rendered in a sketchily classicizing style nearly crisscross its center." The dancing couple in everyday clothes, as Brigitte Léal, a curator at the Musée Picasso in Paris, has noted, is "straight from Pierre Auguste Renoir."

The influence of Renoir (1841–1919) provides the key to *Studies*, says Fitzgerald. The Cubists reviled Impressionism, and Renoir himself was widely condemned by the early-20th-century avant-garde for having embraced academicism. Picasso, however, took a different view of the older master. "Renoir's struggle during his last decades to bridge the gap between his early work and the Western classical tradition without jettisoning his pioneering contributions to Impressionism," Fitzgerald writes, "provided a model for Picasso's own effort to broaden his art without turning his back on Cubism."

The strange pattern of Picasso's *Studies* is tied to Renoir's late style, Fitzgerald says. "During his years of searching for this new style, Renoir developed an unusual practice of sketching on canvas." As one critic explained in 1920, Renoir "multiplied his sketches, throwing numbers of them on a single canvas, here and there, heads of girls and children, flowers, fruit, fish, game—whatever he had in reach at the moment." This let him evaluate not only different subjects side by side but also different styles. In *Studies*, Picasso adopted Renoir's strategy, Fitzgerald says, and created "a painting whose coherence depends on his self-conscious inquiry into the same problem that Renoir had addressed before him—the relationship between avant-garde and traditional styles."

By the mid-1920s, Picasso was ready to move on to a new phase of his career. In search of "another path for reviving the avant-garde," Fitzgerald notes, he began to address "the budding movement of Surrealism. Picasso turned from the soothing glamour of 'things' to consider instead their capacity to shock."



In Studies, *"a summa of Picasso's esthetic position in the years after World War I," the artist applied both realism (to figure) and Cubism (to still life).*

When Hollywood Wooed the Censors

"Hollywood, Main Street, and the Church: Trying to Censor the Movies Before the Production Code" by Francis G. Couvares, in *American Quarterly* (Dec. 1992), Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2715 N. Charles St., Baltimore, Md. 21218-4319.

Today's liberal-conservative clashes over the arts and public morality are hardly the first such conflicts in American history. The Roman Catholic Church's Legion of Decency in 1934 launched a campaign of movie boycotts and edged the film industry into self-censorship. The conflict, however, was not just a case of artistic freedom versus repressive moralism, contends Couvares, an Amherst College historian. The struggle between Hol-

lywood and the Church, he says, was, to a considerable degree, "a mutual embrace."

Well before the 1930s, movie moguls, most of them Jewish, had struggled to mollify their critics, most of them Protestant. But that proved difficult. When upper-middle-class Protestant New Yorkers founded the National Board of Censorship in 1909, movie producers and distributors expected that the board would readily arrive at acceptable standards. The industry was almost eager to comply. But the "censors" could not always agree among themselves. What was worse, they often found their standards bitterly attacked as far too liberal by many middle-American Protestants.

In 1921, after several Hollywood sex scandals (including one in which comedian Fatty Arbuckle, one of the top stars of the day, was accused of rape and murder), and just after New York became the sixth state to set up a board of movie censorship, the moviemakers formed a trade association to head off further legislated censorship. Will Hays, a Presbyterian elder and prominent Republican who had run Warren Harding's successful presidential campaign in 1920, was named to head the new organization.

Hays's message to critics, Couvares says, was simple: "Oppose legislated censorship and the movie industry will allow you . . . to collaborate ac-

Secret Believers

In *New Criterion* (Jan. 1993), editor Hilton Kramer, writing about the life of Mary McCarthy (1912–89), limns the curious political odyssey of the celebrated "New York intellectuals."

[Mary] McCarthy herself was never a leader in the intellectual and political initiatives of [her] generation [of New York intellectuals]. She took her cues from the men in her life—lovers, mentors, colleagues—who were themselves deeply divided in their attitude toward the world they wished to engage in their work. While on the one hand they tended to be rebels of the Left who were fiercely critical of American society and bourgeois life, they were also, on the other, ambitious to secure a place of preferment in the American cultural establishment they looked down upon with a good deal of intellectual scorn and political distaste. In the beginning—that is, in the 1930s, and to a lesser extent in the 1940s—the greatest obstacle to their success was their opposition to Stalinism, which in its cultural manifestations dominated the literary world that held the keys to preferment. Stalinism was, in its literary and artistic standards, philistine and middlebrow, whereas the writers in Partisan Review, *the principal organ of the anti-Stalinist Left, were ferociously highbrow . . . .*

What changed all this, oddly enough, was the Cold War. It was the Cold War that gave this generation of New York intellectuals—McCarthy included—its entrée to the larger cultural stage that it both coveted and condescended to. Suddenly there were jobs in universities, in publishing, and in the mainstream media that had formerly been closed to writers of their persuasion. There were fellowships, subsidies, conferences, contracts, and the other emoluments of an established intellectual class. The irony was, of course, that the New York intellectuals now qualified for the mainstream because of their politics—that is, their anti-Stalinism—at the very moment when the vicissitudes of the political situation—the military threat coming from the Soviet Union—greatly diminished their radical commitment. It was discovered that in an increasingly perilous world, the United States could no longer be considered the principal enemy and might even be worth defending against the libels and slanders of the European—especially the French—Left, which placed itself in militant opposition to American interests . . . .

What has to be understood about the political demeanor of the New York intellectuals in the heyday of the Cold War was that they were never entirely comfortable in the support they rendered to—and received from—the United States in its struggle with the Soviet Union. While fully availing themselves of the benefits of their new position, they could never really give up the idea that political virtue was still in some sense the preserve of the radical Left. They remained, emotionally even more than intellectually, secret believers in the radical dream . . . . [The] radical movement of the Sixties . . . brought [them] back into the political limelight as avowed partisans of the Left.

tively in the great work of improving the 'democracy of entertainment.'" That meant visits to Hollywood stars and studios, and subsidized speaking tours to spread the gospel of "film betterment," i.e. to praise Hollywood's "good" movies rather than condemn its "bad" ones.

At first, many critics were co-opted. However, Couvares writes, "frustration over the failure of Prohibition . . . and the emergence of a more vocal fundamentalist dissent from the cosmopolitan attitudes of the mainstream church leadership" paved the way for new protests against Hollywood. The call for a federal censorship law grew louder. By 1927—when movie producers reluctantly approved a Hays associate's list of "Eleven Don'ts and Twenty-Six Be Carefuls" for filmmakers—reformers were also supporting legislation to ban "block booking" and thus let local exhibitors refuse movies they found offensive. Independent exhibitors, struggling with large, studio-owned theater chains for survival, joined the reformers.

At that critical moment, Couvares writes, "a powerful ally appeared from the unlikeliest quarter—the Catholic Church." While the Church hierarchy included some bitter critics of Hollywood fare, it also strongly opposed both legislated censorship and antitrust legislation. Hays turned to the hierarchy and leading Catholic laity for support. He "allowed the Catholics to write the Production Code" in 1930, and then in 1934, after the Legion of Decency pushed for mandatory enforcement, he put a prominent Catholic layman in charge of administering it. The Production Code ruled in Hollywood until the early 1950s, and Hays, now remembered chiefly as an enemy of free speech, helped avert a federal censorship law.

OTHER NATIONS

AFTER THE VELVET DIVORCE

A Survey of Recent Articles

Václav Havel, the dissident playwright who helped bring about a "velvet" end in 1989 to decades of communist rule, is now president of the Czech Republic—but no longer of Czechoslovakia itself, which has ceased to exist. On the first day of this year, the Czechoslovak federation, which Havel had valiantly tried to hold together, split into its two constituent parts: the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The implications of this fission could prove to be profound. Czechoslovakia was "not just another little country in Eastern Europe," historian Theodore Draper notes in the *New York Review of Books* (Jan. 14 & 28, 1993). "It [was] the only country between Germany and the former Soviet Union that has had an authentic democratic past." For 20 years after its creation in 1918 from the wreckage of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was a thriving democracy. If Czechoslovakia could not survive the transition from communism to multiethnic liberal democracy, how much worse must be the prospects that Romania, Bulgaria, and the other states of Eastern Europe will do so.

The return of freedom to a country that had become "morally unhinged" under communism, Václav Havel observed last spring in the *New York Review of Books* (April 9, 1992), unexpectedly produced "an enormous and blindingly visible explosion of every imaginable human vice," including "hatred among nationalities." Looking ahead then to the June 1992 elections for the Federal Assembly and the two republics' National Councils, the Czech president, while trying to remain hopeful, saw demagogy "everywhere."

From the beginning, Czechoslovakia was a union of "two different national and cultural entities with different political and historical experience," note Martin Butora, a former adviser to Havel and cofounder of Public Against Violence, the leading movement of the democratic revolution in Slovakia in 1989, and his wife, Zora Butorova, a sociologist with the Center for Social Analysis in Bratislava. Before 1918, the Czechs had lived under Austrian rule, the Slovaks under Hungarian rule. "On one side," Butora and Butorova