
tively in the great work of improving the 'democracy of entertainment.'" That meant visits to Hollywood stars and studios, and subsidized speaking tours to spread the gospel of "film betterment," i.e. to praise Hollywood's "good" movies rather than condemn its "bad" ones.

At first, many critics were co-opted. However, Couvares writes, "frustration over the failure of Prohibition . . . and the emergence of a more vocal fundamentalist dissent from the cosmopolitan attitudes of the mainstream church leadership" paved the way for new protests against Hollywood. The call for a federal censorship law grew louder. By 1927—when movie producers reluctantly approved a Hays associate's list of "Eleven Don'ts and Twenty-Six Be Carefuls" for filmmakers—reformers were also supporting legislation to ban "block booking" and thus let local exhibitors refuse

movies they found offensive. Independent exhibitors, struggling with large, studio-owned theater chains for survival, joined the reformers.

At that critical moment, Couvares writes, "a powerful ally appeared from the unlikeliest quarter—the Catholic Church." While the Church hierarchy included some bitter critics of Hollywood fare, it also strongly opposed both legislated censorship and antitrust legislation. Hays turned to the hierarchy and leading Catholic laity for support. He "allowed the Catholics to write the Production Code" in 1930, and then in 1934, after the Legion of Decency pushed for mandatory enforcement, he put a prominent Catholic layman in charge of administering it. The Production Code ruled in Hollywood until the early 1950s, and Hays, now remembered chiefly as an enemy of free speech, helped avert a federal censorship law.

OTHER NATIONS

AFTER THE VELVET DIVORCE

A Survey of Recent Articles

Václav Havel, the dissident playwright who helped bring about a "velvet" end in 1989 to decades of communist rule, is now president of the Czech Republic—but no longer of Czechoslovakia itself, which has ceased to exist. On the first day of this year, the Czechoslovak federation, which Havel had valiantly tried to hold together, split into its two constituent parts: the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The implications of this fission could prove to be profound. Czechoslovakia was "not just another little country in Eastern Europe," historian Theodore Draper notes in the *New York Review of Books* (Jan. 14 & 28, 1993). "It [was] the only country between Germany and the former Soviet Union that has had an authentic democratic past." For 20 years after its creation in 1918 from the wreckage of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was a thriving democracy. If Czechoslovakia could not survive the transition from communism to multiethnic liberal democracy, how much worse must be the prospects that Romania, Bulgaria, and the other states of Eastern Europe will do so.

The return of freedom to a country that had become "morally unhinged" under communism, Václav Havel observed last spring in the *New York Review of Books* (April 9, 1992), unexpectedly produced "an enormous and blindingly visible explosion of every imaginable human vice," including "hatred among nationalities." Looking ahead then to the June 1992 elections for the Federal Assembly and the two republics' National Councils, the Czech president, while trying to remain hopeful, saw demagoguery "everywhere."

From the beginning, Czechoslovakia was a union of "two different national and cultural entities with different political and historical experience," note Martin Butora, a former adviser to Havel and cofounder of Public Against Violence, the leading movement of the democratic revolution in Slovakia in 1989, and his wife, Zora Butorova, a sociologist with the Center for Social Analysis in Bratislava. Before 1918, the Czechs had lived under Austrian rule, the Slovaks under Hungarian rule. "On one side," Butora and Butorova

write in *Freedom Review* (Nov.–Dec. 1992), “was the economically and educationally backward Slovakia, brainwashed by decades of Hungarization and made up mostly of farmers with deep [Catholic] religious convictions. On the other was the more developed Czech society.” Yet “a marked amalgamation” of the two different societies was achieved during the democratic interlude of 1918–38. Under the Communists, the differences that persisted between Czechs and Slovaks were largely suppressed or ignored, and, in the excitement of the Velvet Revolution they were temporarily forgotten.

Czechoslovak president Havel—in theory a ceremonial president above politics—came out boldly in 1991 for a common state and urged a nationwide referendum on the issue of separatism. For more than a year, he worked hard on constitutional changes to give the federal president of the proposed common state more power, including the authority to call a referendum. “He seems to have trusted that the politicians would grasp the good sense in his ideas, and accept them,” writer and translator Paul Wilson notes in the *New York Review of Books* (Aug. 13, 1992). But his proposals went down to defeat in the Federal Assembly. “The intellectual-turned-politician is by nature self-critical, and thus unable to campaign in his own favor,” Eda Kriseová, Havel’s biographer and a former adviser, remarks in *Partisan Review* (no. 4, 1992). Students and intellectuals had largely set off the Velvet Revolution. But intellectuals, Kriseová says, “shy away from the power of government. They have a permanently critical attitude to power, a lack of confidence in it. For that reason they are not very successful at practical politics.”

No referendum on dividing Czechoslovakia was held. But the winners of the June 1992 parliamentary elections were Václav Klaus and his rightist Civic Democratic Party, which won 30 percent of the vote for the Czech National Council, and Vladimír Mečiar, a former Communist, and his leftist Movement for a Demo-



Václav Havel, the hero of the Velvet Revolution, was not able to prevent the Czechoslovak Federation from splitting into separate nations.

cratic Slovakia, which won 37 percent of the vote for the Slovak National Council. Klaus and Mečiar, the new prime ministers of their respective republics, were committed, albeit for different reasons, to splitting up the Czechoslovak state—yet neither emphasized the fact during his political campaign. Klaus, a zealous follower of the American economist Milton Friedman, was intent upon rapidly transforming the Czech economy along free-market lines—and he came to believe that cutting economically backward Slovakia loose would make that easier to accomplish. In Slovakia, meanwhile, Mečiar campaigned for a mixed economy, a much slower rate of privatization, and continued state subsidies to failing industries. He said little about separatism. According to public opinion polls in mid-1992, no more than one in five Slovaks favored separatism. Economically, however, the Slovaks were badly hurting.

For 40 years, notes Paul Wilson, “the Communist regime had put large steel plants, arms factories, and chemical works into Slovakia in an effort to transform its largely rural economy. Thus while communism had meant a decline in the standard of living for most Czechs, most Slovaks had experienced steady improvement. Now their main market, the Soviet Union, had collapsed.” Unemployment in Slovakia climbed to about 12 percent—three times what it was in the Czech Re-

public. The economic disparity, as much as nationalist sentiment, fueled Slovak resentment.

"The original impetus for the split came from the Slovaks . . .," Draper observes, "yet they are undoubtedly going to pay the highest price for it." In years past, Slovakia got some \$300 million in annual subsidies from the federal government. But the split will cost more than money. Slovakia has a large Hungarian minority along its border with Hungary, which has been fixed at the middle of the Danube River. A Hungarian hydroelectric project, by diverting the Danube, has put the location of the border in question. There were 15 million

Czechoslovaks to face about 10 million Hungarians; now, there are only five million Slovaks to face twice as many Hungarians. "The Slovaks may find that it is not so comfortable to survive alone in a hostile environment," notes Draper.

"[The] Czecho-Slovak train that was optimistically speeding forward has suddenly jumped the rails," lament Martin Butora and Zora Butorova. "Despite the peacefulness of recent developments, Czechoslovakia is now viewed as a less secure area for investment, as a hazardous place with an uncertain future." That is unfortunate in itself—and it does not bode well for the rest of Eastern Europe.

India's Tilt Toward the West

"India Copes with the Kremlin's Fall" by J. Mohan Malik, in *Orbis* (Winter 1993), Foreign Policy Research Inst., 3615 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

The demise of the Soviet Union, India's main ally in recent decades, has forced the Asian nation to turn toward the West. Not only is Moscow's extensive military, economic, and diplomatic support a thing of the past, but, with the Cold War over, so is New Delhi's ability to extract advantages for itself by playing the Soviets off against the West. Even so, asserts Malik, a lecturer in defense studies at Australia's Deakin University, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's government now enjoys "unprecedented" strategic opportunities.

"First and foremost," Malik says, "is the opportunity to wean the United States away from its traditional ally, Pakistan, and thus effect a major strategic change in South Asia." The United States had "tilted" toward Pakistan during the Cold War. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Washington channeled aid to the Afghan mujahedin resistance through Pakistan. In October 1990, however, unable to certify, as required by law, that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, the Bush administration suspended all U.S. economic and military aid (\$587 million). Washington, Malik says, has begun to view India, not as the Soviet ally of yesterday, but "as an independent power in Asia and even as a source of stability there, especially in view of the withdrawal of U.S. military bases from the Philippines, the planned

reduction of U.S. forces in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the economic dominance of Japan, and China's tendency to flex its muscles."

Prime Minister Rao, in office since June 1991, has acted boldly to deal with India's accumulated economic woes. [Inflation has dropped to 7.1 percent, the lowest level in two years.] Despite the pressure to curb spending, Rao's government remains committed to a strong military, not only to keep a step ahead of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan and to stay even with China, but also to hold Sikh, Kashmiri, and Assamese separatist movements in check. During the 1980s, India, with Soviet help, built up one of the largest military forces in the Third World. The Indian navy, which includes two aircraft carriers, now is able to show the flag from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, and the nation's nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs are in an advanced stage of development.

Western fears about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, Malik points out, give New Delhi the opportunity to attract military and economic aid for what is, as one observer put it, "the region's last outpost of secular democracy."

But New Delhi and Washington "remain suspicious of each other's long-term agenda and intentions," Malik notes. Many Indian strategists and academics worry that closer ties with the West may mean having to accept the United States as unchallenged global policeman. Senior officials in Rao's government do not seem to share those fears, Malik reports. In any case, given India's tense relations with Pakistan and China and its need for aid, New Delhi now appears to have very little choice.