

professor of psychoanalytic thought at the University of Toronto, the family is predominantly male. She hones in on the Secret Committee in Vienna, which operated as a palace guard to protect Freud and to defend his theories. Not surprisingly, these theories often implied the superiority of men over women. (Possession of that magical instrument, the penis, was considered proof.) Freud's adopted "sons"—Karl Abraham, Max Eitingon, Sandor Ferenczi, Ernest Jones, Otto Rank, and Hanns Sachs—are here pictured bickering with each other while serving their idealized father, Freud. The Freud who emerges in Grosskurth's account hardly deserves all the attention. He is a cold, manipulative narcissist. What made him so unpleasant? Grosskurth offers an answer: Freud received so little tenderness from his mother that "his ability to empathize was frozen."

The figure conspicuously absent from Freud's male family thus becomes the key to his personality. Grosskurth's suggestion is certainly in line with current trends in psychoanalysis, which have shifted from a patriarchal and phallocentric orientation to mother-centered theories. The vocabulary of analysts and therapists reflects this change. While formerly they spoke of resistance, repression, and castration, today they talk of identification, introjection, and deprivation. For this change, argues Sayers, the chair of the Women's Section of the British Psychological Society, we have four women to thank—Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, Anna Freud, and Melanie Klein. Sayers shows how they drew on their own experiences as mothers (or, in Anna Freud's case, on her wartime work in orphanages) to challenge the centrality of male-oriented theories, such as the the castration complex. The irony is that none of these therapists (according to their children) was a good mother, and their approach—which is called "object-relations theory" and concentrates on the child's earliest relations with his mother—appears to emphasize the mother mainly in order to blame her.

Grosskurth and Sayers both intend to challenge the original "operating principles" of psychoanalysis, but in most ways they remain exponents of them. Neither author questions the familial model on which both the old father-centered and the new mother-centered psychoanalysis are based. They never consider whether our views of early infantile experience are shaped by our *cultural* stereotypes of maternal and paternal roles—that is, by culture itself. As long as "mother" and "father" remain the idealized and blamed sources for human psychology, we will be served by simplistic explanations for our behavior in a complex and increasingly violent society.

History

LABOR WILL RULE: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor. *By Steven Fraser. Free Press. 688 pp. $29.95*

This is at once a history of industrial America and a personal success story to outrival anything in Horatio Alger. During the 1930s, Sidney Hillman (1887–1946) was Franklin Roosevelt's adviser on labor policy, memorialized in FDR's quip, "Clear it with Sidney." For a man who had been a revolutionary agitator in Russia during his teens, Hillman had come some distance.

Hillman's rise from an immigrant cutter working in Chicago's garment trade to a national leader of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was exceptional. Labeled a conservative within the labor movement, Hillman tended to avoid direct confrontation; yet his pragmatism won him the rank-and-file's confidence. (CIO members even went along when he recommended wage cuts in the early years of the Depression.)

Fraser, executive editor of Basic Books, is less concerned with Hillman's personal story than with his role in defining the character of modern American liberalism. Along with reformers such as Hull House founder Jane Ad-

dams, Justice Felix Frankfurter, and Senator Robert Wagner (D.-N.Y.), he envisioned an "industrial democracy" that would soften the socially destructive consequences of the competitive marketplace. During the New Deal and World War II, the victories of Hillman's CIO and other industrial unions—often supported by a sympathetic, activist government—seemed to resolve the century-old "labor problem": Relatively peaceful collective bargaining eased many of the conflicts between management and labor, while the higher wages won at the bargaining table tempered the age-old grievances of workers.

A generation ago most scholars of the labor movement applauded such accomplishments. Fraser, however, casts a more skeptical eye on the extent of Hillman's achievement. Fraser points to the racial and ethnic divisions that limited Hillman's appeal even within the industrial working class. Antagonisms between blacks and Appalachian whites defeated Hillman's attempt to organize textile workers in the South. In the North, an almost feudal hierarchy within many factories (Irish and German foremen on the top, Slavs and Italians in the middle, blacks on the bottom) often opposed the CIO. And, paradoxically, the success of labor may have proved its undoing. As the living standards of American workers improved, they demanded less insistently that their voice be heard. Indeed, the bureaucratically structured system of industrial relations that Hillman tirelessly championed—with its grievance procedures, rules for collective bargaining, and reliance upon union lawyers—had little to do with the shop-floor solidarities and socialist visions that had once inspired the young immigrant.

A NATION OF ENEMIES: Chile Under Pinochet. *By Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela. Norton. 367 pp. $24.95*

September 11, 1973, is an unforgettable date in Latin American history. On that day, Chile's Marxist president, Salvador Allende, was murdered, and General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte proclaimed the victory of what was to become one of the world's more brutal military regimes. Chile's 150 years of democratic rule—the most stable democracy on the continent—had come to an abrupt end.

Why, then, did many Chileans greet Pinochet's coup with jubilation? In 1973 Chile was suffering from an inflation rate of 300 percent, and the government was rationing goods. (The sorry state of Chile's economy resulted partly from an international economic blockade organized by the Nixon administration and partly from Allende's ineptitude.) Despite having Allende's blood on his hands, Pinochet arrived as a hero to many.

If this double-image of Pinochet, dictator and hero, seems an enormous incrongruity, that is how Constable, a *Boston Globe* correspondent, and Valenzuela, director of Georgetown University's Center for Latin American Studies, present him. Pinochet was obsessed with the gaudy trappings of power—red-lined capes, a fleet of bullet-proof Mercedes, medallions of himself. At the same time, he was a workaholic who abstained from drink, avoided personal scandals, and harbored an unshakeable sense of moral righteousness. With that belief in his own righteousness, he organized Latin America's most efficient secret police and tortured thousands of political prisoners, even while his market reforms made Chili's economy the second strongest in South America. His "Chicago Boys"—Chilean economists who had imbibed Milton Friedman's free-market theories at the University of Chicago—instituted a capitalist shock treatment that forced Chilean industry to modernize. In 1981, the economy grew by 5.1 percent, while exports increased five-fold over levels recorded less than a decade before.

Chile's economic miracle, however, was a miracle for the few: Many groups—civil servants, teachers, skilled laborers—were left worse off, if not unemployed. When the economy—upheld by debt, high interest rates, and speculation—collapsed in the worldwide recession of 1988, Pinochet held a plebiscite to demonstrate support for his regime. To his astonishment he was voted out of office, though not by