

the hateful idea of "running away to America"—and thereby deserting the Russian Church and the "God-bearing people," the Russians—appeared often in his fiction.

But the Slavophile portrayal of the United States, Gleason says, was less important than the anti-Americanism of radical intellectuals such as Peter Lavrov. Thoughts of the United States as the land of freedom were increasingly abandoned as the 19th century wore on. The corruption of the Gilded Age and the course of industrialization made it seem to Russian radicals that Americans were consumed by "the desire for individual material aggrandizement." At the same time, the radicals came to believe "that Russia had an extraordinary destiny . . . the development of a new and equitable socialist civilization, based on the spontaneous, if untutored, socialism of the Russian peasant." This vision of the Russian future was somewhat different from that of the Slavophiles, but Left and Right agreed on the evils of the American model.

Russians in the political center were not so prone to anti-Americanism. Many architects, teachers, and other new Russian professionals were quite interested in how their American counterparts operated. But it was the radicals' negative vision of America that informed Soviet ideology after the revolution of 1917.

Russians today, as at times in the past, Gleason notes, are disposed to admire Americans, their dynamism and technological

achievements. But, he warns, "the nativist critique of the United States—which is now being articulated only in nationalist and bureaucratic circles—will surely emerge in some recognizable form before too long."

### *Making Peace in El Salvador*

After 12 years and more than 75,000 dead, the war in El Salvador finally came to an end last January with the signing of a peace treaty between President Alfredo Cristiani's government

and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The "turning point on the road to negotiations," according to Stanford political scientist Karl, was the FMLN's unsuccessful

### *The Other God That Failed*

Why did the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire come as such a complete surprise to Sovietologists? Harvard historian Richard Pipes, in *Commentary* (Mar. 1992), says there were several reasons.

*One [cause] was intellectual vanity. With the overwhelming majority of ordinary Americans hostile to communism, the expert was inclined to take a contrarian view, to argue that reality was different or, at the very least, more "complex." For what would be the point of being an expert if one knew no more than the untutored masses?*

*To qualify as an expert one also had to travel to the communist bloc, and this required the kind of access which totalitarian governments granted only foreigners whom it considered friendly. I heard not a few Sovietologists speak privately of the Soviet regime in terms of utmost contempt, but they never dared to do so in public . . .*

*But the failure of the profession was also perhaps most of all due to a "social-scientese" methodology which ignored history, literature, witnesses' testimonies, and all else that could not be explained in sociological jargon and buttressed with statistics. Playing scientists, they developed "models" which assumed that all states and societies were fundamentally identical because they were called upon to perform identical functions. Being imponderable and hence unquantifiable, the peculiar features of national culture escaped their attention. So, too, did the moral dimension of human activity inasmuch as scientific inquiry was expected to be "value-free." Human suffering was an irrelevant factor.*

*The fate of the Sovietological profession, which constitutes only one regiment in the army of social "scientists," should serve as a warning. Science in our day enjoys well-deserved prestige, but its methods cannot be applied to human affairs. Unlike atoms and cells, human beings have values and goals which science is incapable of analyzing because they never stand still and never recur. They are, therefore, the proper province of the humanities, and best studied by the methods of history, literature, and the arts.*

"El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution" by Terry Lynn Karl, in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1992), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

November 11, 1989, military offensive. It was, she says, El Salvador's "Tet."

The war had become a stalemate as early as 1984. Until then, the FMLN had been winning, but the United States, determined not to permit a communist victory, increased its involvement. It promoted the drafting of a new constitution in 1983, poured \$1.8 million into El Salvador's 1984 presidential elections, won by Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte, and provided his government with up to \$1.2 million a day to fight the war.

The Reagan administration's commitment ruled out an FMLN victory, but the U.S. Congress's refusal "to condone either an open alliance with the violent ultraright or intervention by U.S. troops," says Karl, prevented the FMLN's total defeat. The war dragged on, costing tens of thousands of lives and devastating the economy. By September 1987, opinion polls indicated that more than 80 percent of the Salvadoran people wanted a negotiated end to the war.

Like the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the FMLN's November 1989 offensive—in which the guerrillas carried out a wave of attacks in the capital city of San Salvador—was a military failure that nevertheless fatefully altered perceptions. [The Tet offensive in Vietnam, in fact, was misperceived as a U.S. "disaster."] The failure of the Salvadoran rebels' offensive demonstrated what most on the Left already knew:

that they did not have enough support for a widespread popular uprising. The opening of the Berlin Wall that same month and the Soviet Union's decision earlier in the year to cut off arms shipments to Nicaragua's Sandinista government also helped deflate rebel hopes. On the Right, Karl writes, "the rebel occupation of homes in the wealthy Escalón district [of the city] galvanized recalcitrant Salvadoran businessmen to support negotiations," despite the military's opposition to talks.

The Salvadoran army's murder of six Jesuit priests later in November was the final straw. "What died with the Jesuit priests was a [U.S.] foreign policy consensus based on the twin premises that the [Salvadoran] army had successfully contained the FMLN and that democracy was being constructed." Opposition by Democrats on Capitol Hill made it clear that U.S. aid to El Salvador's armed forces would soon be shut off. On February 1, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker came out for "a negotiated settlement which guarantees safe political space for all Salvadorans," thus reversing U.S. policy. The stage was set.

Two years later, the peace treaty was signed in Mexico City. Conservative President Christiani "strode across the podium to shake hands with all five FMLN commanders as participants on both sides cried openly." Yet "fear and uncertainty" are bound to persist, Karl says, at least until the March 1994 presidential elections.

## Saudi Democracy?

"Saudi Arabia: Culture, Legitimacy and Political Reform" by Joseph McMillan, in *Global Affairs* (Spring 1992), International Security Council, 1155 15th St. N.W., Ste. 502, Washington, D.C. 20005.

Oil wealth has brought rapid increases in urbanization, education, and overall living standards in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in recent decades. Does all of this material progress mean, as some Americans wanted to believe after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, that Saudi Arabia is moving inevitably toward democracy? Not at all, says Joseph McMillan, former U.S. Defense Department country director for Saudi Arabia.

The cornerstone of the Saudi political system is the Islamic faith, he points out. It—not the will of the people—is for Saudis the ultimate authority in the land, which the monarch must uphold. The Saudi population is wholly Muslim and overwhelmingly Sunni; no more than seven percent of the Saudis—about 550,000—are Shiites. Democracy has made inroads in

other Muslim nations—notably, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt—but that does not mean that Saudi Arabia is its next likely stop. Saudis set themselves apart from other Arabs and Muslims. Regarding themselves as the most Islamic of Muslims, Saudis take pride in their strict adherence to a distinctively Saudi fundamentalist form of Islam called Wahhabism, named after Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, an 18th-century religious reformer. Government's main purposes, in the Wahhabi view, are to guarantee the purity of the faith, to protect and defend the faithful, and to preserve order in the Muslim community (*ummah*). If the *ulama* (religious scholars) pronounce the ruler un-Islamic, then the subjects have a positive duty to disobey him.

This means that the monarchy has to share