
argues, would restore "something of the original distinction" between the two bodies.

The Making of LBJ

"Lyndon Johnson's Victory in the 1948 Texas Senate Race: A Reappraisal" by Dale Baum and James L. Hailey, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1994), Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Dr., Ste. 1274, New York, N.Y. 10115-1274.

"Landslide Lyndon" they called Lyndon Johnson, after he won a 1948 run-off Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate by only 87 votes out of 988,295. In explaining LBJ's razor-thin victory (tantamount to election since Texas was then a virtual one-party state), Robert A. Caro, author of *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent* (1990), and other historians have focused on this remarkable occurrence in one precinct in the South Texas town of Alice: 202 Mexican-American voters, some of them dead or out of the county that election day, lined up in alphabetical order at the very last minute to cast their ballots overwhelmingly for Johnson. Caro and others see that as part of a pattern of deceit that runs through LBJ's long political career. The Alice vote was indeed a mite suspicious, note Baum and Hailey, a historian and graduate student, respectively, at Texas A&M University. Nevertheless, they contend, fraud was not the chief reason for the future president's narrow victory.

In the July primary that preceded the runoff, former governor Coke Stevenson, a West Texas rancher, got 40 percent of the vote to Johnson's 34 percent, while George E. B. Peddy, a decorated

World War II hero, got 20 percent. Peddy was a conservative and it was thought that his supporters would flock to fellow conservative Stevenson rather than to the more liberal Johnson. LBJ moved right, but, according to an analysis of the voting returns by Baum and Hailey, got little more than one-fifth of the Peddy voters. Nor did he make any significant inroads among Stevenson's original voters. LBJ did do extremely well at attracting new voters and those who had supported minor candidates. But that was not enough to offset the advantage Stevenson had with Peddy voters.

How then did Johnson win? The answer, according to the authors: he did an extraordinary job of getting almost all of his July supporters to turn out and vote for him again in August, while Stevenson abysmally failed to do likewise. An estimated 113,523 Texans who cast ballots for Stevenson in July stayed home in August, whereas only 4,054 LBJ voters did not return to the polls. In two West Texas counties—Hansford and Kinney—Stevenson's local supporters, believing their votes would not add significantly to his statewide margin of victory, complacently decided not even to hold run-off elections. By Baum and Hailey's calculations, their votes alone could have made all the difference for Stevenson.

Despite the "many thousands" of votes that Robert Caro believes were stolen for Johnson (and, it should be noted, numerous votes may also have been stolen for Stevenson), the authors say that if "Calculatin' Coke" had gotten just eight out of every 10 of his July supporters to cast ballots for him again in August, Lyndon Johnson would have had a very different political career.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Ethnic Equations

"Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System" by Ted Robert Gurr, in *International Studies Quarterly* (Sept. 1994), Dept. of Political Science, Ohio State Univ., 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

Civil wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Azerbaijan; genocidal massacres in Burundi; clan fighting

in Somalia. . . . Since the Cold War ended, there seems to have been a veritable explosion of bloody ethnic conflicts around the world. But appearances deceive, says Gurr, a political scientist at the University of Maryland.

"Ethnopolitical conflicts were relatively common, and increased steadily, throughout the Cold War," he reports. The greatest in-