benefactor of the Japanese electronics industry that some critics seem to think it has." And today, Zinsmeister asserts, the Japanese "are discarding industrial policy and government management of their economy—a widely underreported fact in the West." Fact or not, it does not seem to have ended the raucous debate over industrial policy in the United States.

Democracy in Africa

"Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa" by Carol Lancaster and "The Failure of Democratic Reform in Angola and Zaire" by Keith Somerville, in *Survival* (Autumn 1993), International Inst. for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London WC2E 7NQ.

Progress toward democracy in the 47 African nations south of the Sahara has been widespread, if uneven, in recent years. Fifteen African nations can now be regarded as democracies, notes Georgetown University's Lancaster, an adviser to the U.S. Agency for International Development, and at least some political liberalization has taken place in 24 others. Only five countries—two of them, Somalia and Liberia, without any functioning governments whatsoever—have made no progress at all. In three other nations, however—Angola, Zaire, and Togo—democratization has been cut short by violence. Do similar fates await Africa's other nascent democracies?

The successful Free Namibia Campaign used this optimistic print by Namibian artist John Ndevasia Muafangejo (1943-87).

Somerville, a BBC specialist in African affairs, is quite pessimistic. Hopes for Angola and Zaire, he notes, were high just a few years ago. People danced in the streets of the Angolan capital of Luanda on May 31, 1991, in celebration of a peace agreement ending a 16-year civil war. In Zaire, a new democratic constitution was to be drafted by a national conference, in accordance with the promise made in April 1990 by President Mobuto Sese Seko. Today, however, Angola's civil war has resumed and Zaire is in near-chaos.

Mobutu, who agreed only grudgingly to democratic reforms, has used his control of the security forces and the army to keep the government set up by the national conference, headed by Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi, from functioning. With Zaire's economy in ruins, Mobutu has relied on the black market, including the diamond trade, to pay his military and other supporters.

Since the 1991 cease-fire in nearby Angola, Zaire has continued to play a role there, backing Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and, to their mutual profit, serving as a middleman for the sale of diamonds smuggled out of Angola by UNITA and private individuals.

During the Cold War, Savimbi's rebel UNITA had U.S. backing, while the Angolan government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) enjoyed

Soviet and Cuban support. With the Cold War over, Portugal, the United States, and the Soviet Union were able to bring about the 1991 accord. Implementation got off to a good start, Somerville notes. The cease-fire held and the two main protagonists appeared to shift to verbal warfare. The September 1992 elections were held without major incident, but when UNITA lost, Savimbi tried to seize control of the airport in Luanda—and the civil war resumed. Thousands of Angolans have since died.

Western leaders, Somerville believes, overestimated the impact of the Cold War's end and set their hopes for African democracy too high. Lancaster, however, is less gloomy. Africa's "economic conditions, social diversity, and political history do not provide strong grounds for optimism," she acknowledges, but important political changes have taken place.

Growing numbers of individual Africans support democracy, she notes. Many of them have suffered under authoritarian regimes and do not want to repeat the experience. Also, human rights, civic, and other nongovernmental groups have sprung up. The collapse of Soviet-style communism has made it harder for aspiring autocrats to provide ideological justifications for their rule, and Western governments have put pressure on African governments to implement reforms. All this does not guarantee a bright future. But "as the experience[s] of Europe and Latin America have shown," Lancaster concludes, "political freedom can be addictive."

A Golden Parachute For Mr. Castro?

"Waiting for the Blowout—Hurricane Fidel" by Tad Szulc, in *The Washington Spectator* (Oct. 1, 1993), London Terrace Station, P.O. Box 20065, New York, N.Y. 10011.

After nearly 35 years in power and at age 66, Cuba's Fidel Castro is almost certainly nearing the end of his rule. The question is whether or not the transition from his "socialist" regime to whatever comes after it can be accomplished without civil war and massive bloodshed. Szulc, a former *New York Times* correspondent who has known the Cuban leader for more than three decades and is the author of a 1986 biography, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait*, believes that Castro realizes that his revolution and regime have run their course. Anti-Castro incidents, most taking place under the cover of darkness, are on the rise. There have been attacks on police stations in the countryside, windows smashed at Communist Party offices in provincial towns, and anti-Castro graffiti scrawled on walls. "This has never happened before," Szulc says, "and there are more and more reasons to believe that despite his still-fiery rhetoric, Castro himself would be amenable to a negotiated settlement if he were allowed a face-saving exit."

The Cuban economy, no longer propped up by the Soviet Union, can scarcely get much worse. "Eleven million Cubans survive on the edge of disaster today with much of their labor force unemployed, with nagging food shortages, and amid deepening social decomposition," Szulc notes. Farmers, lacking fuel, have replaced their tractors with oxen. In the cities, cars, buses, and trucks have been replaced by bicycles and horse-drawn carts.

How long Cuba can continue in this condition is uncertain, but the danger of an explosion grows with each passing day, Szulc warns, "especially if Washington allows the Florida-based armed mercenaries of Castro's exiled opponents to appear to challenge him with threats of military incursions. The resulting civil war would inevitably bring a lethal wave of vengeance and a bloody settling of personal and political scores." Such bloodshed, taking place only "90 miles from home," could suck in the United States.

For now, Szulc notes, Castro's position is "reasonably secure." The Cuban leader retains the support of the military and the security forces. There is "no widely organized opposition to his rule, and no threatening rival waits in exile." Because he still is popular with many Cubans and has no known serious rival, Castro is in a good position to negotiate with the United States over his own departure from power. For its part, the United States—if it can set aside its long-standing animosity toward the Communist Maximum Leader—is now in a position to ease the transition to a post-Castro Cuba.