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had the clergy been infiltrated, but church leaders for many years had held secret talks with the Stasi.

Theological conservatives, mainly from West Germany, charged that the East German churches had been wholly misguided in recent decades in seeking an accommodation with socialism and the Marxist state; they had neglected the church's prophetic duty to resist tyranny and injustice, and by meeting with the Communists, and even the Stasi, had "sold out" the church. Radicals from the church-related "basis groups," who had helped topple the regime, also demanded that the churches face their failures. The East German bishops, however, took a "cautious and hesitant stance" toward any "Declaration of Guilt."

The critics have lost perspective, Conway contends. The bishops, pastors, and other ecclesiastical leaders had to operate in the same "murky world of corruption, espionage, and intimidation which marked the daily experience of the East German people." The revelations that perhaps 113 pastors worked for the Stasi were shocking, Conway says, but those spies represented only a small fraction of the roughly 4,000 pastors in the former East Germany.

That Manfred Stolpe, the former chief administrative officer of the East German Church Federation, and other church leaders had secret contacts with Stasi and other officials was much more disturbing, Conway notes. Stolpe claimed that in more than 1,000 meetings with the Stasi, he—with the backing of his ecclesiastical superiors—had sought only to protect church interests, to keep suspected individuals out of the Stasi's clutches, and to prevent worse repression. But the fact that the secret talks were held meant that the churches could not claim to have been "merely the innocent victims of Stasi machinations," Conway notes. How far their "collaboration" went, or what the consequences were, is not clear.

The churches' very involvement in the anti-government opposition had ambiguous origins. During the 1970s, the Stasi began to encourage so-called "progressive elements" within the churches, letting compliant churchmen travel to ecumenical meetings abroad

and secretly subsidizing organizations such as the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference. During the 1980s, things started to get out of control, as church leaders and the basis groups of peace activists began "to criticize all militarism, including that of the Soviet Union." Church-organized peace meetings in 1981 drew large crowds, especially of young people; soon, new groups of human-rights and other activists sprang into existence.

Stasi officials met secretly with church leaders and demanded that they bring the basis groups to heel. Whatever the inclinations of the churchmen may have been, they knew they would lose all credibility with their supporters if they tried. In 1989, Conway reports, "the wave of protests and demonstrations sharply increased. In church halls and basements, where there had been scores, hundreds now took part in public discussions calling for reform. In Leipzig, where the Monday prayer meetings for peace had attracted hundreds, thousands now turned up and the crowds spilled out into the streets." The eventual result was completely unambiguous, the collapse of communism, and for helping to bring it about, Conway insists, the churches still deserve much credit.

### *On Being Nordic*

"Between Balts and Brussels: The Nordic Countries after the Cold War" by Ole Wæver, in *Current History* (Nov. 1994), 4225 Main St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19127.

During the Cold War, the five Nordic countries took a lofty stance toward the East-West struggle, calling for peace, disarmament, and alternatives to confrontation. With the end of the Cold War, they suddenly got their wish—and were none too happy about it, writes Wæver, a lecturer in international relations at the University of Copenhagen.

For the Nordic nations, the Cold War was ideal, he says. "Their rhetoric—their national image—depended on being against and maintaining a distance from the Cold War, but that was pleasant. They had lower tensions, no nuclear weapons, no foreign troops." Norway and Denmark played

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minimal roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as did Iceland, which has no army. Sweden was neutral, and Finland, bordering the Soviet Union, wanted to be.

Shunning "confrontation, ideological clarion calls, and militarization," the Nordic countries "could consider themselves keepers of the promise of the more humane society to come when others freed themselves from the grip of East-West antagonism." Sweden especially imagined that it offered other nations a social-democratic "middle way" between communism and capitalism. When the Soviet bloc fell apart, however, the new democracies of Eastern Europe did not rush to adopt the "Scandinavian model." Indeed, in Sweden itself, the Social Democrats fell from power and their vaunted model fell from grace.

Defining Nordic identity anew, Wæver says, has turned into a contest between "European Union-appendix" and "Festung ('Fortress') Norden"—that is, between drawing closer and adapting to an integrated Europe on the one hand, and defending Nordic independence against spreading "Europeanness" on the other. It is a false dichotomy, Wæver believes.

He proposes a new middle way (though he does not call it that): a Scandinavia that looks not only to Brussels but to the new states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. Being Nordic, Wæver asserts, "is to be involved both in Brussels affairs and in the development of the new Baltic states. . . . Nordics are those of us who travel as more than tourists to Tórshavn, St. Petersburg, and Brussels."

## **A Radical Cure For Africa**

"A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa" by William Pfaff, in *Foreign Affairs* (Jan.-Feb. 1995), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Hopes for Africa's future, soaring only a few years ago, are crashing down today. "From now on," says Congolese writer Ange Séverin Malanda, "the danger in several parts of the continent is of pure destruction or generalized

destabilization." Somalia, Liberia, and Angola are approaching anarchy, while the "pure destruction" of genocide appeared in Rwanda last year. The post-Cold War movement toward democracy is foundering, with fewer than one-third of sub-Saharan nations having anything resembling multi-party politics. "Africans acknowledge the immensity of their crisis and the need to consider hitherto unacceptable remedies," writes Pfaff, author of *The Wrath of Nations* (1993). His proposal: "a disinterested neocolonialism" by Europe's former colonial powers.

The project, which might take as long as a century, he says, would not only benefit Africa but would be "a deeply constructive accomplishment for Europe." Africa's plight, after all, is partly the West's fault. The European powers that, from a mixture of motives, colonized Africa destroyed the social and political institutions they found, Pfaff says, but did not stay "long enough to put anything solid and lasting in their place." After the "great wave" of decolonization in the late 1950s and early '60s, "a shameful series of self-interested foreign interventions and ruthless exploitation of indigenous African conflicts by the Soviet Union, its proxy, Cuba, and the United States" made matters worse.

Kenya's Ali A. Mazrui, an editor of the *UNESCO General History of Africa*, last year proposed a United Nations trusteeship system, with African and Asian nations among those appointed to govern certain countries, under the guidance of a council of major African states. It is not going to happen. Pfaff believes that a new form of European oversight stands a slightly better chance of becoming a reality.

The ex-colonial powers have an urgent interest in easing Africa's problems and stemming the tide of immigration to Europe. They also have the means to help, Pfaff observes. "As its former colonial ruler, the Italians know Somalia, just as the French know West and Central Africa, the British, East Africa, and the Portuguese, Angola and Mozambique. . . . If anybody is competent to deal sympathetically with these countries, the Europeans are."