and later, unions—that could sway the Senate to act in behalf of "the middle class, the wage earners, and the small farmers." But these forces no longer exist. The result: gridlock.

The time for something like majority rule in the Senate is long overdue, Geoghegan argues. He favors a graduated system under which the most populous states would get five senators and others would get four, three, two, or one, depending on their size. It is the only way, he believes, to break the strangle hold of the rotten boroughs.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Don't Fool with NATO

"NATO: Use Only in Moderation" by Daniel N. Nelson, in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Nov.–Dec. 1994), 6042 S. Kimbark Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

Now that the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States and other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seem bent on expanding its membership to include Eastern European nations. Nelson, who directs the graduate programs in international studies at Old Dominion University, contends that the allies are taking NATO down "the wrong path."

There is a need for collective security, he says. Western Europeans fear that disorder in the East may spill over onto them, while Central and Eastern Europeans feel vulnerable because they do not have superpower guarantees or a regional security arrangement. But the security threats that Europe now faces, such as political terrorism, international organized crime, and plutonium smuggling, can seldom be successfully met by using military force, he says: "NATO's role—the strictly military defense of the North Atlantic democracies—is substantively different and decisively separate from the wide range of potential disruptions of life in the Vancouver-to-Vladivostok hemisphere."

So far, NATO's steps toward expansion have been hesitant. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), offered to Eastern Europe in lieu of NATO membership after the 1991 NATO summit, "has no power, no budget, and no agenda," Nelson notes. And the Partnerships for Peace, unveiled at a NATO ministerial meeting in the fall of 1993, "may do more harm than good," as the Eastern states vie to mount "earlier, larger, and more sophisticated military exercises" so as to be the first to enter NATO.

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, he asserts, the Clinton administration "has begun to make the terrible mistake of once again drawing lines in Europe. Rather than seeing security as indivisible and collective, it appears that the United States will offer guarantees to those it finds most compatible, not to those whose peace and prosperity are endangered."

Common defense and collective security should not be confused, Nelson argues. "In other words, let NATO be NATO rather than let it metamorphose into a large, indistinct organization with blurred roles, ends, and means. NATO's focus should remain West European and North American, with members among whom interstate conflicts are no longer plausible."

To counter the "more diffuse" threats facing Europe, Nelson says, "NATO needs the help of a vibrant companion organization—one with universal membership, with confidence building, early warning, and conflict resolution mechanisms, as well as observer and peacekeeping missions—all duties aimed at reducing the chance that threats will multiply or intensify beyond capacities to constrain them. These are roles for a fully institutionalized, politically sophisticated collective security organization, not a power-projecting military alliance."

Combining the existing Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the recently added NATO appendages (NACC and the Partnerships for Peace), Nelson suggests, would be a good start at bringing the needed organization into being.