


property owners from discriminating against homosexuals. The trouble with this strategy, Sullivan argues, is that it treats homosexuals as permanent victims, infringes on the liberties of heterosexuals, and only scratches the surface of the problem. "[The] real terror of coming out . . . is related to emotional and interpersonal dignity."

The only viable political stance remaining, Sullivan concludes, is not to try to legislate private "tolerance" of homosexuals but to insist that all public discrimination against them by the state be brought to an end. That means, in his view, ending the ban on homosexuals in the military and allowing people of the same sex to marry. "These two measures . . . represent a politics that . . . makes a clear, public statement



Going aggressively beyond tolerance, school administrators in New York City promoted an elementary-school curriculum portraying homosexuality as a morally legitimate way of life, until outraged parents objected.

of equality, while leaving all the inequality of emotion and passion to the private sphere, where they belong."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Vietnam: Who Served and Who Did Not?

A Survey of Recent Articles

Eighteen years ago, a young journalist named James Fallows described in the *Washington Monthly* (Oct. 1975) how, as a Harvard student during the Vietnam War, he and others like him had dodged the draft. Fallows starved himself sufficiently so that, although standing more than six feet tall, he weighed only 120 pounds when he and others from Harvard and MIT, most of them chanting, "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh/NLF is gonna win," reported to the Boston Navy Yard for their physicals on a spring day in 1970. When the doctor asked Fallows if he had ever contemplated suicide, he replied, "Oh, suicide—yes, I've been feeling very unstable and unreliable recently."

He was rewarded with an "unqualified" verdict, as were most of his Cambridge friends. "I was overcome by a wave of relief . . . and [a] sense of shame," he wrote. Later in the day, buses began to arrive at the navy yard, bearing "the boys from Chelsea . . . the white proles of Boston. . . . They walked through the examination lines like so many cattle off to slaughter." This same scene was repeated all across the country, Fallows maintained. The "mainly-white, mainly-well-educated children of mainly-comfortable parents" took advantage of "this most brutal form of class discrimination" and allowed "the boys of Chelsea [to] be sent off to die." By doing so, Fallows argued, he and his friends helped pro-

long the "immoral" war: "As long as the little gold stars kept going to homes in Chelsea and the backwoods of West Virginia, the mothers of Beverly Hills and Chevy Chase and Great Neck and Belmont were not on the telephones to their congressmen, screaming *you killed my boy*." Only 12 men from Harvard College, not one of them from Fallows's class, died in Vietnam. During World War II, by contrast, 35 men from Harvard's Class of '41 fell before the war was over.

Of course, Vietnam was not World War II. Of the 26 million Americans eligible by age for military service between 1964 and 1973, only 8.4 million served in the armed forces and only 2.1 million—eight percent of the cohort—went to Vietnam. There is no doubt that this relatively small group was not perfectly representative of U.S. society, but how unrepresentative was it?

A recent study of a random sample of the 58,152 Americans killed in Vietnam suggests that the Fallows thesis exaggerated the class gulf between those who went and those who did not. Arnold Barnett, a professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management, and two recent graduates of the school, Timothy Stanley and Michael Shore, writing in *Operations Research* (Sept.–Oct. 1992), conclude that rich and poor communities bore nearly equal burdens. Poor communities suffered 30 deaths per 100,000 population; affluent ones, 26 deaths. The four affluent communities cited by Fallows—Beverly Hills, Chevy Chase, Great Neck, and Belmont—together suffered 29 deaths, which relative to their population was *higher* than the national average, according to Barnett and his colleagues.

Defending (and qualifying) his "class-war" thesis in the *Atlantic* (April 1993), Fallows says that no one contends that Vietnam was a "poorest-of-the-poor" war: "Many of the poorest Americans were disqualified from service . . . because they couldn't meet medical, educational, or disciplinary standards." The U.S. Army in Vietnam, however, "was principally made up of men from working-class and lower-middle-class backgrounds, and the American elite was conspicuously absent."

Barnett and his associates disagree. Few afflu-

ent Americans may have been infantry "grunts" in Vietnam, they contend, but that does not mean "that well-off Americans were out of harm's way." Indeed, they appear to have gone to Vietnam "in sizable numbers," mostly as officers. And more than 13 percent—7,874—of the Americans killed in Vietnam were officers. These dead may not have included many sons of the Ivy League, but almost all, notes Bill Abbott in *Vietnam* (June 1993), were graduates of the service academies, the college Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program, or Officer Candidate School (OCS). Three out of five were in the Army—most of them warrant officers, who served as helicopter pilots, or second lieutenants, first lieutenants, or captains, who served as combat platoon leaders or company commanders.

Did whites shift the burden of Vietnam to blacks? Black casualties did soar early in the war to more than 20 percent of the total, but protests by Martin Luther King, Jr., and other black leaders prompted President Lyndon B. Johnson to order black participation in combat units reduced. In the end, black officers and enlisted men constituted 12.5 percent of all the dead, at a time when blacks constituted 11 percent of the nation's young male population.

"[The] widely held notion that the poor served and died in Vietnam while the rich stayed home is simply not true," writes Abbott, who is working on a book about American military casualties. Some enlisted men who died in Vietnam did indeed come from "poor and broken families in the urban ghettos and barrios, or were from dirt-poor farm homes in the South and Midwest." Most, however, came from "solid middle-class and working-class families."

As Abbott points out, the greatest unfairness was the pre-1969 draft system. Realizing that the limited war would quickly become unpopular if the children of the privileged were forced to fight (and not needing vast numbers of conscripts), the Johnson administration instructed local draft boards in 1965 to defer the college-bound, undergraduates, and postgraduates. That, it seems, is where what has been construed as "class" bias really entered in. The "privileged and influential" were, by and large, not *compelled*

to enter the military. Those of the affluent who did enter usually were volunteers. Indeed, of all the personnel, officers and enlisted, who died in Vietnam, 70 percent were volunteers. (Many would not have volunteered, of course, had it not been for the draft.) As the war went on, and the casualties and criticism mounted, however, this system was changed. In 1969, a draft lottery

was instituted. Fallows and some others who got low numbers then resorted to starvation and other devices to escape service in the "immoral" war. President Richard M. Nixon in 1969 began withdrawing U.S. troops from Vietnam, and in 1973, the draft was ended. Twenty years later, the debate about who served in Vietnam, and who did not, still goes on.

The Balkan War's Shallow, Deadly Roots

"Invitation to War" by William Pfaff, in *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Many in the West believe that war in the Balkans stems from ancient and immutable hatreds, and that barbarism is somehow a natural state of affairs in that corner of the world. This fatalistic view has served to rationalize Western inaction in the former Yugoslavia, notes Pfaff, a columnist and author. Indeed, some of the combatants *do* see themselves as avenging ancient wrongs, starting with the Battle of Kosovo of 1389. But Pfaff argues that today's Balkan antagonisms are actually of relatively recent vintage. The "ethnic war" in the former Yugoslavia is being waged "among three communities possessing no distinct physical characteristics or separate anthropological or 'racial' origins. They are the same people," Pfaff writes, although they do have distinct histories.

After their liberation from the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century, the Serbs claimed primacy among the South Slavs—Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims—and tried to unite them. Serbia was chiefly responsible for the creation of Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of the South Slavs) in 1918, under a Serbian monarch. That, French historian Paul Garde has observed, was when the gulf between the Serbs and the Croats really opened. In the new state of Yugoslavia, the Serbs held absolute sway. Even so, Pfaff points out, from then until 1991—except during World War II, when Croatia's collaborationist regime made "a genocidal assault" on the Serbs—coexistence was the reality in Yugoslavia.

That long history is ignored by the Serbian nationalists, who contend that it is now impossible for Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims to associate in a single state. Serbia is seeking an ethnically pure nation, a Greater Serbia embracing all ethnic Serbs beyond Serbia's current borders. The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, "is formally committed to the principles of the nonethnic, secular democratic state" in which the various groups could continue to live together. This makes the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Pfaff says, "a war of political values"—and, as such, important to the rest of Europe.

The very idea of an ethnically pure nation—a product of 19th-century German romanticism—is "a permanent provocation to war," he declares. In reality, no nation in Europe is "ethnically pure."

The Balkan war now threatens to draw in nearby countries, such as Hungary, which is concerned about the fate of several hundred thousand ethnic Hungarians inside Serbia. But the greater danger to the West is "moral and political, since [the aggression and ethnic purges] contradict the reign of order and legality produced in Western Europe . . . since the end of the Second World War." Pfaff thinks the Vance-Owen plan would only perpetuate existing evils and "intensify insecurities," and he dismisses as unworkable other proposals to protect various ethnic enclaves. The United Nations has lost its military credibility in the course of the Yugoslav affair, Pfaff says, but he urges that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "guarantee against forcible change of those political frontiers in Eastern, East-Central and Balkan Europe that have not yet been violated but are threatened because of ethnic claims and rivalries."