

number of senior officers but with the public. Soldiers are no longer the dregs of society: "With 94 percent of military recruits possessing high school diplomas, enlisted personnel are better educated than the general populace. Virtually all officers have graduated from college, and most senior officers hold post-graduate degrees."

Free of the "civilianizing" influence of the draft, the armed services are also more united than ever, thanks to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and more politicized, thanks to the legacy of Vietnam. Well-versed in international relations, congressional politics, and public relations, most high-ranking officers today "are intellectually prepared to challenge political leaders, particularly when they believe military interests are at stake." And civilian leaders, from President Clinton on down, increasingly lack any military experience or knowledge.

The commitment of those in the armed forces to the democratic political system, while real, is abstract, Dunlap points out: "Military personnel are untroubled by the authoritarian system in which they live; indeed, they cherish the harmony it provides. [They] do not necessarily admire or desire the unbridled individualism enjoyed by civilian society." As its civilian responsibilities multiply, Dunlap warns, the military may start "to assume it has the right, and even the *obligation*, to intervene in a wide range of activities when it perceives it can advance a broadly defined notion of the national interest."

Sons of the South

"Dixie's Dove: J. William Fulbright, the Vietnam War, and the American South" by Randall Bennett Woods, in *The Journal of Southern History* (Aug. 1994), Rice University, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, Texas 77251.

Historian C. Vann Woodward claimed in 1968 that by expanding U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk had betrayed their southern heritage. The South's history of "defeat and failure . . . frustration and poverty . . . slavery and its long aftermath of racial injustice," he argued, should have led them to see things from the Viet-



"A Senator Fulbright to see you, Sire. Seems he can't reconcile himself to your infallibility."

By 1966, Senator J. William Fulbright was a leading critic of President Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policy.

namese point of view. Ironically, says Woods, a historian at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, Johnson and Rusk did appreciate "the burden of southern history"—and it helped inspire them to intervene in Vietnam. One of their most powerful opponents, however, was another son of Dixie, Senator J. William Fulbright (D.-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His convictions sprang in part from a very different reading of the South's history.

Johnson had encountered in the Hill Country of Texas, and Rusk, in the hills of Georgia, "poverty, racial exploitation, ignorance, and human degradation," Woods notes. The experience turned them into reformers, representatives of "southern liberalism at its best and at its worst." Such liberalism produced the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, Medicare, the War on Poverty, and other Great Society measures. But it also bred in Johnson and Rusk, "if not a desire to carry the blessings of liberty and democracy to Southeast Asia, at least a wish to create a viable society in South Vietnam when forced by the exigencies of the Cold War to do so." In Johnson's eyes, the Vietnamese peasants were much like the poor farm laborers of the South.

Fulbright, the son of a wealthy farmer and banker who settled in Fayetteville, a small university town in the northwest corner of Arkansas, "had almost no personal contact with the poverty and racism characteristic of much of the South," Woods notes. Although he supported Johnson's Great Society and was one of the era's foremost spokesmen for liberal internationalism, Fulbright was in some ways deeply conservative. His opposition to the war, Woods says, stemmed from his determination "to preserve the traditional features of Anglo-American civilization—a republican form of government, rule by an educated elite, reverence for the law and tradition, political stability, and a humane free enterprise system." Fulbright feared that LBJ's unwise venture in Vietnam was endangering America's own republican institutions. Imperialism and republicanism were not compatible.

"If Fulbright's philosophy was rooted in the Anglophilia and class-consciousness of Arkansas's planting aristocracy, it grew also out of the mind-set of the southern highlanders who populated the Ozark mountains," Woods writes. "Their salient features—a stubborn independence and an ingrained tendency to resist established authority—contributed significantly to Fulbright's stance toward the war in Vietnam." So did his opposition to the Civil Rights movement, which he saw as largely just another effort by the North to impose its will and culture on the South.

Looking upon Southeast Asia with a southerner's historical memory, Woods says, Fulbright was led "to identify both with his own nation, embroiled in a hopeless war half a world away, and with Vietnam, struggling desperately to fend off a larger imperial power."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Turning Grain Into Gold

"The Coming Boom in American Agriculture" by Thomas J. Duesterberg, in *Hudson Briefing Paper* (May 1994), Hudson Institute, Herman Kahn Center, P.O. Box 26-919, Indianapolis, Ind. 46226.

It is no small irony that America's oldest industry is one of its strongest. Despite floods in the Midwest and drought in the South, U.S. agricultural exports in 1993 were close to the all-time high of \$43 billion. The surplus in agricultural products cut the overall U.S. trade deficit by more than \$19 billion. Now, argues Duesterberg, director of the Hudson Institute's Competitiveness Center, if the United States can take advantage of huge markets developing in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, U.S. farmers and food processors could sell an additional \$90 billion worth of their products overseas.

The key is rapid economic growth in East Asia and Latin America, including Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. As incomes go up, Duesterberg points out, so do appetites for more highly nu-

tritious foods such as milk products, meats, fruits, and vegetables. Asia's three billion people now consume, on average, only about 11 grams of high-quality protein per day, while the affluent Japanese take in about 52 grams per day (which is 20 fewer grams than Americans ingest). In recent years, China's consumption of pork has increased by three million tons annually, while in India milk consumption has grown by about two million tons per year.

If the trends toward higher incomes and better diets continue in Asia, estimates Dennis Avery, director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Global Food Issues, consumption of livestock and poultry there will grow by 500 percent over the next 20 years. The annual demand for grain alone would grow by 200 million tons.

It is often said that American farmers are the most productive and efficient in the world, and the United States is far and away the leading exporter of farm products. But that does not guarantee a bigger U.S. share of the market. The United States over the last decade has seen no substantial increase in its total farm exports.