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hierarchical political system culminating in the emperor, its essential feature was its stress on the family as the basic building block of society. The moral obligations of family life took precedence over all others, including obligations to the emperor. This was not true in Japan, notes Fukuyama, where Chinese Confucianism was modified after being imported in the 17th century so that one's duties to the emperor were deemed superior. Huntington's general characterization of Confucianism holds much more true for Japanese than Chinese Confucianism, Fukuyama says. "Yet it is Japan, rather than China, that has been democratic for the past 45 years."

Paradoxically, he argues, the weaker Chinese deference to authority created a greater need for an authoritarian political system: "Precisely because state authority is less respected in China, the danger of social chaos emerging in the absence of an overt, repressive state structure is greater there than in Japan." The stress on political authoritarianism in Singapore and other Southeast Asian states may also be less a reflection of their "self-discipline—as they would have outsiders believe—than of their rather low level of spontaneous citizenship and corresponding fear of coming apart."

The most important difference between Confucian culture and the West's Christian and democratic culture, Fukuyama says, has to do with the latter's regard for the individual, for human rights, and for the individual conscience as the ultimate source of authority. "This, it is safe to say, does not have a counterpart in any Confucian society."

Nevertheless, Fukuyama says, the thesis that economic development gives rise to political liberalization has been bolstered in recent decades—and nowhere more so than in Asia. Confucian societies such as Japan and South Korea "have been able to accommodate a greater degree of political participation and individual liberty than Singapore without compromising their own fundamental cultural values, and Taiwan is moving rapidly in the same direction. I see no reason why Singapore should not be able to follow this path."

## *An Ounce of Prevention?*

"Alchemy for a New World Order" by Stephen John Stedman, in *Foreign Affairs* (May-June 1995), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

"Preventive diplomacy" and "conflict prevention" are the latest enthusiasms among the foreign policy cognoscenti, and numerous weighty studies are promised. It seems that whatever the disaster, whether anarchy in Somalia, civil war in the former Yugoslavia, or genocide in Rwanda, some analysts believe that early diplomatic intervention could have prevented it at little cost. Thus, in the Balkans, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has asserted, "the West has missed repeated opportunities to engage in early and effective ways that might have prevented the conflict from deepening." All the prevention chatter is largely wishful thinking, contends Stedman, a professor of African studies and comparative politics at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Heading off bloodshed in Somalia, Bosnia, or Rwanda, he says, "would have involved substantial risk and great cost. The cheapness of intervention depends on what actions will be necessary to deter the parties in a conflict from using violence (or more violence) to resolve it." Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, and genocidal factions such as the presidential guard in Rwanda "decided on civil war," Stedman points out, "because they thought they could prevail militarily and that the international community was powerless to stop them. If they had faced an early international willingness to use massive force, then their calculations might have been different." If the threat worked, the cost would have been slight. But if it did not, "then only the use of force with the risk of prolonged involvement in a civil war" could work.

Stedman is equally critical of the theory of "conflict prevention," which suggests that foreign aid can be used to eradicate the putative roots of strife, including poverty, environmental degradation, and overpopulation. Between 1992 and '94, the United States gave aid to Rwanda to improve governance, strengthen

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## Hell, Yes, We Will Go!

A growing number of people on the American Left are looking at military intervention in a new light, Michael Walzer, a professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, in Princeton, New Jersey, and author of *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), notes in *Dissent* (Winter 1995).

*Should we put soldiers at risk in faraway places when our own country is not under attack or threatened with attack (not Maine or Georgia or Oregon) and when national interests, narrowly understood, are not at stake? I am strongly inclined, sometimes, to give a positive answer to this question.... The reason is simple enough: all states have an interest in global stability and even in global humanity, and in the case of wealthy and powerful states like ours, this interest is seconded by obligation. No doubt, the "civilized" world is capable of living with grossly uncivilized behavior in places like East Timor, say—offstage and out of sight. But behavior of that kind, unchallenged, tends to spread, to be imitated or reiterated. Pay the moral price of silence and callousness, and you will soon have to pay the political price of turmoil and lawlessness nearer home. . . .*

*[Interest] and obligation together have often provided an ideology for imperial expansion or Cold War advance. So it's the political Right that has defended both, while the Left has ac-*

*quired the habit of criticism and rejection. But in this post-imperial and post-Cold War age, these positions are likely to be reversed or, at least, confused. Many people on the Right see no point in intervention today when there is no material or, for that matter, ideological advantage to be gained. "What's Bosnia to them or they to Bosnia/ that they should weep for her?" And a small but growing number of people on the Left now favor intervening, here or there, driven by an internationalist ethic. They are right to feel driven. Internationalism has always been understood to require support for, and even participation in, popular struggles anywhere in the world. But that meant: we have to wait for the popular struggles. Liberation should always be a local initiative. In the face of human disaster, however, internationalism has a more urgent meaning. It's not possible to wait; anyone who can take the initiative should do so. Active opposition to massacre and massive deportation is morally necessary; its risks must be accepted.*

democratic organizations, train market entrepreneurs, and increase farm productivity. The Hutu genocidal assault on the Tutsis there, however, had little to do with living conditions. It "was chosen, planned, and directed by individuals who did not want to cede power," writes Stedman.

"Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks," he concludes, "policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later."

## The Hiroshima Debate

"The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb" by Robert James Maddox, in *American Heritage* (May-June 1995), Forbes Building, 60 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10011; "Hiroshima: Historians Reassess" by Gar Alperovitz, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1995), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2400 N St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-1153.

As the recent rows over the Smithsonian Institution's planned *Enola Gay* exhibit and the U.S. Postal Service's mushroom-cloud postage stamp demonstrate, President Harry S