

limits in George Will's eyes. He also argued that they would deal a blow to the "careerism" of today's Congress. But, asks Garry Wills, is professionalism such a bad thing? One commentator wrote in a 1983 book that Washington politics is "a complex profession—a vocation,

not an avocation The day of the 'citizen legislator'—the day when a legislator's primary job was something other than government—is gone. A great state cannot be run by 'citizen legislators' and amateur administrators." That commentator's name? George Will.

Court Politics

"The Supreme Court and Political Eras: A Perspective on Judicial Power in a Democratic Polity" by John B. Taylor, in *The Review of Politics* (Summer 1992), Univ. of Notre Dame, P.O. Box B, Notre Dame, Ind. 46556.

Does the Supreme Court, as Mr. Dooley said, follow "th' iliction returns," or does it, as Justice Robert H. Jackson complained in 1941, the very year he assumed his seat, serve as "the check of a preceding generation on the present one"? Neither, argues Taylor, a political scientist at Washington College, Maryland.

If the Court did tend to lay the dead hand of the past on the pressing work of a new era, then one would expect that after "critical" elections in which basic electoral realignments occurred—the elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932—there would have been a high level of conflict between the "old" Court and the "new" president and Congress. Instead, Taylor finds, of the 92 instances in which the Court voided acts of Congress through 1968, only 25 took place during such "lag" periods—and only 19 involved legislation enacted by the new regime. Moreover, 12 of those 19 cases occurred during the New Deal era. That unusual experience was undoubtedly fresh in Jackson's mind when he leveled his charge against the Court in 1941. But 19 cases in 178 years, notes Taylor, "is not an impressively high number."

If humorist Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley was correct, one would expect, conversely, that once the Court had gained a sufficient complement of new justices, it would begin revising legislation from the earlier era. Not so, Taylor finds. Of the 92 instances of judicial review, 67 occurred after a new majority had established itself on the Court, but only two altered laws from the previous era. Surprisingly, the Court was much more likely to overturn legislation enacted during its own era.

"The Supreme Court is not normally a generation behind, nor is it a slavish adherent to the latest electoral trend," Taylor concludes. Politics, for the justices, is less a matter of political parties and transient elections than of constitutional issues and judicial philosophy. The Court's power tempers, and is tempered by, the political power of the two elected branches of government. Interacting with them in complex ways, the Supreme Court is "a major participant in an ongoing process, and it is in the mundane vibrations of power in that process, day in and day out, that the genius and the explanation of the system lie."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

China's Rising Power

"Awakening Dragon" by Ross H. Munro, in *Policy Review* (Fall 1992), 214 Mass. Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002-4999; "China on the Rise" by Charles Horner, in *Commentary* (Dec. 1992), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022; "China: the Coming Power" by Barber B. Conable, Jr., and David M. Lampton, in *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992-93), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, Washington policymakers have been debating how best to promote democracy and human rights in China. But some analysts say that that

debate is now largely beside the main point. An economically vigorous China is suddenly presenting the United States with new opportunities—and perhaps new dangers. Today, warns

Munro, of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, China appears "firmly embarked on a course of explosive economic growth and military assertiveness."

Thanks to Deng Xiaoping's Leninist capitalism, China's economy may soon be "as dynamic as Taiwan's, yet 60 times larger," Munro observes. China enjoys Most Favored Nation trade status with the United States, despite efforts by liberals in Congress to make it conditional on human-rights progress. The U.S. trade deficit with China, only \$2.8 billion in 1987,

was nearly \$13 billion in 1991 and an estimated \$15 billion or more in 1992, second only to the U.S. deficit with Japan.

Munro finds this alarming. Other analysts are more sanguine. Conable, former president of the World Bank and now chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and Lampton, president of the committee, point out that the U.S. trade deficit with "Greater China" (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) declined slightly during 1987-91 because Taiwan and Hong Kong shifted much of

Punching Tickets in Vietnam

In *Sewanee Review* (Summer 1992), West Point graduate (Class of 1961) Pat C. Hoy II ponders what happened in the American military during the Vietnam War when "management" took the place of leadership.

One morning about halfway into my tour in Vietnam, my battalion commander overheard a conversation between me and my friend Charlie Catlett, who was the executive officer. I was the S-3, the operations officer. Our battalion had an odd mission for light artillery. Instead of providing direct support for a particular infantry unit, we provided general support for the corps, moving and shooting like heavy artillery. When a general found a gap in the artillery coverage, we moved a battery of artillery (six howitzers) to fill it. We were always employed piecemeal.

When our battalion CO [commanding officer] eavesdropped that morning, he heard excitement. Charlie and I had gotten word from Group Artillery Headquarters that we might get a direct support mission. The whole battalion would join an operation near the Cambodian border. We would be together, providing fire direction as well as fire support. We would, finally, do what we had been trained to do.

Lost in our own enthusiasm, Charlie and I failed to hear our fearless leader come up into the washroom from the underground bunker where the three of us slept. We were talking about using the battalion's command-and-control helicopter to go out for a recon over the sugar plantation where we would move our own headquarters. . . . When our CO walked into the room, he was already furious about what he had heard. There, in our common area, he admonished us for even thinking about taking his helicopter anywhere.

"Besides," he said, "I'm not so goddamn sure we want the mission. My [expletive] helicopter's not going anywhere without me, and before I go anywhere, I'm going to Group Headquarters."

I had never heard him swear before, had never heard him express an interest in any of our operations beyond knowing when and where our units would move. He had not been our commander. He had been a mere observer of war. Having come directly from the Department of the Army staff, he needed to punch the next ticket—battalion commander. A man couldn't get to his destination without those tickets. Getting them punched—each of them that the Pentagon managers considered important for advancement—was paramount; the mission and the men were not. . . .

The problem was the mission and the risk—the risk to the CO's reputation. Charlie and I had gotten excited about a mission that our CO didn't want. He was perfectly happy to leave the business of fire control to someone else, even if it meant—and until then had always meant—that our three firing batteries would be split and employed separately, even if it meant that our men would be subjected to the whims of other commanders who would always consider them second to their own men (no matter what), even if it meant that our men, time after time, had to join units in the heat of conflict and fall into the rhythm of someone else's way of doing business. The risks to our soldiers, under such circumstances, were always greater. . . .

Our battalion did not get the mission. My boss and his boss, the group commander, had other priorities in Vietnam, including the construction of a cement tennis court in our battalion area and a handball court in the Group chapel. . . . Winning the war was not on their agenda.


their manufacturing and assembly operations aimed at the U.S. market to the Chinese mainland. In the eyes of Conable and Lampton, China's economic boom not only presents tremendous opportunities for American investment and trade but "will soon put serious political reform back on the agenda."

Horner, president of the Madison Center in Washington, also views China's economic rise as benign, and he thinks it possible that communism in China "really is withering away, to be superseded by some softer, albeit authoritarian, regime—like that, precisely, of Singapore."

Unlike Japan, China seems inclined to translate its economic gains into international influence. Despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Beijing has increased its official military budget by 52 percent since 1989. It has exported nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan, and last spring conducted its largest-ever nuclear test.

In recent years, Munro notes, China has become increasingly assertive in territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, where it claims islands hundreds of miles offshore now held by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the

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Human rights remains a hot issue dividing the United States and China, but both nations want to avoid any disruption of relations.

Philippines. Although China may not be "wildly ambitious or dangerously bellicose," Horner notes, it does seem to be "of an imperial mind, prepared to reoccupy the space in Asia vacated by a defunct Soviet Union, a withdrawing United States, and a reticent Japan." Chinese domination of the South China Sea is virtually certain, Munro says. "The United States can live with this historical shift if it succeeds in convincing China not to overplay its hand."

Democracy, Yes; Realpolitik, No

Should U.S. foreign policy emphasize the promotion of democracy abroad? Not according to a number of "realist" and "neorealist" pundits from both ends of the political spectrum. The liberal neorealists often seem to be more isolationist than their conservative counterparts, such as Irving Kristol, but all agree that in foreign policy, morality must give way to "the national interest," that international politics is mainly about power, not the quest for justice. Kaufman, a University of Vermont political scientist, says, however, that the issue is not whether to pursue the national interest, but how to define it. He contends that promoting and maintaining democracy abroad—especially in geopolitically important states such as

"Democracy, Morality and the National Interest" by Robert G. Kaufman, in *Strategic Review* (Spring 1992), United States Strategic Inst., 2020 Penn. Ave. NW, Ste. 610, Washington, D.C. 20006.

Germany, Japan, and Russia—remain "vital national interests" of the United States.

Conceptions of *realpolitik* that are "overly narrow" should be rejected on practical as well as moral grounds, Kaufman argues. "Those realists who attempt to sever foreign policy from morality are paradoxically more unrealistic than many so-called idealists." Americans, he observes, must be convinced that U.S. foreign policy is morally right, as well as in the U.S. self-interest. *Realpolitik* alone will not suffice to win the domestic support needed to sustain an effective foreign policy.

That is not to say that the United States should take enormous risks to establish democracy everywhere on the globe. "Sometimes,"