
Analysts can draw on two main intellectual traditions: conservative "realism," which stresses the pursuit of national interests and a balance of power, and Wilsonian liberalism, which emphasizes the spread of liberal political values. During the Cold War, Americans often did not have to choose, Betts points out: "The communist threat, like the fascist threat before it, combined military power with anti-liberal ideology, allowing conservative realism's focus on might and liberal idealism's focus on right to converge in a militant policy."

Take the question of whether the United States should want China to prosper. "For liberals," Betts writes, "the answer is yes, since a quarter of the world's people would be relieved from poverty and because economic growth should make democratization more likely, which in turn should prevent war between Beijing and other democracies. For realists, however, the answer should be no, since a rich China would overturn any balance of power."

Liberal and realist prescriptions are similarly at odds on Japanese military power. For liberals, a stronger Japan would be at worst harmless, since Japan is a democracy and a long-standing ally of the United States. For realists, however, a Japan armed with military power commensurate with its economic power, "unless it is pinned down by a powerful common enemy, is a potential threat. It would be the strongest military power in Asia, and the second-ranking one in the world." The fact that Japan is democratic is no guarantee of peace. Indeed, some observers doubt that Japan really is or will remain a democracy in Western terms.

Betts (who leans toward the realist perspective) believes that China is "the state most likely over time to disturb equilibrium in the region—and the world." Even by conservative estimates, he notes, China is not far from becoming an economic superpower. With just "a bit of bad luck," Betts warns, China's economic development could make the old Soviet military threat seem almost modest. In any case, in dealing with a prosperous China, the only alternatives for the United States "will be to accept Chinese hegemony in the region or to balance Chinese power" with what he calls "polite containment."

Fighting the Last War

"Down the Hatch" by Eliot A. Cohen, in *The New Republic* (Mar. 7, 1994), 1220 19th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

In the difficult effort to chart a course in the post-Cold War world, the Clinton administration's 1993 "bottom-up review" of defense policy is a major policy statement. Unfortunately, argues Cohen, director of the strategic studies program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, it does not supply the radical rethinking of U.S. military needs that is needed. Mincing no words, he calls the report "timid," "conservative," and "possibly dangerous."

The review is unrealistic on several levels,

Losing the Peace?

Václav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, in *Foreign Affairs* (Mar.–Apr. 1994):

If we in [the] "postcommunist" countries call for a new order, if we appeal to the West not to close itself off to us, and if we demand a radical reevaluation of the new situation, then this is not because we are concerned about our own security and stability, and not only because we feel that the security of the West itself is at stake. The reason is far deeper than that. We are concerned about the destiny of the values and principles that communism denied, and in whose name we resisted communism and ultimately brought it down. . . .

Naturally, all of us continue to pay lip service to democracy, human rights, the order of nature and responsibility for the world, but apparently only insofar as it does not require any sacrifice. By that, I do not mean, of course, merely sacrifice in the form of fallen soldiers. The West has made, and continues to make, such sacrifices. . . . I have in mind, rather, sacrifice in a less conspicuous but infinitely broader sense, that is, a willingness to sacrifice for the common interest something of one's own particular interests, including even the quest for larger and larger domestic production and consumption.

according to Cohen. Its distinguishing premise is that the United States should be prepared to fight two major regional wars almost simultaneously—for example, a Korean war and a conflict with a rearmed Iraq. But a replay of the Persian Gulf War is unlikely. In fact, Cohen observes, if Saddam Hussein's defeat "taught America's foes anything, it was that they should *not* replicate the Iraqi strategy. Massed tank armies are not the way to take over small countries that happen to be American allies—far better to launch ambiguous takeovers behind the smoke screen of liberation movements or uncontrolled dissident groups or native putsch-makers."

Even more fatal to the review's blueprint, Cohen says, the U.S. military, for at least five to 10 years, will be incapable of carrying out the plan. "American airlift and sealift simply could not move the bottom-up review force to two simultaneous wars, nor could the United States shuttle forces from a war in one corner of the globe to a war in another without pause for re-fitting, retraining, or rest." In addition, Cohen argues, the blueprint force—about the minimum size necessary to sustain, even in theory, the two-war strategy, and little smaller than the force planned by the Bush administration—"is just plain unaffordable." With 10 active army and three marine divisions, 12 aircraft carriers, and 13 active air force wings, the force looks formidable. But its size will come at the cost of deferring replacement of helicopters, tanks, and other equipment; after 10 to 15 years, "a massive junking of obsolescent gear" would be necessary.

As if all this were not enough, Cohen discerns "a deeper malady" in American strategy: It fails to face up to the fact that sooner or later the United States will confront "upheavals overseas that cannot be accommodated or negotiated away," such as a takeover of Egypt by Islamic fundamentalists. It also fails to look beyond the next five or 10 years, to "a world in which China becomes an assertive Asian power, perhaps provoking a Japanese nuclear response, or a world in which nuclear weapons are not merely developed but occasionally used."

The Pentagon planners, wedded to Cold War thinking, assumed that the United States would always fight defensive wars. But it is just as likely, Cohen says, "as in the Gulf or now in

Bosnia," that it "will find itself weighing an intervention to reverse a fait accompli, to prevent a disaster, or to excise a menace." That would require a very different force structure. And there are more subtle military matters to ponder, Cohen argues. Between the world wars, the U.S. military, operating at a relaxed pace that encouraged reflection, managed to produce "a generation of leaders who had thought deeply and imaginatively about their profession." They proved invaluable when war came again. Now that the Cold War is over, America needs to figure out how to breed a similar generation of military leaders.

Iraqgate Unraveled

"The Myth of Iraqgate" by Kenneth I. Juster, in *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1994), 2400 N St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-1153.

New York Times columnist William Safire and other members of the press have written extensively about what they call "Iraqgate." The gist of their attack is that prior to the Persian Gulf War, the Bush administration perverted U.S. agricultural-assistance programs to provide loans to Iraq's Saddam Hussein, who then used the money to buy weapons. Various charges of wrongdoing, criminal or otherwise, have been made by the news media, among them that the CIA helped get money to Iraqi arms agents, that the U.S. government itself shipped arms to Iraq, and that the Bush administration tried to cover up alleged misconduct.

After more than four years of hearings and investigations by various executive branch, congressional, and judicial bodies, the charges of wrongdoing remain unproven, notes Juster, a lawyer who served in the State Department during the Bush administration (and says he had no involvement in U.S. policy toward Iraq before the invasion of Kuwait). What is more, he contends, the press, which is largely responsible for creating the widespread impression that something deserving the name "Iraqgate" happened, has repeatedly misrepresented crucial facts regarding the workings of the agricultural-assistance program and what Iraq did under the program.