

can rule from 1776 to 1940—and, arguably, to 1947,” Carlson notes. “Military regulations uniformly forbade the peacetime enlistment of married men, and discouraged marriage thereafter.” In time of total war, of course, married men were called to arms. The bachelors-only policy stemmed partly from the traditional American aversion to standing armies. But it also was a time-honored way of reconciling “the military’s need for a soldier’s full obedience, immediate availability, frequent movement, and extended service with a man’s natural desire to settle down and procreate.” Only senior officers were exempt from the marriage stricture.

But the Cold War, Carlson notes, resulted in “a kind of permanent mobilization.” The armed services swelled to several million. By 1960, dependent wives and children for the first time outnumbered uniformed personnel in the active force. Today, about 60 percent of those on active duty have spouses or other dependents. A new twist was added with the integration of women into the services, beginning in the 1970s. The changes raise difficult sexual and child-care issues, not to mention costs. In fiscal year 1994, outlays for dependent health care, family housing, and other items may consume \$25 billion, or one-tenth of the nation’s military budget.

With the Cold War over, Carlson argues, America should get women and married men—and a lot of other people—out of the military. He favors a radically reduced army: An “expeditionary force” of only 250,000 to 300,000 professionals. For the possible “big war,” he proposes a Swiss-style citizen force, aided by up to 50,000

full-time professional officers and noncommissioned officers. Beginning at age 21, all males would be required to serve six years in the active militia, but they would be free to marry.

Giving Up the Bomb

“Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb” by J. W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, in *Foreign Affairs* (Nov.–Dec. 1993), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Who could have guessed that the first nation ever to engage in unilateral nuclear disarmament would be South Africa, long one of the world’s “pariah states”? After confirming suspicions that South Africa possessed “a limited nuclear deterrent capability,” President F. W. de Klerk announced last March that his country had disarmed itself. De Villiers, chairman of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, Jardine, national coordinator of science and technology policy for the African National Congress (ANC), and Reiss, a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, say that Pretoria had come to realize that its nuclear weapons “were not only superfluous but actually counterproductive.”

South Africa, which possesses abundant reserves of uranium, decided by the late 1950s to create a nuclear research and development program for peaceful purposes. By the late 1960s it had constructed a uranium-enrichment plant, which made the manufacture of material for nuclear weapons possible. In 1974 John Vorster, then prime minister, approved development of a nuclear-explosive capability limited, the authors say, to such purposes as mining excavation. During the next several years, Pretoria decided to build a nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, six bombs were fully assembled.

That decision, formalized in 1978, “is best understood in light of [South Africa’s] international standing at the time,” the authors say. Pretoria’s relations with the rest of the world were rapidly deteriorating; it feared, as de Klerk noted in March, “a Soviet expansionist threat to southern Africa,” and it was worried about the imminent independence of neighboring Zimbabwe under an actively antiapartheid regime. It was alarmed by its “relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance should it be attacked.” Under the strat-



egy adopted in 1978, the government would neither confirm nor deny that it had a nuclear-weapons capability; but in the event of a military threat, it would reveal that capability covertly, or if necessary overtly.

"Toward the end of the 1980s—after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independence of Namibia, the cessation of hostilities in Angola, and the withdrawal from that country of 50,000 Cuban troops—South Africa saw clearly that the nuclear deterrent was becoming superfluous," the authors write. Indeed, the deterrent was becoming a burden. Signing the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, "would have distinct advantages for South Africa's international relations, especially those with other African countries." Soon after de

Klerk won the presidency in September 1989, the decision was made to dismantle the nuclear arsenal, close down the enrichment plant, and destroy technical drawings. This was accomplished by early July 1991.

South Africa signed the NPT on July 10, 1991, and two months later concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. After next April's unprecedented non-racial elections, an ANC-led government is expected to take office. There remains the question of what the new government will do with the country's stockpile of enriched uranium. The authors are hopeful: "ANC President Nelson Mandela has declared that South Africa must never again allow its resources, scientists, and engineers to produce weapons of mass destruction."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Did Deregulation Work?

"Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists" by Clifford Winston, in *Journal of Economic Literature* (Sept. 1993), American Economic Assoc., 2014 Broadway, Ste. 305, Nashville, Tenn. 37203.

Soon after the Carter administration began deregulating airlines in 1978, airfares rose and airline profits dropped. Does that mean that deregulation failed? Not at all, argues Winston, of the Brookings Institution. The 1979 energy crisis drove fuel prices higher—and it was *that* increase that brought about the hike in fares and the drop in profits. Isolate the effects of the energy crisis, as some economists have, and it turns out that fares were *lower* and profits *higher* than they would have been without deregulation.

During the 1970s and early '80s, other industries—including railroads, trucking, cable TV, telecommunications, banking, natural gas, and petroleum—were also deregulated. The share of gross national product (GNP) produced by fully regulated industries fell from 17 percent in 1977 to less than seven percent in 1988. Economists, through their research, generally supported this movement. In trying to assess its impact, Win-

ston notes, many popular analysts simply compare the "before" and "after" snapshots, and if the latter seems worse, conclude that deregulation failed. Winston argues that the trouble with that approach, as the airline case illustrates, is that it fails to take into account the impact of the business cycle, technological developments, or other changes in the economy that may be taking place at the same time.

Studies in which economists try to account for such changes, Winston says, show that deregulation has indeed improved the economy's efficiency: "Society has gained at least \$36–46 billion (1990 dollars) annually from deregulation, primarily in the transportation industries. . . . This amounts to a seven–nine percent improvement in the part of GNP affected by regulatory reform." Consumers have been the main beneficiaries. For labor, the impact has been mixed, with some small wage losses but some modest employment gains. Producers, surprisingly, "have actually benefited, on net, from reform." Airlines have enjoyed a substantial increase in profits; the well-publicized financial difficulties they experienced at various times during the past decade resulted from rises in fuel prices, general economic downturns, or other factors,