
to stake out fresh positions that speak to their concerns.

It is not feminists who are the main obstacle blocking the success of the right-to-life movement, Muller contends. Rather, it is "the millions of more or less conservative middle-class parents who know that, if their teenage daughter were to become pregnant, they would advise her to get an abortion rather than marry out of necessity or go through the trauma of giving birth and then placing the child up for adoption." And many people in other circumstances—"young, unmarried, pregnant women loath to bring a child into a family-less environment; parents of a fetus known to be afflicted by a disease such as Tay-Sachs that will make its life painful and short; parents whose children are likely to be born with severe genetic defects, who know that the birth of the fetus will mean pain for them and for their other children—all choose abortion," Muller says, "not because they fetishize choice but because they value the family."

The unborn child has moral standing but sometimes, Muller says, "choosing to give birth may be socially dysfunctional, morally irresponsible or even cruel: inimical to the forces of stability and bourgeois responsibility conservatives cherish." Conservatives ought to favor abortion in such circumstances.

Even many who strongly defend abortion are uneasy about it, McKenna points out, as evidenced by the euphemisms they frequently employ. "Abortion is a 'reproductive health

procedure' or a 'termination of pregnancy.' Abortion clinics are 'reproductive health clinics' (more recently, 'women's clinics'), and the right to obtain an abortion is 'reproductive freedom,'" he notes.

Opponents of abortion, he argues, should take a leaf from Abraham Lincoln's position on the evil of slavery. In his "House Divided" speech of 1858, and in subsequent speeches and writings, "Lincoln made it clear . . . that his intention was not to abolish slavery but to 'arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction.'" Pro-life politicians today should follow Lincoln, McKenna argues, recognizing abortion's legal status but treating it as "an evil that needs to be restricted and discouraged."

He believes that the Democratic Party is the natural home for such a Lincolnian position. The Republicans, as champions of unbridled individualism, "are pro-choice in their hearts." The Democrats, under the influence of pro-choice feminists and abortion lobbies, "are pro-choice for political reasons." But "the same formula—grudgingly tolerate, restrict, discourage—that I have applied to abortion is what liberal Democrats have been using to combat racism over the past generation," McKenna writes. In time, he thinks, Democrats may shake themselves free of the abortion lobbies and take a Lincolnian stand on abortion.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Warlike Democracies

"Democratization and the Danger of War" by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, in *International Security* (Summer 1995), Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Univ., 79 John F. Kennedy St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Shortly after U.S. peace-keeping troops landed in Haiti in 1994, U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake declared that "spreading

democracy . . . serves our interests" because democracies "tend not to abuse their citizens' rights or wage war on one another."

A world full of mature, stable democracies probably would be a safer one for the United States, agree Mansfield and Snyder, political scientists at Columbia University. It is a common view. But trying to bring that world closer to reality, they argue, may promote not

peace, but war. "Countries do not become democracies overnight," and in the typically rocky transition period, the authors say, states tend to become "more aggressive and war-prone, not less."

Analyzing the same statistical data for 1811-1980 that other scholars have used to support the "peaceable democracies" thesis, Mansfield and Snyder find that, on average, *democratizing* states were about two-thirds more likely to go to war than were states that did not experience any change in their form of government.

Why should this be? After the breakup of an autocratic regime, note the authors, nascent democratic institutions are weak, and groups that had done well under the old regime "vie for power and survival" with one another and with new groups "representing rising democratic forces." Struggling to win mass support, the rivals often resort to nationalistic appeals, unleashing forces that are hard to control.

Virtually every great power, the authors say, "has gone on the warpath during the initial phase of its entry into the era of mass politics." Mid-Victorian Britain, for example, in transition from the partial democracy of the First Reform Bill of 1832 to the full-fledged democracy of the later Gladstone era, "was carried into the Crimean War by a groundswell of belligerent public opinion." Similarly, the leaders of Emperor Wilhelm II's Germany, facing universal suffrage but only limited governmental accountability, were pushed toward World War I by their "escalating competition with middle-class mass groups for the mantle of German nationalism."

Similar forces are at work today in Russia and the former Yugoslavia, Mansfield and Snyder note. "Russia's poorly institutionalized, partial democracy has tense relationships with many of its neighbors and has used military force brutally to reassert control in Chechnya; its electorate cast nearly a quarter of its votes [in 1993] for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy." The "return to imperial thinking" in Moscow results from President Boris Yeltsin's "weakness, not his strength."

Instead of "a naive enthusiasm for spreading peace by promoting democratization," Mansfield and Snyder maintain, the United States and its allies need a strategy for minimizing the risks that accompany liberalization. Experience in Latin America, they point out, suggests that giving the military and others threatened by change a "golden parachute," including guarantees that they will not end up in jail, helps smooth transitions. In the postcommunist states, the authors conclude, "finding benign, productive employment for the erstwhile Communist *nomenklatura*, military officer corps, nuclear scientists, and smoke-stack industrialists" ought to be a top priority.

The CIA Got It Right

"The CIA Vindicated" by Bruce D. Berkowitz and Jeffrey T. Richelson, in *The National Interest* (Fall 1995), 1112 16th St. N.W., Ste. 540, Washington, D.C. 20036.

As if the Aldrich Ames disaster were not enough, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been harshly criticized by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D.-N.Y.), *New York Times* columnist William Safire, and others for failing to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union. Berkowitz, a former CIA analyst, and Richelson, author of the forthcoming *A Century of Spies*, beg to differ with these eminent critics.

That the Soviet economy was faltering was evident to CIA and defense intelligence analysts by the late 1970s, the authors say; by 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, its "stultified, stalled-out condition" was a given. Analysts asked two main questions: was Gorbachev serious about economic reform? Could he carry it out "without losing control and releasing forces that would bring down the Soviet system"? In 1985, they agreed that Gorbachev was serious, but they doubted that the reforms would work or that the system was at risk. Two years later, however, the CIA issued a more pessimistic assessment, stating: "If it suspects that [liberalization] is getting out of control, the Party could well