
"radically different from that intended or expected. It was hedged with ironies and paved with unconscious as well as conscious paradoxes." The greatest irony is that *Ostpolitik* achieved its goal inadvertently: By propping up East Germany with recognition and financial support, West Germany allowed the communist regime to skate along without ever attempting the political and economic reforms that other Soviet satellites had to institute. This made East Germany a particularly hollow state, and helps explain why the regime collapsed so completely when it was challenged.

To be sure, West German policy was "very patient, consistent, predictable . . . waiting for the big chance." But when its "consistency hardened into rigidity," it ended up putting West Germany's interests—"order"—above the interests and ideals of Europe, most notably freedom. Moreover, it failed to take note of the broader changes occurring in the communist world. Nevertheless, *Ostpolitik* did succeed in removing an unattractive image of Germany, and, in conjunction with the aggressive public diplomacy of the United States, did contribute to "the necessary mixture of incentive and deterrent, punishment and reward" that helped tear down the Iron Curtain throughout Eastern Europe.

Today, Germany is still "in the condition of becoming." Unlike most powers in history, as historian Fritz Stern has said, Germany is being given a second chance. But its dilemma is essentially the same as it was when the German state's first chance arose a century ago. Being of that "critical size," which Chancellor Kiesinger described in 1967 as "too big to play no role in the balance of forces, too small to keep the forces around it in balance by itself," Germany has to decide what kind of power it will be. Will it play the traditional great-power role or forge a new role based on the conscious habit of not exerting its power to the full?

Garton Ash is not overly optimistic that Germany will use its renewed power—both military and economic—wisely. The style of *Ostpolitik* will probably prevail, which could lead to a cynical exploitation of the ideal of a united Europe for largely German interests. Moreover, the distinctive characteristics of East German culture have to be considered: "It [is] possible that tol-

erance, pluralism, democracy and the virtues of ever closer cooperation [will] spread from west to east." But it is just as possible that "intolerance, tribalism and the forces of disintegration [will] spread from east to west." The re-emergence—however marginal—of a very old-fashioned febrile nationalism at street level in Germany can only reinforce the sober view that Garton Ash takes of the likely future.

Science & Technology

AT THE HAND OF MAN: Peril and Hope for Africa's Wildlife. By Raymond Bonner. Knopf. 322 pp. \$24

THE LAST PANDA. By George B. Schaller. Univ. of Chicago. 291 pp. \$24.95

Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi's 1989 decision to torch \$3 million worth of confiscated elephant ivory was not greeted with universal acclaim by conservationists. Many felt the stunt would serve only to blunt criticism of Kenya's inconsistent enforcement of poaching laws, not to curb such slaughter in the future. Proceeds from the ill-gotten ivory might better be used to fund prevention programs, or even to help feed Kenya's people.

The incident underscores many of the difficulties surrounding contemporary conservation efforts. Individuals and organizations devoted to saving endangered species often reside in Western countries far removed from the areas where such animals live. They have difficulty appreciating the indigenous perspective on conservation, and often fail to anticipate the potential consequences of their proposals.

Not surprisingly, the leaders of many African nations, carrying bitter memories of the colonial period, resent foreign intrusion into their affairs. Many nations, beset by civil strife and economic woes, also lack the resources or even the desire to preserve endangered animals. A curious dilemma exists concerning large-animal herds. While government officials recognize that the animals attract tourist dollars, maintaining large preserves inhibits efforts to convert land to agricultural use. And should an elephant wander out of a park and trample a farmer's crops, it is hard to convince the farmer not to kill it, espe-

cially since its meat can provide food and its ivory can be sold on the black market.

Bonner admires Zimbabwe's solution to the dilemma. There, tourist dollars generated by interest in wildlife "correlate as closely as possible with where the wildlife is." This provides local people with an incentive to protect animals; elsewhere, such funds go into national treasuries, from which they rarely filter down to the rural populations.



George Schaller, a noted naturalist, finds similar circumstances threatening the giant panda. The panda exists in the wild only in remote sections of China, but the combined pressures of poaching (a panda pelt fetches more than \$10,000 on the black market, while a live bear can bring more than 10 times that amount) and diminished habitat have reduced its numbers to fewer than 1,000.

In recent years, political and economic realities have all but ended panda research, and while provisional plans exist to set aside preserves, no real action has occurred. The declining numbers of wild pandas has forced Beijing to abandon the practice of sealing diplomatic relations with gifts of breeding pairs. (Hence the arrival in 1972 of Ling-Ling, since deceased, and Hsing-Hsing to Washington's National Zoo.) They have in fact come up with an alternative practice that Schaller finds more disturbing: lending out bears for limited-term zoo exhibition in return for cash. Conservation officials feel the practice puts undue stress on the remaining pandas and reduces the likelihood of their producing new cubs in captivity, and they have pressured the Chinese government to reconsider it.

How best to save the giant panda? Schaller's

conclusions are remarkably similar to Bonner's: The "effort must involve local people, based on their interests, skills, self-reliance, and traditions, and it must initiate programs that offer them spiritual and economic benefits." Conservation, he adds, "cannot be imposed from above."

NUCLEAR RENEWAL: Common Sense About Energy. By Richard Rhodes. *Whittle Books in association with Viking Publications.* 127 pp. \$17.50

Author of the prize-winning saga *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (1986), Richard Rhodes here looks at the peacetime fallout from that endeavor: nuclear power's current problems and future promise. Today about 100 nuclear plants operate in the United States, more than in any other country, but far fewer than the thousands once predicted for an era of electricity that would be "too cheap to meter."

Rhodes blames nuclear power's "present impasse" on contentious political control by federal and state authorities and unrealistic economic decisions that priced atomic-generated electricity out of the market. "The truth," writes Rhodes, "is that nuclear power was killed, not by its enemies, but by its friends." These friends included greedy manufacturers and contractors who escalated plant size (and costs) for elusive "economies of scale," federal regulators who ignored the financial consequences of their rules, utility executives and rate commissioners who gladly passed rising expenses on to consumers, and members of Congress who pampered the infant nuclear industry with the 1957 Price-Anderson Act, which indemnified utilities from liability for their nuclear accidents.

But while Rhodes explains nuclear power's problems astutely, his account of its promise is misplaced. For example, he hopes to solve today's political and economic problems with a technical solution: the integral fast reactor (IFR). This sodium-cooled nuclear power plant is a beguiling "breeder" reactor of the 1950s, once touted for making extra plutonium fuel but now—in a still unproven metamorphosis—also expected to consume plutonium from other reactors. Rhodes says the IFR will dispel political opposition because it is safer than today's water-