
the drug czar's office for about half a year, focuses more on White House "culture": the social chasm separating the West Wing from the Old Executive Office Building, the catty in-fighting over press leaks, an obsession with perks verging on parody. A series of "Freeze Frames" between chapters offers brief glimpses into the lives of unnamed staffers. Narrated in the second person, they provide readers with a vicarious tour of the Bush administration. Podhoretz can turn a good phrase, but his metaphors need pruning—career government officials "attach themselves and their careers to the public trough with glue as strong as barnacles"—and he sometimes comes off as too clever by half.

Both books convey a strong sense of betrayal as they describe the Bush administration seducing, frustrating, and finally abandoning its many young and ideology-driven staffers. To them, Bush's failure—not as a Republican, but as Reagan's heir—was a personal affront.

THE FATE OF HONG KONG: The Coming of 1997 and What Lies Beyond. *By Gerald Segal.* St. Martin's. 234 pp. \$21.95

What exactly will happen at midnight on June 30, 1997, when the six million people living in the British colony of Hong Kong are handed over to the People's Republic of China? Journalists and businesspeople frequently envision nightmare scenarios. According to one, Hong Kong, accustomed to running itself as a near-perfect market economy, declares its *de facto* independence; the Chinese Communist rulers then forceably put down the "rebellion" and in the process reduce the island to an economic backwater. Even now, the flight of worried emigrants from Hong Kong—who by 1997 may number one million—is putting a damper on the economy.

Segal, editor of the *Pacific Review*, believes that such fears are exaggerated. What may happen, he argues, is in fact happening already. Determined that China avoid the Soviet Union's fate, Deng Xiaoping has put economic growth first and allowed China's regions to develop their own trade with other countries. For the past decade, China's southern Guangdong province has formed a trading alliance with Hong Kong,

the latter acting as the external engine for an unprecedented prosperity in a mainland Chinese region. This economic interdependence, Segal argues, will also reduce the risk of Beijing's intervention. Moreover, further successes in the Guangdong-Hong Kong region will accelerate the economic decentralization of the country, making it easier for the outside world to deal with China.

Such large-scale forecasts, Segal admits, are risky. At present growth rates, China could well be the world's largest economy after the year 2010. Then there's the fact of China's history: Healthy economic regionalism is quite different from a disunited China in chaos, for which there are precedents. But while Hong Kong's economy will surely suffer in the transfer, at this point the potential for overall benefit seems greater than that for overall disaster.

IN EUROPE'S NAME: Germany and the Divided Continent. *By Timothy Garton Ash.* Random House. 680 pp. \$27.50

Timothy Garton Ash is among the more distinguished contemporary journalists specializing in Central European affairs. He has written vivid accounts of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the 1989 revolutions in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, and Berlin. Now he turns his attention to a question that is as big as any in the modern world: How will a reunited Germany exercise its power in the future? To find possible answers, Garton Ash painstakingly reconstructs the history of West Germany's foreign policy from the 1950s to the late 1980s, particularly its strategy of *Ostpolitik*.

The brainchild of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Willy Brandt, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Ostpolitik* was West Germany's strategy for dealing with its neighbors to the east, and was consistently implemented right up to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Its central aim was "normalization": establishing full diplomatic and other relations with the communist countries. Most important, it sought to "stabilize" East Germany both by recognizing its legitimacy and by providing hard currency when its economy faltered. The ultimate goal was reunification.

Reunification was surely achieved, but, as Garton Ash shows, the path to this end was

"radically different from that intended or expected. It was hedged with ironies and paved with unconscious as well as conscious paradoxes." The greatest irony is that *Ostpolitik* achieved its goal inadvertently: By propping up East Germany with recognition and financial support, West Germany allowed the communist regime to skate along without ever attempting the political and economic reforms that other Soviet satellites had to institute. This made East Germany a particularly hollow state, and helps explain why the regime collapsed so completely when it was challenged.

To be sure, West German policy was "very patient, consistent, predictable . . . waiting for the big chance." But when its "consistency hardened into rigidity," it ended up putting West Germany's interests—"order"—above the interests and ideals of Europe, most notably freedom. Moreover, it failed to take note of the broader changes occurring in the communist world. Nevertheless, *Ostpolitik* did succeed in removing an unattractive image of Germany, and, in conjunction with the aggressive public diplomacy of the United States, did contribute to "the necessary mixture of incentive and deterrent, punishment and reward" that helped tear down the Iron Curtain throughout Eastern Europe.

Today, Germany is still "in the condition of becoming." Unlike most powers in history, as historian Fritz Stern has said, Germany is being given a second chance. But its dilemma is essentially the same as it was when the German state's first chance arose a century ago. Being of that "critical size," which Chancellor Kiesinger described in 1967 as "too big to play no role in the balance of forces, too small to keep the forces around it in balance by itself," Germany has to decide what kind of power it will be. Will it play the traditional great-power role or forge a new role based on the conscious habit of not exerting its power to the full?

Garton Ash is not overly optimistic that Germany will use its renewed power—both military and economic—wisely. The style of *Ostpolitik* will probably prevail, which could lead to a cynical exploitation of the ideal of a united Europe for largely German interests. Moreover, the distinctive characteristics of East German culture have to be considered: "It [is] possible that tol-

erance, pluralism, democracy and the virtues of ever closer cooperation [will] spread from west to east." But it is just as possible that "intolerance, tribalism and the forces of disintegration [will] spread from east to west." The re-emergence—however marginal—of a very old-fashioned febrile nationalism at street level in Germany can only reinforce the sober view that Garton Ash takes of the likely future.

Science & Technology

AT THE HAND OF MAN: Peril and Hope for Africa's Wildlife. By Raymond Bonner. Knopf. 322 pp. \$24

THE LAST PANDA. By George B. Schaller. Univ. of Chicago. 291 pp. \$24.95

Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi's 1989 decision to torch \$3 million worth of confiscated elephant ivory was not greeted with universal acclaim by conservationists. Many felt the stunt would serve only to blunt criticism of Kenya's inconsistent enforcement of poaching laws, not to curb such slaughter in the future. Proceeds from the ill-gotten ivory might better be used to fund prevention programs, or even to help feed Kenya's people.

The incident underscores many of the difficulties surrounding contemporary conservation efforts. Individuals and organizations devoted to saving endangered species often reside in Western countries far removed from the areas where such animals live. They have difficulty appreciating the indigenous perspective on conservation, and often fail to anticipate the potential consequences of their proposals.

Not surprisingly, the leaders of many African nations, carrying bitter memories of the colonial period, resent foreign intrusion into their affairs. Many nations, beset by civil strife and economic woes, also lack the resources or even the desire to preserve endangered animals. A curious dilemma exists concerning large-animal herds. While government officials recognize that the animals attract tourist dollars, maintaining large preserves inhibits efforts to convert land to agricultural use. And should an elephant wander out of a park and trample a farmer's crops, it is hard to convince the farmer not to kill it, espe-