry Koster and the French artist Jean Rugendas is the following:

In conversing on one occasion with a man of color who was in my service, I asked if a certain capitão-mor was not a mulatto man; he answered, "He was, but he is not now." I begged him to explain, when he added: "Can a capitão-mor be a mulatto man?"

This exchange has been cited as proof that unusual opportunities for social ascent existed for mulattoes in colonial Brazil. In fact, these mixed-bloods were consistently held up for ridicule and derision by the Europeans. All the mulatto could do in retaliation was to vent his rage and frustration on those darker than himself. Perhaps Koster and Rugendas should have asked themselves instead: Did Luso-Brazilians consider the *capitão-mor* in question to be white?

There were, however, a few mulattoes who realized that spurning the black man and accepting white domination was not likely to allow many of them to penetrate the upper echelons of Brazilian society. In 1798, a group of mulatto tailors, engravers, and militiamen in Salvador plotted to overthrow Portuguese rule and ostensibly to create a republic in which there would be equality of opportunity for all races. Nevertheless, as Lucas Dantas, one of the ringleaders, constantly emphasized, the primary goal was the abolition of distinctions between whites and mulattoes, rather than broad legal and social equity. Thus, as any cynic could have predicted, the only black invited to participate not only refused, but betrayed the uprising.

Brazil Today

Colonial Brazil became the independent Brazilian Empire in 1822. Slavery ended in 1888. In 1889, the nation became a republic. Yet, in 1976, Brazil remains a place where the mulatto still strives to separate himself socially from the black, while the white man holds them both to be inferior.

Then as now, a mulatto with straight hair, money, and a fair complexion will marry a white woman, even one with less education and lower social status. For the attractive mixed-blood female, a white lover is generally better than a black husband. As Donald Pierson noted in *Negroes in Brazil*, the fruit of such a liaison might be illegitimate, but it would have

a lighter skin. Thus, the mother could claim that she was "cleansing (i.e., whitening) her race." Brazilian thinkers like Nina Raimundo Rodrigues and Manuel de Oliveira Lima and several North American authors have hailed this practice, bestowing upon it the vague but appealing name: *branqueamento* (the whitening process).

In Brazil, it has been the haphazard acceptance of the mulatto that has been the most conspicuous aspect of racial relations since the days of slavery. But the growth of industrialization and the increasing urbanization have had fundamental impact. Afro-Brazilians represent roughly 40 percent of the total population. Some of them are beginning to free themselves from the psychological slavery implicit in the silent acceptance of white supremacy. One observes a more aggressive spirit among blacks and browns in the industrial cities of the south and southeast. Afro-Brazilian university students may not say "Black is Beautiful," but they no longer look in the mirror and curse their kinky hair. Slowly, the Brazilian racial outlook is changing. But how the Afro-Brazilians, 330 years after their ancestors were first transported to the New World, will proceed to work out their future, no one can say.



BACKGROUND BOOKS

BRAZIL

Brazil. Many North Americans think of the Amazon, *Carnaval* in Rio, Brasilia's highrise architecture, the *samba*, dictators, coffee. Although the number of books in English on Brazilian subjects has grown rapidly, filling 62 pages of the *Hispanic American Historical Review* in a recent two-part series by Thomas E. Skidmore on the historiography of Brazil, U.S. readers still do not have much general knowledge of the world's fifth largest nation.

A good reading list starts with broad histories and cultural surveys, followed by books on politics, race, regions, the military, and selections from Brazil's own vivid literature.

But, first, back to coffee. Its importance in Brazilian history, shaping both rural society and economic growth, cannot be overstated. No work in English matches Affonso de Escragno Taunay's 15-volume **HISTORIA DO CAFE NO BRASIL**. Taunay's work is described in **LATIN AMERICA: A Guide to the Historical Literature** edited by Charles C. Griffin (Univ. of Tex., 1971) as "vast, indispensable, poorly organized, and unindexed"; understandably, the 15 tomes have yet to be translated from Portuguese.

There is, however, among books available in English, E. Bradford Burns's **A HISTORY OF BRAZIL** (Columbia, 1971, cloth & paper) to take the reader in one volume through the full sweep of events from Portuguese discovery in 1500 to the 1960s. This narrative of exploration, war, slavery, the coffee trade, industrial development, and often brutal politics can be paired with Charles Wagley's **AN INTRODUCTION TO BRAZIL** (Columbia, 1963, 1970, cloth & paper).

Wagley, a noted cultural anthropologist and a pioneer among American scholars of Brazil, analyzes rural and urban society in terms of race, class, region, religion, the arts. In the latest edition's final chapter, "If I Were a Brazilian," Wagley views uncontrolled urban growth and runaway inflation and concludes: "I would be confused. Before my eyes would be the great Brazilian dilemma posed by a Brazilian proverb—'Brazil is rich but Brazilians are poor.'"

Riches there have always been, as the classic **COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL** by Caio Prado, Júnior (Univ. of Calif., 1967, cloth & paper) makes plain. **THE GOLDEN AGE OF BRAZIL, 1695-1750** is Charles Boxer's vivid account of the gold and diamond boom—55 years of hunting and digging treasure (Univ. of Calif., 1962).

Political upheaval has also been chronic in Brazil. Probably the best narrative in English covering the period from the first unsuccessful attempt to establish a republic in 1788-92 to the military overthrow of President João Goulart is **A HISTORY OF MODERN BRAZIL, 1889-1964** by José Maria Bello, published in Portuguese in 1940 and later translated and revised for publication by Stanford (1966). The English edition has good maps and a helpful chronology. More recent books covering briefer periods are Thomas E. Skidmore's **POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy** (Oxford, 1969, cloth, 1967, paper); Alfred C. Stepan's **THE MILITARY IN POLITICS: Changing Patterns in Brazil** (Princeton, 1971); and a collection of articles on the present-day situation

edited by Stepan entitled **AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL: Origins, Policies, and Future** (Yale, 1973, cloth, 1976, paper).

The Skidmore study opens with the 1930 *coup d'etat* that ended the "old Republic" (proclaimed at the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889) and closes with the revolt that ended the 1946 Republic. Stepan's own book treats the military as a political institution and analyzes the military role in the turbulent period before 1964. The essays in the volume edited by Stepan deal largely with the subsequent military regimes.

Another collection of essays, **BRAZIL IN THE SIXTIES**, edited by Riordan Roett (Vanderbilt, 1972) covers the political setting (including Brazilian-American relations), the general economy and, more specifically, agricultural policy (the statistics inevitably suffer from obsolescence), change in such areas as education, the middle class, and the Church, and social protest in the novel and the theater.

BRAZIL AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1930-39; The Politics of Trade Rivalry by Stanley E. Hilton (Univ. of Tex., 1975) treats the special case of U.S.-German rivalry for Brazilian support in the period prior to World War II. Hilton rebuts Marxist historians who interpret Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor policy" as beneficial primarily to U.S. business; he shows that the Brazilians, far from being duped, often outsmarted the Americans as President Vargas played his cards well against both FDR and Adolf Hitler.

BRAZILIAN CULTURE: An Introduction to the Study of Culture in Brazil by Fernando de Azevedo, published originally in Portuguese in 1950 and translated into English by W. Rex Crawford (Macmillan, 1950; Hafner, 1971, facsimile ed.), looks at the social structure of Brazil from the early days to the end of World War II from an an-

thropologist's viewpoint.

Azevedo's findings are extended in several more specialized studies that cover race, the plantation system, the distinctive regions, the peasantry, and the coming of industrial civilization.

Among these, a short book by Marvin Harris, **PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS**, summarizes anthropologists' studies of racial relationships in Brazil compared to those in several other Latin American nations and the United States (Walker, 1964, cloth; Norton, 1974, paper). A more recent title, **NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States** by Carl Degler (Macmillan, 1971) covers this ground in greater detail. A third book, hard going for the nonspecialist but perhaps the most thorough of the three is Fernandes Florestan's **THE NEGRO IN BRAZILIAN SOCIETY** (Univ. of Calif., 1969, cloth; Atheneum, 1971, paper).

Warren Dean's **RIO CLARO: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920** (Stanford, 1976) traces the growth of plantation society in a county in southern Brazil that was for a century one of the centers of coffee production. Dean is principally interested in the black slave labor force, which was finally replaced by Swiss, German, and Italian immigrants after the (violent) abolition of slavery in the 1880s.

RIO GRANDE DO SUL AND BRAZILIAN REGIONALISM, 1822-1930 by Joseph LeRoy Love (Stanford, 1971) is a detailed analysis of the politics of the cattle-raising state in Brazil's far South that has long been the cradle of plotters and leaders; it was from Rio Grande do Sul's *estancias* that Getúlio Vargas rode with several "provisional corps" of *gaúchos* to power in 1930.

Richard M. Morse's **FROM COMMUNITY TO METROPOLIS: A Biography of São Paulo** (Univ. of Fla., 1958;

Octagon, 1971) is the first significant attempt at Brazilian urban history. It explains the dynamism of the city southwest of Rio de Janeiro whose population grew from less than half a million people in 1940 to nearly 6 million in 1970.

Familiar to most students of Latin America is T. Lynn Smith's **BRAZIL: People and Institutions**, first published in 1946 and now in its fourth edition (La. State Univ., 1972), a comprehensive, readable text on the sociology of the country. Smith's recent **BRAZILIAN SOCIETY** (Univ. of N. M., 1975) focuses more narrowly on the sociology of development, with emphasis on migration to the cities from the countryside after 1940. His migrants are former members of the hard-pressed farmer class described in Shepard Forman's **THE BRAZILIAN PEASANTRY** (Columbia, 1975), a study that includes information on marketing, land ownership, and the culture, politics, and policies that combine to keep the peasant, like his urban brother in the teeming *favelas* of Rio and São Paulo, in grinding poverty.

The facts of history, of politics, of social structure and modernization, and the analyses built upon these facts by scholars, helpful as they are, do not explain everything. But Brazil has a powerful literature, fortunately increasingly available in fine translations, that provides a sense of the life and character of Brazilians.

MODERN BRAZILIAN SHORT STORIES, translated and introduced by William L. Grossman (Univ. of Calif., 1967), includes one by João Guimarães Rosa, a diplomat, poet, and novelist (**THE DEVIL TO PAY IN THE BACKLANDS**) whom many Brazilians consider their most important contemporary writer. This tale of a luckless, mysterious fisherman and his family on the Amazon, "The Third Bank of the River," conveys in a few pages the ironic tone of much Brazilian prose.

Elizabeth Bishop, a prize-winning American poet, who has lived long in rural Brazil, has compiled **AN ANTHOLOGY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRAZILIAN POETRY** (Wesleyan, 1972), in English translations by W. S. Merwin, Richard Wilbur, James Wright, and others, including Miss Bishop herself. She and her coeditor Emanuel Brasil observe:

"Poets and poetry are highly thought of in Brazil. Among men, the name of poet is sometimes used as a compliment or term of affection, even if the person referred to is a businessman or politician, not a poet at all. One of the most famous twentieth-century Brazilian poets, Manuel Bandeira, was presented with a permanent parking space in front of his apartment house in Rio de Janeiro, with an enameled sign POETA—although he never owned a car and didn't know how to drive."

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Leslie B. Rout, Jr. (see page 74), Joan R. Dassin, assistant professor of English at Amherst College, and Riordan Roett, director of Latin American Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies, recommended these selections.*