public. The economic disparity, as much as nationalist sentiment, fueled Slovak resentment. "The original impetus for the split came from the Slovaks . . .," Draper observes, "yet they are undoubtedly going to pay the highest price for it." In years past, Slovakia got some $300 million in annual subsidies from the federal government. But the split will cost more than money. Slovakia has a large Hungarian minority along its border with Hungary, which has been fixed at the middle of the Danube River. A Hungarian hydroelectric project, by diverting the Danube, has put the location of the border in question. There were 15 million Czechoslovaks to face about 10 million Hungarians; now, there are only five million Slovaks to face twice as many Hungarians. "The Slovaks may find that it is not so comfortable to survive alone in a hostile environment," notes Draper. "[The] Czecho-Slovak train that was optimistically speeding forward has suddenly jumped the rails," lament Martin Butora and Zora Butorova. "Despite the peacefulness of recent developments, Czechoslovakia is now viewed as a less secure area for investment, as a hazardous place with an uncertain future." That is unfortunate in itself—and it does not bode well for the rest of Eastern Europe.

India's Tilt Toward the West

"India Copes with the Kremlin's Fall" by J. Mohan Malik, in Orbis (Winter 1993), Foreign Policy Research Inst., 3615 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

The demise of the Soviet Union, India's main ally in recent decades, has forced the Asian nation to turn toward the West. Not only is Moscow's extensive military, economic, and diplomatic support a thing of the past, but, with the Cold War over, so is New Delhi's ability to extract advantages for itself by playing the Soviets off against the West. Even so, asserts Malik, a lecturer in defense studies at Australia's Deakin University, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's government now enjoys "unprecedented" strategic opportunities.

"First and foremost," Malik says, "is the opportunity to wean the United States away from its traditional ally, Pakistan, and thus effect a major strategic change in South Asia." The United States had "tilted" toward Pakistan during the Cold War. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Washington channeled aid to the Afghan mujahedin resistance through Pakistan. In October 1990, however, unable to certify, as required by law, that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, the Bush administration suspended all U.S. economic and military aid ($587 million). Washington, Malik says, has begun to view India, not as the Soviet ally of yesterday, but "as an independent power in Asia and even as a source of stability there, especially in view of the withdrawal of U.S. military bases from the Philippines, the planned reduction of U.S. forces in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the economic dominance of Japan, and China's tendency to flex its muscles."

Prime Minister Rao, in office since June 1991, has acted boldly to deal with India's accumulated economic woes. [Inflation has dropped to 7.1 percent, the lowest level in two years.] Despite the pressure to curb spending, Rao's government remains committed to a strong military, not only to keep a step ahead of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan and to stay even with China, but also to hold Sikh, Kashmiri, and Assamese separatist movements in check. During the 1980s, India, with Soviet help, built up one of the largest military forces in the Third World. The Indian navy, which includes two aircraft carriers, now is able to show the flag from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, and the nation's nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs are in an advanced stage of development.

Western fears about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, Malik points out, give New Delhi the opportunity to attract military and economic aid for what is, as one observer put it, "the region's last outpost of secular democracy."

But New Delhi and Washington "remain suspicious of each other's long-term agenda and intentions," Malik notes. Many Indian strategists and academics worry that closer ties with the West may mean having to accept the United States as unchallenged global policeman. Senior officials in Rao's government do not seem to share those fears, Malik reports. In any case, given India's tense relations with Pakistan and China and its need for aid, New Delhi now appears to have very little choice.