minimal roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as did Iceland, which has no army. Sweden was neutral, and Finland, bordering the Soviet Union, wanted to be.

Shunning "confrontation, ideological clarion calls, and militarization," the Nordic countries "could consider themselves keepers of the promise of the more humane society to come when others freed themselves from the grip of East-West antagonism." Sweden especially imagined that it offered other nations a social-democratic "middle way" between communism and capitalism. When the Soviet bloc fell apart, however, the new democracies of Eastern Europe did not rush to adopt the "Scandinavian model." Indeed, in Sweden itself, the Social Democrats fell from power and their vaunted model fell from grace.

Defining Nordic identity anew, Wæver says, has turned into a contest between "European Union-appendix" and "Festung ('Fortress') Norden"—that is, between drawing closer and adapting to an integrated Europe on the one hand, and defending Nordic independence against spreading "Europeanness" on the other. It is a false dichotomy, Wæver believes.

He proposes a new middle way (though he does not call it that): a Scandinavia that looks not only to Brussels but to the new states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. Being Nordic, Wæver asserts, "is to be involved both in Brussels affairs and in the development of the new Baltic states.... Nordics are those of us who travel as more than tourists to Tórshavn, St. Petersburg, and Brussels."

A Radical Cure For Africa

"A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa" by William Pfaff, in *Foreign Affairs* (Jan.–Feb. 1995), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Hopes for Africa's future, soaring only a few years ago, are crashing down today. "From now on," says Congolese writer Ange Séverin Malanda, "the danger in several parts of the continent is of pure destruction or generalized destabilization." Somalia, Liberia, and Angola are approaching anarchy, while the "pure destruction" of genocide appeared in Rwanda last year. The post–Cold War movement toward democracy is foundering, with fewer than one-third of sub-Saharan nations having anything resembling multiparty politics. "Africans acknowledge the immensity of their crisis and the need to consider hitherto unacceptable remedies," writes Pfaff, author of *The Wrath of Nations* (1993). His proposal: "a disinterested neocolonialism" by Europe's former colonial powers.

The project, which might take as long as a century, he says, would not only benefit Africa but would be "a deeply constructive accomplishment for Europe." Africa's plight, after all, is partly the West's fault. The European powers that, from a mixture of motives, colonized Africa destroyed the social and political institutions they found, Pfaff says, but did not stay "long enough to put anything solid and lasting in their place." After the "great wave" of decolonization in the late 1950s and early '60s, "a shameful series of self-interested foreign interventions and ruthless exploitation of indigenous African conflicts by the Soviet Union, its proxy, Cuba, and the United States" made matters worse.

Kenya's Ali A. Mazrui, an editor of the UNESCO General History of Africa, last year proposed a United Nations trusteeship system, with African and Asian nations among those appointed to govern certain countries, under the guidance of a council of major African states. It is not going to happen. Pfaff believes that a new form of European oversight stands a slightly better chance of becoming a reality.

The ex-colonial powers have an urgent interest in easing Africa's problems and stemming the tide of immigration to Europe. They also have the means to help, Pfaff observes. "As its former colonial ruler, the Italians know Somalia, just as the French know West and Central Africa, the British, East Africa, and the Portuguese, Angola and Mozambique.... If anybody is competent to deal sympathetically with these countries, the Europeans are."