have found another way to protest: rock music with anti-establishment lyrics. Teenage rock idol Cui Jian's latest album, "Jiejue" (Resolve), for example, begins with these lines: "There are many problems before us;/There's no way to resolve them./But the fact that we have never had the chance/Is an even greater problem."

Its enthusiasm for defiant rock lyrics, Hooper says, is but one manifestation of the fact that the current generation of Chinese youth is openly behaving in ways that run counter to both socialist and traditional Confucian values.

The nation's 300 million young people (ages 14–25) constitute one-fourth of the population. With almost no memories of the Maoist cult of austerity, Hooper writes, they have "taken to consumer culture with a vengeance." The youths' spare *yuan* have attracted both local manufacturers and multinational corporations. Like their Western peers, young Chinese now crave VCRs, computer games, and stereo systems, "not to mention brand names from Adidas to 'Fun' faded denim." The generation gap is especially wide when it comes to clothing, Hooper adds.

In TV and magazine ads, glamorous young women "drape themselves over motorbikes, sip expensive canned drinks, and tout the latest beauty products." Youth magazines such as Shanghai's *Youth Generation* and Guangzhou's *Golden Generation* now dwell on young romance. Premarital sex is still officially frowned upon, Hooper says, but cohabitation has become widespread among the privileged *gaoganzidi* (the children of high Communist Party officials.) Most Chinese high-school students now attend sex education classes.

Young performers, fashion designers, restaurateurs, and others, Hooper says, make up an "economic and social elite" among the new generation. Most young people live far away from the "glamorous world of hotel bars and health clubs." But television has made many rural youths aware of the seductions of urban life, and millions of them have been pouring into China's big cities—only to find their employment prospects limited. Even high-school graduates face a tight job market, Hooper notes. Officials for years have spoken of *daiye qingnian* ("youth awaiting job assignment"), but they now acknowledge that China has a serious unemployment problem.

China's aging leaders tolerate the new youth culture in the hope that it will serve as an escape valve for the underlying "restlessness and edginess" which they fear "might boil over into demands for change or simple strife." However, before many more years have passed, Hooper believes, the rising economic, social, and political aspirations of China's young people are going to present a powerful challenge to that nation's rulers.

Pacifism in One Country

"Germany, Japan, and the False Glare of War" by Daniel Hamilton and James Clad, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1991), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St. N.W., Ste. 400, Washington, D.C. 20006; "Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview" by Inoguchi Takashi and "The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis" by Ito Kenichi, in *The Journal of Japanese Studies* (Summer 1991), Thomson Hall DR-05, Univ. of Wash., Seattle, Wash. 98195.

American leaders have looked to Japan as a major partner in shaping and maintaining a "new world order." But the Persian Gulf War showed that—like Germany, the other major partner in the U.S. scheme—the Asian nation is reluctant to assume such a role. Japan only slowly and spasmodically gave financial aid (about $10 billion, ultimately) to the U.S.-led multinational forces, and then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's proposal to provide token military support to the war effort was with-

Europe's Quest for Unity

A Survey of Recent Articles

Visions of a European "superstate" received an enormous boost from the end of the Cold War. As late as summer 1990 it appeared that the need to rely on U.S. military power was fast disappearing. In the emerging world order, economic strength would be what counted most. The 12-nation European Community (EC) was already moving toward a much improved common market by the end of 1992. A newly unified Europe, with Germany as its economic dynamo, would soon, along with that other economic powerhouse, Japan, be joining the United States at the summit of international affairs.

That was the dream, but, as Giuseppe Sacco in *Commentary* (Sept. 1991) and other analysts say, it did not last long. The awakening began in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Gulf crisis, writes John Newhouse in the *New Yorker* (Sept. 2, 1991), "obliged the United States to do what only it could do, and reminded the European nations of their dependence on that special role." The crisis also displayed, as Sacco writes, a European Community unable "to shape even the slightest role for itself." Nor did the individual European nations, "preoccupied . . . with the balance-of-power situation within the European theater itself," do what the Community could not. Germany, in particular, not wanting to complicate its relations with the Soviet Union, then considering ratification of German reunification, aligned itself with the U.S.-led coalition only at the last minute. Even Britain, in appealing to its European partners to join in supporting the United States, "had its eye on the future architecture of *European* security, to which it wished to keep the Americans moored as strongly as possible."

The European Community resolved to do better in the next crisis—which came last spring, when Yugoslavia started sliding toward civil war. As the crisis unfolded, however, European disunity became painfully apparent. Dissent by one nation or another always blocked Community action. Germany threatened to recognize Slovenia or Croatia, notes *Süddeutsche Zeitung* foreign editor Josef Joffe, writing in the *New York*

drawn in the face of loud political opposition at home. The war stimulated "overdue" internal debate about Japan's future global responsibilities, assert Hamilton and Clad, senior associates at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Japan deserves credit for its financial and diplomatic contributions. But, they add, the United States should think twice before pushing it into a military role. Leaving aside Asia's anxiety about a revival of Japanese military power, there is the fact that the "trauma of defeat" lingers in the Japanese memory.



A Japanese view of the Gulf War: Skepticism about use of military power was widespread among the Japanese during the war.

Japanese public opinion is strongly against taking on such a burden, notes Inoguchi, a political scientist at the University of Tokyo. More than two-thirds of the Japanese surveyed in one poll believe that their nation should become more

Times (Aug. 28, 1991), but France and Britain, fearing a Teutonic power play, refused to go along. The Cold War's end, he says, "has . . . loosened the political bonds forged in the West," and left Western Europe looking like "a bunch of teenagers suddenly forced to fend for themselves."

Yet European unification is not all illusion. The Community has been rapidly moving toward removal of customs and other barriers as part of the effort to create a single market after 1992. Agreement reached in October between the Community and the seven-member European Free Trade Association means that Western Europe's 380 million people will be joined together in a powerful trading bloc. There has also been progress toward monetary union. But reaching a consensus on a *political* union that does not have a defense component that would undermine NATO and send Americans packing is proving no easy task.

Trying to "deepen" the European Community is hard enough, Newhouse says, but doing so while also "widening" it to take in aspiring new members from Central and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, may be impossible. Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta are already knocking on the Community's door. Some members, such as France, want only to deepen the Community; others, such as Britain, would rather enlarge it. The Germans profess to be devoted to *both* operations. Their position reflects their need "to prove themselves 'good Europeans' and so have a political license from their partners to concentrate . . . on absorbing 17 million new citizens [and] helping most of Eastern Europe move toward market economies and . . . democracy."

German reunification, Sacco says, "has altered the balance within the very heart of the EC, bringing back to the surface certain unsavory qualities of nationalism and political rivalry." That makes a united Europe just as urgent a goal now as before the Cold War.

Newhouse sees "cause for optimism." The "pivotal relationship" is between France and Germany, and each harbors doubts about the other's willingness to build a united Europe. The success of the December 1991 EC summit meeting comes not a moment too soon. The EC, Newhouse says, is "Europe's last best hope of containing its furies."

involved in world affairs, but in ways in keeping with its pacifist constitution. Japan, in other words, "should continue to [focus] on commercial activities and endeavor to make financial, technological, and scientific contributions to keep the world safe from hunger and war."

Ito, a professor of international politics at Aoyama-Gakuin University who advocated sending Japan's Self-Defense Forces abroad during the Gulf War, decries "the emotion of 'one-country pacifism' in which the Japanese want to be the only ones who avoid all the risks." This deep-seated outlook, he says, "is rooted in our experience of the utter horror of World War II, including the atomic bomb." But, he argues, "now that the situation is one of 'having to do something for the sake of others,' Japan's postwar pacifism must confront its own logical bankruptcy and is losing its moral foundation . . . . Japan has become too important a nation to be the world's conscientious objector."

Inoguchi insists that the Japanese are not being selfish. From their reading of history, they have derived a "deep skepticism about the utility of military power, especially as projected onto foreign terrain for a prolonged period of time." Many Japanese suspect that "more enduring regional factors will diminish the long-term impact" of the Gulf War victory. Moreover, Inoguchi adds, the Japanese are constrained by *others'* reading of history. The prospect of Japanese military involvement in the Gulf War aroused the suspicions of the Chinese and other Asians who had suffered from past Japanese aggression.

Hamilton and Clad urge the United States to tread cautiously. Were Japan to become a military force again, "the balance of power would change dramatically, instantly destabilizing the [region] and transforming . . . Japanese domestic politics." Japan's leaders do not want this; nor do its neighbors. "Neither should the United States."