goslavia and in conflicts throughout the former Soviet Union.

The United States has already been tripped up by a late-20th-century warlord in Somalia, where its attempt to bring General Mohammed Farah Aidid to heel was an embarrassing failure. But the United Nations has experienced even more trouble in the former Yugoslavia, Peters maintains: “Imagining they can negotiate with governments to control warrior excesses, the United Nations and other well-intentioned organizations plead with the men-in-suits in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo to come to terms with one another. But the war in Bosnia and adjacent regions already has degenerated to a point where many local commanders obey only orders which flatter them.” If a peace treaty ever is signed, the only way it could be made to work would be “for those forces loyal to the central authorities to hunt down, disarm, and if necessary kill their former comrades-in-arms who refuse to comply with the peace terms. Even then, ‘freedom fighters,’ bandits, and terrorists will haunt the mountain passes and the urban alleys for years to come.”

Warfare with warlords, Peters says, “is a zero-sum game. And it takes guts to play.” The United States, he urges, should begin amassing intelligence on specific warrior chieftains for future use, and the army should give more time to training its officers and soldiers to deal with warrior threats.

Meanwhile, he says, some basic questions must be answered: “Do we have the strength of will, as a military and as a nation, to defeat an enemy who has nothing to lose? When we face warriors, we will often face men who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave rationally according to our definition of rationality, who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive. . . . Are we able to engage in and sustain the level of sheer violence it can take to eradicate this kind of threat?”

Out of Control?


“The U.S. military is now more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any [other] time in American history,” and civilian control over the military is becoming dangerously frayed. So contends Kohn, who was chief of Air Force history from 1981 to ’91 and now teaches at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The situation today, he observes, is very different from what it was during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when civilian leaders aggressively asserted control over the military. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara imposed restrictive rules on military operations in South Vietnam, and President Lyndon B. Johnson personally selected bombing targets in North Vietnam. Aiming to keep the war limited, they instead were keeping it from being won, in the eyes of many officers. After McNamara, Kohn notes, the military and its political allies reacted powerfully against what they regarded as civilian meddling in military affairs.

Other developments widened the civilian-military breach. As “national security became a matter of intense partisanship,” beginning in the late 1960s, the professional military “became politicized, abandoning its century-and-a-half tradition of non-partisanship,” Kohn writes. “It
began thinking, voting, and even espousing Republicanism with a capital R.” Under President Richard M. Nixon and later GOP administrations, moreover, the military was given greater authority in setting military policy within the Pentagon and in making decisions in the field. And with the end of the draft, the officer corps became less ideologically diverse. The post-Vietnam military as a whole became “increasingly conscious of itself as a separate entity in American society.”

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 greatly strengthened the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military adviser to the president and secretary of defense. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., who served as chairman from 1985 to ’89, “used his position to influence foreign policy” on such matters as whether to escort Kuwaiti ships through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. (He was in favor.)

Crowe’s successor, General Colin L. Powell, “was much bolder,” Kohn maintains. Even before assuming the chairmanship in the fall of 1989, Powell concluded that the Cold War was over and that U.S. strategy and force structure needed to be overhauled. “Without any authorization from superiors,” he developed a plan to do that, and—in spite of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s initial disagreement with his assumptions about the Soviet threat—sold his plan to the White House and Congress. As chairman (until retiring last year), Powell also “took it upon himself to be the arbiter of American military intervention overseas [in] the most explicit intrusion into policy since MacArthur’s conflict with Truman.” For example, he firmly opposed intervention in Mexico (where civil war threatened U.S. business interests) to depose Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta in 1914, for example, he “proclaimed standards for recognizing Huerta’s government that, if applied uniformly, would have required the United States to withdraw recognition from almost all the world’s governments.”

Woodrow Wilson is unique among 20th-century American presidents in having spawned an “ism”—and Wilsonianism is far more than just a memory from decades long past. President George Bush’s quest for a New World Order, for example, was certainly Wilsonian in character. But what exactly is this Wilsonianism that continues to haunt America? asks Fromkin, author of A Peace to End All Peace (1989).

It cannot be the body of governing principles that guided Wilson in his decisions, Fromkin argues, for there was no such thing. Although biographer Arthur S. Link contends that the president reasoned deductively from a core of general principles to arrive at policies, Wilson’s positions were not consistent, Fromkin points out. “He initially was opposed to U.S. involvement in world affairs, to preparedness, to American entry into the Great War, and to participation in an international league. Later he advocated all of these.” Wilson did not act from principle, in Fromkin’s view, but rather appealed to principle “to justify what he wanted to do for personal reasons—or else felt compelled to do politically, even if against his own inclinations or beliefs.” When he intervened in Mexico (where civil war threatened U.S. business interests) to depose Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta in 1914, for example, he “proclaimed standards for recognizing Huerta’s government that, if applied uniformly, would have required the United States to withdraw recognition from almost all the world’s governments.”

Even if one limits the definition of Wilsonianism to ideas Wilson expressed in his role as “peacemaker to a war-torn world” toward the end of World War I, and takes his “points, principles, ends, and particulars at face value, they still fall short of outlining a doctrine,” Fromkin says. In 1918, Wilson “essentially proposed a wholly new approach to the framing of a postwar settlement: He proposed that the great powers put aside their own needs and interests and instead resolve all questions on their intrin-