some 19,000 subscribers, a slight majority of them from New York State, and had become the primary market for American paintings (other than portraits). During its existence, the union bought 2,481 works of art from more than 300 American artists; in its heyday, from 1847 through 1851, it purchased an average of almost 400 paintings a year. The union helped to support many artists associated with the Hudson River school, as well as genre painters such as George Caleb Bingham, noted for his representations of Midwestern river life.

But the Art-Union came under attack from several quarters. Expressing the view of the genteel press, Nathaniel Parker Willis, editor of the *Home Journal,* contended that true artistic taste was the property of only the enlightened few. Willis scorned the union's managers as "'mere tradesmen' whose lack of discrimination and inadequate appreciation of quality demoralized art and artists," Klein writes.

Many artists shared Willis's view. In 1851, a year the union passed over his landscapes, Thomas Doughty denounced the organization for expending "[its] means in a most prodigal manner on some half-dozen or so of pet artists" while refusing to give "even a crumb for others."

The "penny press," particularly James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald,* became the Art-Union's principal antagonist. Purporting to speak for the "public" (and amplifying the grievances of disgruntled artists), the penny press "reviled the alleged duplicity of the managers" and insisted that the Art-Union "promoted private, selfish interests." Managers, the *Herald* charged, "were manipulating the lottery in their own interest."

With critics attacking the Art-Union's lottery, the New York Supreme Court ruled it illegal in 1852, effectively killing the organization. The Art-Union's fall "signaled a decisive change in the patronage and exhibition of American art," Klein concludes. Henceforth, she says, in such institutions as the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the emphasis would be less on educating the broad public than on preserving the best art for the enlightened few.

OTHER NATIONS

Adieu, Quebec?

A Survey of Recent Articles

For more than three decades, the threatened secession of Quebec has disturbed Canada's domestic tranquillity. With a referendum promised for later this year, the issue may be settled once and—if not for all, at least for a long time.

"From the early 1960s," David J. Bercuson, a historian at the University of Calgary, writes in *Current History* (Mar. 1995), "the Canadian federation has been akin to a marriage in which one partner has his or her bags perpetually packed in the vestibule, in full sight of the other partner, as a constant reminder of how tenuous the marriage really is. No marriage can go forward on that basis; nor can a political union."

"Because the rest of Canada is no longer prepared to make concessions to appease Quebec," Canadian media magnate Conrad Black points out in *Foreign Affairs* (Mar.–Apr. 1995), "Quebec will finally have to decide whether it really wishes to be part of Canada or not."

Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau, whose separatist Parti Québécois narrowly won the provincial election last fall and pledged to hold a referendum on independence this year, said in April that a spring vote, which had been widely anticipated, would be too "hasty." Instead, he announced, "We've de-

cided to convene Quebecers for their moment of truth this fall."

The postponement may have been prompted by opinion surveys, which seldom have shown support for secession among Quebecers (about 12 percent of whom are primarily English-speaking) running higher than 45 percent. In 1980, when an earlier Parti Québécois government held a referendum on "sovereignty association" (i.e., political sovereignty juxtaposed with economic association with Canada), 60 percent of Quebecers voted against it. (Although a bare majority of Francophones voted yes, Anglophones overwhelmingly voted no.)

Within days of that *non* vote, observes Thomas G. Barnes, a historian at the University of California, Berkeley, writing in an issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Mar. 1995) devoted to Canada, Liberal prime minister Pierre Trudeau informed the 10 provincial premiers that he intended, via Parliament, to push ahead with plans to "patriate the Constitution" (make Canada fully independent of Great Britain). The resulting constitution, with an elaborate Charter of Rights and Freedoms, took effect in 1982, although Quebec—which was given little it did not already have—refused to ratify it.

In the years since, David Bercuson observes, two major efforts have been made "to square the circle—to reconcile the mounting demands of French Quebeccers to create a nation within a nation, and the growing refusal of English-speaking Canadians to make compromises on political principles that they believe constitute the essence of being Canadian."

The first effort, led by Progressive Conservative (Tory) prime minister Brian Mulroney, culminated in the Meech Lake Accord of 1987, which proclaimed Quebec "a distinct society within Canada." But the accord failed by mid-

Solzhenitsyn Speaks

Interviewed by Natalia Zheinorova of *Argumenty i fakty*, Alexander Solzhenitsyn declares in *Index on Censorship* (Mar.–Apr. 1995) that Russia should let the Chechen people go.

During the course of my trip across Russia [in 1994], I repeatedly said that Chechnya should be given independence. But the Moscow media were determined to ignore my statements. I also spoke about Tajikistan. Now Chechnya is ablaze and everyone is asking: "Why is Solzhenitsyn silent?" When Tajikistan explodes, they'll say the same. Which is why I am issuing yet another warning: we must leave Tajikistan without further delay.

When [Dzhokhar M.] Dudayev declared [Chechnya's] independence we should have acted right away: strengthened our borders, organized customs posts to prevent the passage of drugs or arms. We should have declared all Chechens in Russia foreigners and asked them to go home or get a visa, like any other foreigner. . . . And we should have provided refuge for all Russians who wanted to leave Chechnya. . . .

When one part of the body is gangrenous, it has to be amputated to save the rest. The integrity of Russia is more important. I have heard it said that our leadership is ready to agree to a confederation with Chechnya. In fact we need neither a confederation nor a federation. The Russian Federation is an artificial, Leninist invention. Russia never was a federation; it never was formed on the basis of a union of ready-made states. Today the autonomous republics are based almost entirely on minorities. The 1989 census shows that Tataria has a Tatar population of 48.5 percent; Yakutia is 37 percent Yakut; Bashkiria 22 percent Bashkir; and Karelia just 10 percent Karelian. It is only in Chechnya, Tuva, and Chuvashia [and, since June 1992, Ingushetia] that the indigenous population is over two-thirds of the population as a whole. In the remaining republics Lenin's formula has given power to a minority.



In what may be a sign of growing chaos, a diptheria epidemic broke out in the former Soviet Union in 1990 and has been rapidly spreading since then. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report *(Mar. 17, 1995) says that cases jumped from 839 in 1989 to 47,802 last year, when 1,746 persons died.*

1990 to get the required unanimous consent of all 10 Canadian provinces, thanks to Manitoba and Newfoundland.

The second effort "to square the circle" resulted in the Charlottetown Accord of August 1992, which reiterated Quebec's distinctiveness but also addressed a host of other issues, such as western Canada's demands for institutional reform. The agreement was endorsed by Mulroney and the federal government, the three major federal parties, the 10 provincial premiers, the leaders of the Northwest and Yukon territories, and the leaders of the main "aboriginal" peoples (Indians and Eskimos)—by everybody, in short, except the voters. In an October 1992 referendum on the accord, 54 percent of Canadians—including a majority of Quebecers, who evidently thought that it did not sufficiently increase their province's status and powers—voted against it.

This failure sealed the fate of Mulroney and his party, says Thomas Barnes. "A year later, under a new leader . . . the Tories went down to the most stunning defeat in Canadian political history." They won only two seats in the 295-member Parliament—a staggering loss of 151 seats. The Liberals, under Jean Chrétien, returned to power, and the role of Official Opposition was taken, astonishingly, by Lucien Bouchard's pro-independence Bloc Québécois, formed after the Meech Lake debacle.

"Instead of engendering unity," David Bercuson points out, "the constant constitutional tinkering between 1982 and 1992 created greater

disunity, as expectations were raised and dashed, and then raised and dashed again." The continuing failure to resolve the matter lessened Canadians' faith in their leaders. "Worse, it has produced government by bribery, under which Ottawa has continually attempted to purchase the loyalty of Quebecers." Between 1970 and 1990, by University of Calgary economist Robert Mansell's estimate, Ottawa poured over $160 billion more into Quebec than it took out in tax revenues.

Ottawa also gave greater recognition to the French language and tried to counter the notion that this was mainly a Quebec matter. The Official Languages Act of 1969 designated both French and English official languages of Canada and "decreed that federal government services should be provided in either language in the capital and throughout the country wherever there was 'sufficient demand,'" Dale Thomson, a political scientist at McGill University in Montreal, notes in the *Annals*. The act also provided for federal financial support for second-language education. Quebec, however, took the view that the French language was the basis of its "distinct society," and that therefore, French and English could not have equal standing in the province. Under the 1977 Charter of the French Language, only the French version of government documents was to be legally binding, and public signs, with only rare exceptions, were to be in French. When the Supreme Court of Canada in 1989 declared the law forbidding the use of English on public signs unconstitutional, Quebec used a loophole in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to re-enact the original language law. "English-speaking Canadians were outraged," observes David Bercuson.

Canada today is a country of two fundamentally different worldviews, Bercuson says. "English-speaking Canadians conceive of Canada as a nation of individual citizens who are equal before the law—regardless of the language their forbears spoke—and who live in a federation of provinces with equal constitutional status." But French-speaking Quebecers "view Canada as a nation of collectivities defined primarily by language," and think Quebec "needs special powers to defend itself and cannot be subject to the dictates of institutions representing the collective power of 'the English.'" Compromise between these worldviews is no longer possible, he believes.

"Most Canadians agree that the process of having a plebiscite on the future of Canada conducted in Quebec alone every 10 to 15 years must stop," Conrad Black says.

What happens next is up to the Quebecers, Joseph Jockel of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies concludes. English Canada, he says in the *Annals*, is presenting Quebec with a choice: "the current constitutional arrangements, take them or leave them."

China's Stillborn Industrial Revolution

"The Needham Puzzle: Why the Industrial Revolution Did Not Originate in China" by Justin Yifu Lin, in *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (Jan. 1995), 1130 East 59th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

Until the last few centuries, the eminent British scholar Joseph Needham has shown, China was well ahead of the West in most areas of science and technology. Many historians agree that by the 14th century China was on the threshold of a full-fledged scientific and industrial revolution. Yet it failed to cross that threshold—and when progress in the West accelerated after the 17th century, China lagged further and further behind. Left unresolved was the question of why it was unable to keep its early lead.

A widely accepted explanation among many scholars—first proposed by Mark Elvin, author of *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (1973)—has been that China's early adoption of such modern institutions as family farming, fee-simple ownership, and the market system