
ness, Segal argues, is that it makes most people in public office unwilling to rock the boat, even when the craft is headed in the wrong direction. Members of Congress are too nice to their colleagues, too nice to the bureaucrats whose work

they are supposed to oversee, and too nice to the lobbyists who importune them and give them money (but not for specific favors, of course). What a better world it would be, Segal believes, if nice guys in Washington really did finish last.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

A Vision Thing Overdose

"The Recovery of Internationalism" by David C. Hendrickson, in *Foreign Affairs* (Sept.-Oct. 1994), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Candidate Bill Clinton's message in the 1992 campaign was plain: President George Bush was neglecting the domestic welfare. He was much too preoccupied with foreign affairs. So well did the Democrat get his message across, observes Hendrickson, a political scientist at Colorado College, that an important fact was obscured: Clinton was calling for a far more ambitious foreign policy than Bush's. He not only embraced the incumbent's idea of a "new world order" but promised to use trade as a lever to press China on human rights and to bring democracy to Haiti and Cuba. He also vowed to stop Serbian aggression in Bosnia with air strikes and other means. And the promises did not end there.

Alas, in one area after another, the Clinton administration subsequently has awkwardly retreated, causing a loss of U.S. prestige abroad and public disillusionment at home. The withdrawal from "extravagant" internationalism is necessary, Hendrickson argues, but it should not be allowed to turn into a rout, lest the United States abandon its proper course, "moderate" internationalism.

Attempting to extend democracy and human rights through trade embargoes, whether in Asia or the Caribbean, Hendrickson contends, not only harms innocent people but violates the fundamental rule that states should not intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Although the United States has often departed from that standard, it has "seldom formally disavowed" it,

and with good reason: Observance of the rule contributes to international peace. Nothing would bring closer Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's prophesied "clash of civilizations," Hendrickson observes, than "a determined effort to deny legitimacy to nondemocratic states." As the administration finally seemed to realize in the case of China (although not yet in the Caribbean), the United States should try to help those states that are moving toward free markets and democracy, "without undertaking warlike measures against nondemocratic states for the crime of being nondemocratic."

In trying to achieve its ambitious aims of improving human rights in China, keeping North Korea from getting nuclear weapons, and halting Serb aggression in Bosnia, Hendrickson says, the administration found that its initial goals could not be achieved except possibly through unilateral action—and that such action would "endanger interests of greater weight than those that would be secured" by it.

The administration's "activist agenda," Hendrickson says, "not only violates the traditional meaning of internationalism," which forbids intervention and preventive war, but it also "regularly places the United States in opposition to allied states and other regional powers." Internationalism, by contrast, "has always been identified with the virtues of acting in concert rather than unilaterally." The Clinton administration has been wise to retreat from many of its "advanced positions," Hendrickson says. Unfortunately, the administration has too often given "the appearance of being dragged, kicking and screaming, to a more limited and sensible policy."