artists. In recent years, however, many of their successors—including novelist Roddy Doyle, poet Ciaran Carson, playwright Brian Friel (*Dancing at Lughnasa*), and film directors Jim Sheridan (*In the Name of the Father*) and Neil Jordan (*The Crying Game*)—have bucked the expatriate tradition. "By staying in Ireland and writing out of their experience of it, they have had to [deal with] a period of radical change and unsettlement" on the island, observes O'Toole, a columnist for the *Irish Times*. Their work, as a result, has aroused international interest in modern Ireland.

For artists from the North, such as Brian Friel (who lives in rural Donegal) and fellow playwright Frank McGuinness (*Someone Who'll Watch Over Me*), dealing with change "has meant facing up to the traumas of the Northern Ireland conflict over the past 25 years," O'Toole says.

For those from the Republic of Ireland, the change has been less dramatic but still considerable. Roddy Doyle, Neil Jordan, Jim Sheridan, and the members of the rock band U2 live in Dublin. "The working class urban experience described by Roddy Doyle, the dislocated city sounds of U2, the wild side of sexuality in the films of Neil Jordan," O'Toole points out, "all speak of an Ireland very far removed from the world of farm, pub, and kitchen that was typical of Irish novels and plays up to the 1960s."

Elsewhere in Europe, it is said that international (i.e. American) film and music are overwhelming local cultures. Not in Ireland, O'Toole maintains. "By taking hold of the new forms, Irish artists have been able to gain both new ways of expressing themselves and the international audience that film and rock music bring." The Dublin soul band in Doyle's novel *The Commitments* is "a good symbol," O'Toole believes, "of the way in which Ireland has taken the new cultural influences from the international mainstream and made something fresh and distinctive from them." The book gave rise to a movie that was internationally popular, which in turn led to a most unlikely spectacle, an Irish soul album rising on the charts of America's *Billboard* magazine.

Rotten in Russia

"The Russian 'Mafiya' " by Stephen Handelman, in *Foreign Affairs* (Mar.–Apr. 1994), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Though frequently discussed by Western observers, organized crime in Russia is often underestimated, contends Handelman, a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University's Harriman Institute and former Moscow bureau chief for the *Toronto Star*. It has become "a dagger pointed at the heart of Russian democracy."

Large criminal organizations, led by godfathers known as *vory v zakonye* (thieves-in-law), first surfaced during the 1960s in many Russian cities, often operating in tandem with government officials. During the 1970s and '80s, Russians be-


AT LAST MAFIA IS IN OUR HANDS...
VLADIMIR MOCHALOV

The view from Krokodil, *a Moscow magazine.*

gan using the word *mafiya* to describe "the vast networks of corruption lurking inside regional and central ministries," Handelman says. Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*, by expanding the realm of private commerce, gave the "underground tycoons and party barons" a legitimate outlet for their secret wealth. "Black and gray money poured into the stock exchanges, joint ventures, cooperatives, banks, and joint stock companies that were otherwise celebrated abroad as harbingers of economic reform." By the late 1980s, according to Russian analysts, most of the small cooperative businesses established during *perestroika* were either controlled by criminal elements or heavily in debt to them. Liberalization since has eased the way for the *mafiya*. "In the absence of government regulation, criminal cartels have infiltrated banks, real-estate markets, stock exchanges, and even the rock-music industry." Popular support for economic reform has been undercut.

Smuggling has become the *mafiya*'s main source of revenue. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party machine, huge quantities of copper, zinc, and other metals were shipped from central Russia in unmarked trucks or military aircraft to Baltic ports and then to Scandinavia or Western Europe.

A Faithful Leninist

Did Joseph Stalin betray Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the promise of Leninism? Western Communists and their sympathizers said so for many decades, but Harvard University historian Richard Pipes, writing in the *American Scholar* (Spring 1994), offers a different view.

An examination of Stalin's career reveals that he did not seize power after Lenin's death [in 1924] *but ascended to it, step by step, initially under Lenin's sponsorship. Lenin came to rely on Stalin in managing the party apparatus, especially after 1920, when the party was torn by democratic heresies. . . . [Contrary] to Trotsky's retrospective claims, Lenin depended not on him but on his rival to carry on much of the day-to-day business of government and to advise him on a great variety of issues of domestic and foreign policy. . . . That in the last months of his active life Lenin developed doubts about Stalin and came close to breaking off personal relations with him should not obscure the fact that until that moment he had done everything in his power to promote Stalin's ascendancy. And even when Lenin became disappointed with his protégé, the shortcomings he attributed to him were not very serious—mainly rudeness and impatience—and related more to his managerial qualifications than to his personality. There is no indication that Lenin ever saw Stalin as a traitor to his brand of communism.*

But even the one difference separating the two men—that Lenin did not kill fellow Communists and Stalin did so on a massive scale—is not as significant as may appear at first sight. Toward outsiders, people not belonging to his order of the elect—and that included 99.7 percent of his compatriots—Lenin showed no human feelings whatever, sending them to their death by the tens of thousands, often to serve as an example to others. . . . Lenin's insiders were to Stalin outsiders, people who owed loyalty not to him but to the Party's founder and who competed with him for power; and toward them, he showed the same inhuman cruelty that Lenin had displayed against his enemies.

Beyond the strong personal links binding the two men, Stalin was a true Leninist in that he faithfully followed his patron's political philosophy and practices. Every ingredient of what has come to be known as Stalinism save one—murdering fellow Communists—he had learned from Lenin, and that includes the two actions for which he is most severely condemned: collectivization and mass terror. Stalin's megalomania, his vindictiveness, his morbid paranoia, and other odious personal qualities should not obscure the fact that his ideology and modus operandi were Lenin's.

Today, some 3,000 to 4,000 gangs, with perhaps 100,000 members, are operating in Russia, Handelman reports. "Gangland murders, bomb explosions, kidnappings, and gun battles have become part of daily life." Crime jumped by one-third between 1991 and '92. In a 1992 survey, three out of four Muscovites said they were afraid to walk the streets at night. Such fears have built support for extremists such as ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who has advocated shooting lawbreakers on sight.

Russia's new leaders, Handelman contends, "have failed to adopt any significant measures to curb organized crime." As the law stands now, police may arrest people they catch in a criminal act, but the "mastermind" who is not on the scene cannot be prosecuted. Handelman advocates Western assistance not only to beef up Russia's police and criminal justice system but to help to develop viable banking and legal systems.

Turkey's Democratic Secret

"Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy" by Bernard Lewis, in *Middle East Quarterly* (Mar. 1994), 4304 Osage Ave., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

Democracy has reached the seedling stage in many parts of the globe recently, but has not flourished in the Islamic world. Of the 51 sovereign states in the International Islamic Conference, only one—the Turkish Republic—has experienced more than one democratic transfer of power. Lewis, an emeritus professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University, is not entirely satisfied with the standard explanation of Turkey's success.

He does not disagree with many of the major points commonly made. It is important that, unlike most of the Islamic lands of Asia and Africa, Turkey was never subject to imperial rule or domination. "The Turks were always masters in their own house, and, indeed, in many other houses, for a long period," Lewis notes. Modern Turkey, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), emerged from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Its politics was not built around a national liberation movement.

Nor was full democracy introduced all at once. Beginning under the later Ottoman rulers, Turkey "went through successive phases of limited democracy, laying the foundations for further development, and, at the same time, encouraging the rise of civil society," with its "mediating institutions"—the neglected factor, Lewis believes, in Turkey's success. Gradually, "a professional, technical, managerial, entrepreneurial middle class" emerged. By its own efforts, and not by some accident, such as the presence of oil in the subsoil, Turkey was able to achieve significant economic growth, an important undergirding for democracy.

"It is not easy to create and maintain free institutions," Lewis notes, "in a region of age-old authoritarian traditions, in a political culture where religion and ethics have been more concerned with duties than with rights, in which obedience to legitimate authority is a religious obligation as well as a political necessity, and disobedience a sin as well as a crime." Indeed, some observers have considered Atatürk's separation of religion and state the crucial difference between Turkey and the rest of the Muslim world.

But when it diminishes civil society, modernization can work *against* democracy, Lewis points out. The pre-Atatürk modernization in some ways did this. It strengthened the power of the sultans while weakening or eliminating mediating institutions: the religious establishment, the military establishment, and the *ayan* ("notables, who amounted to a provincial gentry and magistracy").

The movement for constitutional and representative government that began in 19th-century Turkey, Lewis says, was not just a drive "to import or imitate Western practices," but an effort "to restore . . . old established rights, and to restrain what was perceived as a newly imposed despotism." Perhaps because of this reform tradition, modern Turkish rulers seem to appreciate the importance of mediating—and sometimes troublesome—institutions such as independent newspapers and trade unions. The spread of such bedrock institutions of civil society, Lewis says, is vital to the spread of democracy in the Middle East.