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began thinking, voting, and even espousing Republicanism with a capital R." Under President Richard M. Nixon and later GOP administrations, moreover, the military was given greater authority in setting military policy within the Pentagon and in making decisions in the field. And with the end of the draft, the officer corps became less ideologically diverse. The post-Vietnam military as a whole became "increasingly conscious of itself as a separate entity in American society."

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 greatly strengthened the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military adviser to the president and secretary of defense. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., who served as chairman from 1985 to '89, "used his position to influence foreign policy" on such matters as whether to escort Kuwaiti ships through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. (He was in favor.)

Crowe's successor, General Colin L. Powell, "was much bolder," Kohn maintains. Even before assuming the chairmanship in the fall of 1989, Powell concluded that the Cold War was over and that U.S. strategy and force structure needed to be overhauled. "Without any authorization from superiors," he developed a plan to do that, and—in spite of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's initial disagreement with his assumptions about the Soviet threat—sold his plan to the White House and Congress. As chairman (until retiring last year), Powell also "took it upon himself to be the arbiter of American military intervention overseas [in] the most explicit intrusion into policy since MacArthur's conflict with Truman." For example, he firmly opposed intervention in Bosnia. After Bill Clinton's election, Powell "virtually defied" his move to allow avowed homosexuals to serve in the armed forces.

Secretary of Defense William Perry, Kohn concludes, must "undertake a concerted campaign to restore civilian control," one that goes beyond just asserting his authority on policy matters. "Proper civil-military relations will have to be taught to the officer corps at every level," Kohn believes, if the dangerous trend he sees is to be reversed.

## Wilsonian Illusions

"What Is Wilsonianism?" by David Fromkin, in *World Policy Journal* (Spring 1994), World Policy Institute, New School for Social Research, 65 Fifth Ave., Ste. 413, New York, N.Y. 10003.

Woodrow Wilson is unique among 20th-century American presidents in having spawned an "ism"—and Wilsonianism is far more than just a memory from decades long past. President George Bush's quest for a New World Order, for example, was certainly Wilsonian in character. But what exactly is this Wilsonianism that continues to haunt America? asks Fromkin, author of *A Peace to End All Peace* (1989).

It cannot be the body of governing principles that guided Wilson in his decisions, Fromkin argues, for there was no such thing. Although biographer Arthur S. Link contends that the president reasoned deductively from a core of general principles to arrive at policies, Wilson's positions were not consistent, Fromkin points out. "He initially was opposed to U.S. involvement in world affairs, to preparedness, to American entry into the Great War, and to participation in an international league. Later he advocated all of these." Wilson did not act from principle, in Fromkin's view, but rather appealed to principle "to justify what he wanted to do for personal reasons—or else felt compelled to do politically, even if against his own inclinations or beliefs." When he intervened in Mexico (where civil war threatened U.S. business interests) to depose Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta in 1914, for example, he "proclaimed standards for recognizing Huerta's government that, if applied uniformly, would have required the United States to withdraw recognition from almost all the world's governments."

Even if one limits the definition of Wilsonianism to ideas Wilson expressed in his role as "peacemaker to a war-torn world" toward the end of World War I, and takes his "points, principles, ends, and particulars at face value, they still fall short of outlining a doctrine," Fromkin says. In 1918, Wilson "essentially proposed a wholly new approach to the framing of a postwar settlement: He proposed that the great powers put aside their own needs and interests and instead resolve all questions on their intrin-

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sic merits." Justice supposedly was the key to a lasting peace. Wilson failed to see that "it is not enough to say 'do justice,' when there is no "objective code or standard" that is universally accepted.

What Wilsonianism really amounts to, after all, Fromkin concludes, is "the view that perpetual peace can be achieved through international cooperation, if it is institutionalized, even though the nations of the world remain independent." Warfare is not just to be reduced or mitigated—it is to be abolished.

During the 1930s, Fromkin argues, "Wilsonianism was put to the practical test. . . . There were frequent and eloquent appeals to world public opinion by leaders of all the democracies. FDR and oth-

ers addressed reasoned pleas to the dictators themselves. The democracies practiced disarmament and convened world disarmament conferences. The League of Nations declared an embargo on supplies to fascist Italy in the [1935] Abyssinian matter. Roosevelt organized an embargo on oil supplies to militarist, aggressive Japan. They exhausted this full bag of Wilsonian tricks, and none of them worked."

Wilsonianism's "intellectual bankruptcy" was apparent then, Fromkin writes, and realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau spelled out clearly what was wrong with it. Even so, as Bush's New World Order attests, Wilsonianism today remains quite influential.

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## ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

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### *Payment Due*

"Generational Accounting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy" by Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, in *Journal of Economic Perspectives* (Winter 1994), American Economic Assoc., 2014 Broadway, Ste. 305, Nashville, Tenn. 37203-2418.

Ross Perot and many others who bemoan the mounting national debt and demand deficit cuts claim that today's Americans are unfairly shifting the fiscal burden to tomorrow's. The situation is even worse than these critics realize, according to economists Auerbach, of the University of Pennsylvania, Gokhale, of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and Kotlikoff, of Boston University.

They favor a new "generational accounting" method that better reflects the future costs of today's spending. The conventional deficit figure, they point out, is "an arbitrary number whose value depends on how the government chooses to label its receipts and payments." In fact, the Congressional Budget Office routinely offers an assortment of deficit estimates, including ones for the very large "official" deficit (\$290 billion in 1992), the extra-large "on-budget" deficit (\$340 billion), which excludes the big Social Security surplus, and, for the Pollyannas in the

populace, the merely large "standardized employment" deficit (\$201 billion). None is the "correct" deficit, and none measures long-term effects of deficit spending.

Enter "generational accounting," a concept that Auerbach and his colleagues developed and which the federal government has used in appendices to the last two federal budget documents: "Generational accounts indicate, in present value, what the typical member of each generation can expect to pay, now and in the future, in net taxes." Net taxes are all taxes (federal, state, and local) that a generation pays over its lifetime minus all the governmental transfer payments that it receives (such as Social Security and Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Using a variety of demographic and economic projections, generational accounting makes it possible to estimate what the unborn will owe in their lifetimes.

The authors calculate that while men who were 40 years old in 1991 will pay \$180,100 in net taxes in the years remaining to them, and 65-year-olds will get a net *benefit* of \$74,000, males born in 1991 will pay net taxes of \$78,900. Given current policy, Auerbach and his colleagues say, the "typical" future generation of males born after 1991 will have to pay \$166,500 (in 1991 dollars)—an amount about 111 percent greater than