
The New Crusaders

In the *National Interest* (Winter 1993–94), Alan Tonelson, research director of the Economic Strategy Institute, discerns a new willingness to use force abroad on the part of certain liberals, such as *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis.

Although many of the new internationalists opposed fighting "a war for oil," they have favored using military force—even unilaterally, if necessary—in areas such as Kurdistan, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. No significant U.S. interests are at stake in these regions, but liberals have portrayed intervention as necessary to advance internationalism's key systemic goals: greater international prosperity and stability, as well as a kinder, gentler world. If successful, such peacekeeping, peace-making, and nation-building operations would also further the grander internationalist objective of a true world community governed by law rather than force—an objective they see as the ultimate guarantor of American security and prosperity, and which has been dear to liberal hearts since the Enlightenment. . . .

So striking has been the contrast between Gulf and post-Gulf stances of liberals, that some of their critics sardonically accuse them of favoring military actions only when no serious purely U.S. interests are at stake. But this jibe points to a central truth about liberal internationalism. Whether during the Cold War or after the Cold War, purely U.S. national interests were never its top priority. In fact, they were not even supposed to exist.

pectation of conflict, and the necessity of taking care of one's interests, one may wonder how a state with the economic capability of a great power can refrain from arming itself with the weapons that have served so well as the great deterrent."

Japan, for example, must worry about China (and vice versa). "China is rapidly becoming a great power in every dimension: internal economy, external trade, and military capability. . . . Unless Japan responds to the growing power of China, China will dominate its region and become increasingly influential beyond it." China, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea, all have nuclear arms to deter threats against their vital interests. "Increasingly, Japan will be pressed to follow suit."

What will the new world be like? "Germany, Japan, and Russia will have to relearn their old

great-power roles, and the United States will have to learn a role it has never played before," Waltz says. No longer will Washington be able to make policies unilaterally. International politics, however, will remain basically anarchic, Waltz believes. Strategic nuclear weapons are useful only for deterrence. Since all the great powers will have such deterrents, the importance of conventional military forces will be reduced. That "will focus the minds of national leaders on their technological and economic successes and failures."

Although there may be more democratic, and fewer authoritarian, states in the new world, that does not mean that "the Wilsonian vision of a peaceful, stable, and just international order" is on the verge of realization, Waltz cautions. Democratic states, too, have conflicts. The War of 1812 was fought by two democracies (Britain and the United States); so was the Civil War. "A relative harmony

can, and sometimes does, prevail among nations," he says, "but always precariously so."

The Few, the Proud, The Single

"Your Honey or Your Life" by Allan Carlson, in *Policy Review* (Fall 1993), The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002-4999.

When Marine Corps commandant Carl Mundy announced last August that the corps would cease accepting married recruits and discourage postenlistment weddings, he was swiftly overruled. Nevertheless, "the weight of American history and military tradition was firmly on General Mundy's side," writes Carlson, author of *Family Questions* (1988).

"A 'bachelor' military force was the Ameri-

can rule from 1776 to 1940—and, arguably, to 1947,” Carlson notes. “Military regulations uniformly forbade the peacetime enlistment of married men, and discouraged marriage thereafter.” In time of total war, of course, married men were called to arms. The bachelors-only policy stemmed partly from the traditional American aversion to standing armies. But it also was a time-honored way of reconciling “the military’s need for a soldier’s full obedience, immediate availability, frequent movement, and extended service with a man’s natural desire to settle down and procreate.” Only senior officers were exempt from the marriage stricture.

But the Cold War, Carlson notes, resulted in “a kind of permanent mobilization.” The armed services swelled to several million. By 1960, dependent wives and children for the first time outnumbered uniformed personnel in the active force. Today, about 60 percent of those on active duty have spouses or other dependents. A new twist was added with the integration of women into the services, beginning in the 1970s. The changes raise difficult sexual and child-care issues, not to mention costs. In fiscal year 1994, outlays for dependent health care, family housing, and other items may consume \$25 billion, or one-tenth of the nation’s military budget.

With the Cold War over, Carlson argues, America should get women and married men—and a lot of other people—out of the military. He favors a radically reduced army: An “expeditionary force” of only 250,000 to 300,000 professionals. For the possible “big war,” he proposes a Swiss-style citizen force, aided by up to 50,000

full-time professional officers and noncommissioned officers. Beginning at age 21, all males would be required to serve six years in the active militia, but they would be free to marry.

Giving Up the Bomb

“Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb” by J. W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, in *Foreign Affairs* (Nov.–Dec. 1993), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Who could have guessed that the first nation ever to engage in unilateral nuclear disarmament would be South Africa, long one of the world’s “pariah states”? After confirming suspicions that South Africa possessed “a limited nuclear deterrent capability,” President F. W. de Klerk announced last March that his country had disarmed itself. De Villiers, chairman of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, Jardine, national coordinator of science and technology policy for the African National Congress (ANC), and Reiss, a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, say that Pretoria had come to realize that its nuclear weapons “were not only superfluous but actually counterproductive.”

South Africa, which possesses abundant reserves of uranium, decided by the late 1950s to create a nuclear research and development program for peaceful purposes. By the late 1960s it had constructed a uranium-enrichment plant, which made the manufacture of material for nuclear weapons possible. In 1974 John Vorster, then prime minister, approved development of a nuclear-explosive capability limited, the authors say, to such purposes as mining excavation. During the next several years, Pretoria decided to build a nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, six bombs were fully assembled.

That decision, formalized in 1978, “is best understood in light of [South Africa’s] international standing at the time,” the authors say. Pretoria’s relations with the rest of the world were rapidly deteriorating; it feared, as de Klerk noted in March, “a Soviet expansionist threat to southern Africa,” and it was worried about the imminent independence of neighboring Zimbabwe under an actively antiapartheid regime. It was alarmed by its “relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance should it be attacked.” Under the strat-

