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argues, would restore "something of the original distinction" between the two bodies.

### ***The Making of LBJ***

"Lyndon Johnson's Victory in the 1948 Texas Senate Race: A Reappraisal" by Dale Baum and James L. Hailey, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1994), Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Dr., Ste. 1274, New York, N.Y. 10115-1274.

"Landslide Lyndon" they called Lyndon Johnson, after he won a 1948 run-off Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate by only 87 votes out of 988,295. In explaining LBJ's razor-thin victory (tantamount to election since Texas was then a virtual one-party state), Robert A. Caro, author of *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent* (1990), and other historians have focused on this remarkable occurrence in one precinct in the South Texas town of Alice: 202 Mexican-American voters, some of them dead or out of the county that election day, lined up in alphabetical order at the very last minute to cast their ballots overwhelmingly for Johnson. Caro and others see that as part of a pattern of deceit that runs through LBJ's long political career. The Alice vote was indeed a mite suspicious, note Baum and Hailey, a historian and graduate student, respectively, at Texas A&M University. Nevertheless, they contend, fraud was not the chief reason for the future president's narrow victory.

In the July primary that preceded the runoff, former governor Coke Stevenson, a West Texas rancher, got 40 percent of the vote to Johnson's 34 percent, while George E. B. Peddy, a decorated

World War II hero, got 20 percent. Peddy was a conservative and it was thought that his supporters would flock to fellow conservative Stevenson rather than to the more liberal Johnson. LBJ moved right, but, according to an analysis of the voting returns by Baum and Hailey, got little more than one-fifth of the Peddy voters. Nor did he make any significant inroads among Stevenson's original voters. LBJ did do extremely well at attracting new voters and those who had supported minor candidates. But that was not enough to offset the advantage Stevenson had with Peddy voters.

How then did Johnson win? The answer, according to the authors: he did an extraordinary job of getting almost all of his July supporters to turn out and vote for him again in August, while Stevenson abysmally failed to do likewise. An estimated 113,523 Texans who cast ballots for Stevenson in July stayed home in August, whereas only 4,054 LBJ voters did not return to the polls. In two West Texas counties—Hansford and Kinney—Stevenson's local supporters, believing their votes would not add significantly to his statewide margin of victory, complacently decided not even to hold run-off elections. By Baum and Hailey's calculations, their votes alone could have made all the difference for Stevenson.

Despite the "many thousands" of votes that Robert Caro believes were stolen for Johnson (and, it should be noted, numerous votes may also have been stolen for Stevenson), the authors say that if "Calculatin' Coke" had gotten just eight out of every 10 of his July supporters to cast ballots for him again in August, Lyndon Johnson would have had a very different political career.

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## **FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

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### ***Ethnic Equations***

"Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System" by Ted Robert Gurr, in *International Studies Quarterly* (Sept. 1994), Dept. of Political Science, Ohio State Univ., 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

Civil wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Azerbaijan; genocidal massacres in Burundi; clan fighting

in Somalia. . . . Since the Cold War ended, there seems to have been a veritable explosion of bloody ethnic conflicts around the world. But appearances deceive, says Gurr, a political scientist at the University of Maryland.

"Ethnopolitical conflicts were relatively common, and increased steadily, throughout the Cold War," he reports. The greatest in-

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crease took place during the 1970s, when 55 ethnic groups were involved in serious clashes, up from 39 during the preceding decade. During the 1980s, the total was 62; in 1993–94, it was only eight higher.

Of the 50 “serious” ethnic conflicts in the world today, more than half began before 1987. These Cold War-vintage conflicts are also the more deadly ones, resulting, on average, in 111,000 deaths and 408,000 refugees. The 23 conflicts begun since 1987, in contrast, have produced many fewer deaths (43,000 on average) but many more refugees (684,000).

The end of the Cold War did intensify a few rivalries, notably in Afghanistan and Angola, where the superpowers’ disengagement gave impetus to existing tensions or allowed old ones to resurface. But most other Third World ethnic conflicts are in “the weak and economically stagnant states of Africa south of the Sahara.”

Twenty new states have come into being since the Cold War ended, and others have been experimenting with democratic institutions. “Much of the upsurge in communal conflict,” Gurr says, “has occurred precisely in these states, and as a direct consequence of the fact that institutional change has opened up opportunities by which communal groups can more openly pursue their objectives.” Six of the recent conflicts erupted in the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states.

Indeed, the sense of alarm about the supposed explosion of “tribal” conflict in recent years, Gurr believes, is partly a result of “the fact that some of the new conflicts have erupted on Western Europe’s doorstep.”

## *Head in the Sand?*

“Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure” by Noel Malcolm, in *The National Interest* (Spring 1995), 1112  
16th St. N.W., Ste. 540, Washington, D.C. 20036.

For all of the West’s diplomatic efforts to halt the destruction of Bosnia, argues Malcolm, a London political columnist and author of

*Bosnia: A Short History* (1994), Western statesmen have failed to understand what the war there is about.

“Although commentators and analysts had been accurately charting the political strategy of the Serbian communist leader, Slobodan Milosevic, since 1988—the takeover of the political machinery in Montenegro and the Vojvodina, the illegal suppression of local government in Kosovo in 1989, the mobilization of nationalist feeling in Serbian public opinion, the slow-moving constitutional coup against the federal presidency, the Serbian economic blockade against Croatia and Slovenia in late 1990, the theft by Serbia that year of billions of dinars from the federal budget . . . and the incitement and arming of Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia during 1990 and 1991—it was as if the Western governments could see no pattern in these events whatsoever,” Malcolm writes. “When Croatia and Slovenia, losing patience with Milosevic’s attempts to manipulate the federal Yugoslav system, voted for independence, the West reacted with incomprehension.”

After the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation, Western policymakers comforted themselves with the thought that it had been inevitable, either because of the collapse of Soviet communism or because of “ancient ethnic hatreds” in Yugoslav history. The first theory was implausible, Malcolm says, as Yugoslavia since 1948 had been less under Moscow’s control than any other country in Eastern Europe. The second theory was simply wrong. The few examples of wars and massacres that were offered in its support, he says, “were from the 20th century, or at most the late 19th, [and] arose mainly from the most untypical episodes in Balkan history, conflicts introduced or exacerbated by forces (such as the Axis invasion) from outside Yugoslavia itself. For most of the rest of the history of those lands, there are no records of Croats killing Serbs because they were Serbs, or vice versa.”

The theory of “ancient ethnic hatreds” nevertheless became popular, Malcolm says. It was convenient to Western political leaders, for it made all sides to the conflict