for the same crimes. That fear turned out to be misguided, Forer claims. In a survey of her own court's sentencing during the early '70s, she found that conservative and liberal judges consistently imposed similar sentences in similar circumstances. In fact, under mandatory guidelines, sentencing has become far more discriminatory, though now differences result far more from the color of the accused than from the political leanings of the judge. Prosecutors, who now have the power to sentence, notoriously convict a disproportionate percentage of minority defendants, and black defendants receive the death penalty at a far higher rate than whites.

The estimated re-incarceration rate for released prisoners in the United States is 41 percent, and it costs the government \$35,000 a year or more to keep each prisoner behind bars. Does it make sense to keep throwing bad actors back into the prisons at such an expense? A doctoral candidate at the Wharton School of Business found that less than a quarter of the 600 felons Forer had sentenced-most to probation and payment of restitution—were rearrested for other crimes. One such case involved Willie, an illiterate 19-year-old gang member who was convicted of aggravated assault for injuring a member of a rival gang in what police called a routine rumble. Rather than send Willie to jail, as she now would be forced to do, Forer put him on strict probation for five years. She required him to live in a supervised group home, to learn to read, to find work, and to pay a \$300 fine by the end of the fifth year. With the help of an unusually conscientious parole officer, Willie finished parole with a high school diploma, a job, his own apartment, and a wife (Forer performed the wedding ceremony). Perhaps most important, Willie had no new arrests.

**THE GREEN CRUSADE:** Rethinking the Roots of Environmentalism. *By Charles T. Rubin. Free Press.* 312 pp. \$22.95

Two centuries after the nation's founding, environmentalism is probably the closest thing Americans have to a civic religion. While it is illegal to pray aloud in school and suspect to salute the flag, it is not thought unusual if

schools teach a fantastic environmentalist catechism of devastation and disaster that suggests, among other things, that Planet Earth will soon be reduced to a lifeless cinder if children let the water run while brushing their teeth.

If this really is a new order in the making, Rubin's intellectual survey of its founding mothers and fathers does not offer much encouragement for the next two centuries. In the work of Rachel Carson, Paul Ehrlich, E. F. Schumacher, and the handful of other environmental popularizers he carefully scrutinizes, the Duquesne University political scientist finds internal contradictions and, worse, sloppy and often downright dishonest science employed to advance half-hidden utopian political agendas. Rubin is not a shrill critic, however, and he points out that others have erred in labeling these environmentalists Luddites. Indeed, he argues, it is their technological optimism and faith in a rationally designed world that often leads them into totalitarian temptations: Follow my plan and we will solve all human problems, they suggest.

Their faith in certain visions of progress blinds both environmentalists and their critics to the complexities of human needs and desires, Rubin writes. But oddly enough he looks for a remedy in the scientific method, hoping that future environmental prophets will see its virtues. One exemplary figure is British scientist James Lovelock, who, in response to scientists' criticisms over the years, has continually revised his famous Gaia hypothesis, which suggests that the earth is a kind of self-regulating entity working toward the optimum conditions of life. Another is René Dubos, whose famous slogan "Think Globally, Act Locally" Rubin sees as a rejection of the dangerous "everythingism" of environmentalism, in which the connection of one problem to all others allows nothing but allencompassing solutions.

It is not encouraging to read Rubin's chapter on the likely next generation of environmentalist popularizers. "Deep ecologists" such as Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess and American academics William Devall and George Sessions dismiss their predecessors as mere "reform environmentalists" and criticize them for accepting the corrupt "anthropocentric" view that

human beings enjoy a "privileged" status in nature. Aptly enough, Rubin calls this chapter "The Mind O'erthrown."

**THE WAGES OF GUILT:** Memories of War in Germany and Japan. *By Ian Buruma. Farrar Straus.* 330 pp. \$25

To Ian Buruma as a child, the first enemies were the Germans—this despite his having been born in the Netherlands six years after

World War II ended. The old animosity persisted in Holland, where adults kept it fresh for children too young to have experienced the war's reality. Despite the cultural similarities between the two nations, or because of them, the

Dutch after the war drew clear borders, geographical and mental, to keep the Germans beyond the pale.

In his early forties, Buruma began to wonder how the Germans remembered the war. Having lived in and written about Asia for many years (he was the arts editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review), he also began to wonder the same about the Japanese. So in his fourth book, which blends history, sociology, political commentary, and cultural appreciation, he set out to explore the complex psychological legacy of World War II for the two defeated nations.

A clear-eyed observer alert to rote pieties and practiced evasions, Buruma is curious why so many Germans today are obsessed with the war and the Nazis, with mourning and remembrance, when 30 years ago they were accused of being unable to mourn. The turning point, Buruma found, was the broadcast of the American miniseries *Holocaust* on German television in January 1979. Although it was entertainment, not art, it struck home with the Germans as nothing had before, unleashing the introspection that continues to this day. Buruma believes German memory is now like "a massive tongue seeking out, over

and over, the sore tooth." Although many of those old enough to have lived through the Nazi years would prefer to forget, the young especially want the past rehearsed, to establish a moral superiority over their parents and to "crack their guilty silence."

This German preoccupation with guilt over old horrors puzzles the Japanese, who are far more reluctant to come to grips with their wartime past. Why is the collective German memory so different from that of the Japanese? Buruma suggests various possible reasons: Japan is an

Asian shame culture, Germany, a Christian guilt culture; the Japanese were responsible for much unspeakable cruelty—the atrocities the army committed against the Chinese at Nanjing in 1937 were kept hidden for years from the Japa-

nese public—but for no Holocaust; finally, to some Japanese, the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki argue powerfully that they were victims.

For Buruma, the explanation lies less in the history of the war than in the history of the postwar political arrangement imposed on the Japanese, "a generous version of the Versailles Treaty: loss of sovereignty without financial squeeze." The Japanese were encouraged to get rich, while matters of war were taken out of their hands. The same corrupt party stayed in power for more than 40 years. The settlement helped to stifle public debate and has, in his view, kept the Japanese from political maturity: "As far as the history of World War II was concerned, the debate got stuck in the late 1940s."

Buruma believes that Japan will not develop a grown-up attitude toward the past until it is allowed political responsibility over matters of war and peace. That the justice minister in the Japanese government newly come to power in the spring of 1994 could dismiss the massacre at Nanjing as a "fabrication" shows the distance still to be traveled. That he was fired three days later shows there is hope.