
ture sign pledges to vote for the winner of the primary. Progressives in other states followed suit. By 1910, 27 state legislatures had been pushed to petition Congress for a constitutional amendment. Two years later, the Senate finally gave in, and in 1913 the 17th Amendment became law after it was ratified by three-fourths of the states. A 28th Amendment, the authors say, could be only a few years away.

Court Costs

"Dwarfing the Political Capacity of the People? The Relationship Between Judicial Activism & Voter Turnout, 1840-1988" by Philip A. Klinkner, in *Polity* (Summer 1993), Thompson Hall, Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. 01003.

Legal scholars have long debated whether or not Supreme Court activism discourages public participation in electoral politics. Klinkner, of Loyola Marymount University, sides with the critics of activism. Comparing voter turnout in congressional and presidential elections between 1840 and 1988 with the number of federal, state, and local laws overturned by the Supreme Court during the two years before each election, he finds a troubling pattern.

Until the 1890s, turnout relative to the aver-

ages for the entire 148-year period was very high and "judicial activism" very low. (Usually fewer than a dozen laws were overturned in each two-year period.) From the 1890s to the 1930s, his index of activism rose to an average of 30 and voter turnout dropped. From the 1930s until 1960, the opposite pattern prevailed; and between 1960 and 1988, the pattern reversed itself again.

Since most people have only a very limited knowledge of what the Supreme Court is doing, a question arises: *How* does judicial activism depress turnout? Klinkner suggests that activism by the Court has its most direct impact on labor unions and other organizations that get out the vote. The activist Warren and Burger courts of 1953-86, for example, often let liberal interest groups achieve their goals without having to win popular support; hence, such groups put their money and energy into litigation rather than voter mobilization.

The possibility that judicial activism may result in more voters staying home on Election Day does not mean, in Klinkner's view, that the high court should always sit on its hands. In *Brown v. Board of Education*, the 1954 ruling outlawing school segregation, the requirements of justice were clear. The lesson, Klinkner asserts, is rather "that judicial activism may not be cost-free."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Filling a Vacuum

"The Emerging Structure of International Politics" by Kenneth N. Waltz, in *International Security* (Fall 1993), Center for Science and International Affairs, 79 John F. Kennedy St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States stands supreme, its power virtually unchecked. This will not last, promises Waltz, a prominent political scientist at the University of California at Berkeley. Within the next 10 to 20 years, he predicts, Germany (or perhaps a "United States of Europe"), Japan, and China may well become great powers—probably joined by Russia—all armed with nuclear weapons.

Waltz does not find the nuclear prospect trou-

bling. "China and other countries have become nuclear powers without making the world a more dangerous one," he argues. "Why should nuclear weapons in German and Japanese hands be especially worrisome? Nuclear weapons have encouraged cautious behavior by their possessors and deterred any of them from threatening others' vital interests."

Will Japan or Germany, already economic powerhouses, *want* to become great powers? Probably, Waltz believes. As memories of World War II fade, so will Japanese and German nuclear inhibitions. "Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict. Why should the future be different from the past? Given the ex-

The New Crusaders

In the *National Interest* (Winter 1993–94), Alan Tonelson, research director of the Economic Strategy Institute, discerns a new willingness to use force abroad on the part of certain liberals, such as *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis.

Although many of the new internationalists opposed fighting “a war for oil,” they have favored using military force—even unilaterally, if necessary—in areas such as Kurdistan, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. No significant U.S. interests are at stake in these regions, but liberals have portrayed intervention as necessary to advance internationalism’s key systemic goals: greater international prosperity and stability, as well as a kinder, gentler world. If successful, such peacekeeping, peace-making, and nation-building operations would also further the grander internationalist objective of a true world community governed by law rather than force—an objective they see as the ultimate guarantor of American security and prosperity, and which has been dear to liberal hearts since the Enlightenment. . . .

So striking has been the contrast between Gulf and post-Gulf stances of liberals, that some of their critics sardonically accuse them of favoring military actions only when no serious purely U.S. interests are at stake. But this jibe points to a central truth about liberal internationalism. Whether during the Cold War or after the Cold War, purely U.S. national interests were never its top priority. In fact, they were not even supposed to exist.

pectation of conflict, and the necessity of taking care of one’s interests, one may wonder how a state with the economic capability of a great power can refrain from arming itself with the weapons that have served so well as the great deterrent.”

Japan, for example, must worry about China (and vice versa). “China is rapidly becoming a great power in every dimension: internal economy, external trade, and military capability. . . . Unless Japan responds to the growing power of China, China will dominate its region and become increasingly influential beyond it.” China, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea, all have nuclear arms to deter threats against their vital interests. “Increasingly, Japan will be pressed to follow suit.”

What will the new world be like? “Germany, Japan, and Russia will have to relearn their old

great-power roles, and the United States will have to learn a role it has never played before,” Waltz says. No longer will Washington be able to make policies unilaterally. International politics, however, will remain basically anarchic, Waltz believes. Strategic nuclear weapons are useful only for deterrence. Since all the great powers will have such deterrents, the importance of conventional military forces will be reduced. That “will focus the minds of national leaders on their technological and economic successes and failures.”

Although there may be more democratic, and fewer authoritarian, states in the new world, that does not mean that “the Wilsonian vision of a peaceful, stable, and just international order” is on the verge of realization, Waltz cautions. Democratic states, too, have conflicts. The War of 1812 was fought by two democracies (Britain and the United States); so was the Civil War. “A relative harmony

can, and sometimes does, prevail among nations,” he says, “but always precariously so.”

The Few, the Proud, The Single

“Your Honey or Your Life” by Allan Carlson, in *Policy Review* (Fall 1993), The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002–4999.

When Marine Corps commandant Carl Mundy announced last August that the corps would cease accepting married recruits and discourage postenlistment weddings, he was swiftly overruled. Nevertheless, “the weight of American history and military tradition was firmly on General Mundy’s side,” writes Carlson, author of *Family Questions* (1988).

“A ‘bachelor’ military force was the Ameri-