

tice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan. According to biographer Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower privately said on a number of occasions that he wished the Supreme Court had upheld *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) instead of overturning it in *Brown v. Board of Education*, the landmark 1954 decision declaring segregation in public schools unconstitutional. After Eisenhower left office, he frequently said that his biggest mistake had been appointing Warren to the court. For his part, Warren said in his memoirs that he always believed Eisenhower "resented our decision in *Brown*." Despite all this, San Francisco attorney Michael Kahn, a member of the Center for the Study of the Presidency's national advisory council, contends that, in civil rights, Eisenhower "got exactly what he bargained for" in his Supreme Court appointments.

When Eisenhower nominated Warren to be chief justice in 1953, he was very familiar with the man and his reputation as a liberal Republican, Kahn notes. Warren, a former California governor, had been his party's vice-presidential nominee in 1948 and had competed against Eisenhower for the 1952 presidential nomination. Moreover, the president and Attorney General Herbert Brownell, who helped him select Warren, were well aware that *Brown v. Board of Education* had been argued in the 1952-53 term and scheduled for a rehearing, and that a landmark civil-rights decision was in the offing.

Hence, Kahn argues, the *Brown* ruling, at least to the extent that it was Warren's doing, should have come as no surprise.

"Southern fury against the 'northern Supreme Court's' effort to impose on the South 'northern values' and standards of equality was unabated throughout the 1950s in virulent racist and segregationist rhetoric and conduct," Kahn notes. "It was in this context that Eisenhower [appointed to the court] four Midwesterners and Northerners [John Marshall Harlan, Brennan, Charles Whitaker, and Potter Stewart], each of whom pledged—in absolute defiance of southern senatorial anger and threats of reprisals—to uphold the principles of *Brown v. Board of Education*." In the case of liberal Democrat Brennan, Eisenhower may not have known in 1956 that the jurist "would ultimately become a symbol of liberal judicial philosophy for two generations of Americans," Kahn says, but there was no doubt at all that he "would vigorously implement civil rights decisions."

During his presidency, Eisenhower did not doubt that he had been right to select Warren as chief justice. Later, however, as a result of his disapproval of the Warren Court's expansive interpretations of the rights of accused criminals and communists in the early 1960s, his feelings changed. But that, Kahn says, should not diminish President Eisenhower's great—and little recognized—accomplishment in the field of civil rights.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Ronald Reagan, Peacemaker

The policy of containment, pursued by the United States for more than four decades, usually gets much of the credit for the West's victory in the Cold War. The knock-out punch, conservatives maintain, was delivered by the Reagan administration's firm anticommunist stance and its determined military buildup. Political scientists Daniel Deudney of the University of Pennsylvania and John Ikenberry of Princeton have a different interpretation, one that offers greater comfort to post-Vietnam liberals who feared nuclear destruction more than communism and favored a policy of ac-

commodation with the Soviet Union rather than one of confrontation.

Containment, as applied over the decades, was important in blocking Soviet expansionism, Deudney and Ikenberry acknowledge, but it was not just Western strength that finally brought the Cold War to an end. "The initial Soviet response to the Reagan administration's [military] buildup and belligerent rhetoric was to accelerate production of offensive weapons, both strategic and conventional. That impasse was broken not by Soviet capitulation but by an extraordinary convergence by Reagan and

"Who Won the Cold War?" by Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1992), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2400 N St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-1153.

In Victory, Indifference

Writing in *The Times Literary Supplement* (May 22, 1992), military analyst Edward N. Luttwak, of Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, sees a hard-won maturity in the American public's "peculiar indifference" to the United States' Persian Gulf and Cold War victories.

[British Prime Minister Clement] Attlee had good reason to be anxious when faced with the emotional storms unleashed across the Atlantic by the vicissitudes of the Korean War. And Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam War was conditioned by his fear that, if the public became aroused, it would impulsively demand stronger action against Vietnam's Soviet and Chinese allies than prudence allowed. But after their long education in the hard school of the Cold War, Americans at large, otherwise not especially sophisticated, proved themselves almost Bismarckian in their cold-blooded attitude to the Gulf crisis from start to finish.

Before the fighting, instead of uttering war cries . . . a vast majority of the American public evidently considered the use of force against Iraq as a complicated question in need of serious analysis, a fit subject for prolonged Congressional deliberations During the fighting . . . the destruction of Iraqi military power was clearly viewed by most Americans as a necessary chore rather than as an occasion for glorious combat After the fighting, the parallel absence of triumphalism . . . was the most telling evi-

dence of the public's maturity, its sober appreciation that while defeat would have been disastrous, victory over Iraq could not yield much, and would probably engender new travails of one sort or another

[As for the Cold War], there is no denying that the Soviet Union would have won global predominance even as its internal decay silently progressed, had the United States not shown the prolonged tenacity that Churchill for one feared impossible, both by military expenditures sustained year after year, and by the patiently persistent diplomacy that preserved its broad alliances decade after decade. Americans are not especially modest, yet no outburst of self-congratulation ensued when the Soviet Union finally collapsed after the August 1991 coup [The] American people [were] manifestly indifferent to all that power and glory, not because of pettier distractions but rather because [they] correctly saw no worthwhile purpose for either

Sooner than most of the foreign-policy elite in fact, the common people of America . . . instinctively understood that victory in the Cold War had abruptly weakened the United States as well, for its military-diplomatic power was thereby devalued. Not without bitterness, Americans repeated to one another the season's joke: the Cold War is over, Japan has won. Even if the terminology was not theirs, a great many Americans understood that a new "geo-economic" era had abruptly emerged

Mikhail Gorbachev on a vision of mutual nuclear vulnerability and disarmament."

President Reagan's aversion to nuclear weapons was just as strong as his anticommunism, Deudney and Ikenberry argue. Although most administration officials disagreed with him, the president regarded the abolition of nuclear weapons as "a realistic and desirable goal." Reagan's strong antinuclear views at the 1985 Geneva summit meeting were "decisive in convincing Gorbachev that it was possible to work with the West in halting the nuclear arms race." At the Reykjavik summit meeting the next year, Reagan's antinuclear commitment became even more open, and he and Gorbachev "came close to agreeing on a comprehensive program of global denuclearization that was far bolder than any seriously entertained

by American strategists since . . . 1946."

Many hard-liners in Washington were aghast. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger accused Reagan of engaging in "casual utopianism." But Reagan's antinuclearism, the authors contend, gave Gorbachev "the crucial signal . . . that bold initiatives would be reciprocated rather than exploited." The first fruit was the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces—"the first genuine disarmament treaty of the nuclear era."

"Not just containment, but also the overwhelming and common nuclear threat brought the Soviets to the negotiating table," Deudney and Ikenberry write. "In the shadow of nuclear destruction, common purpose defused traditional antagonisms." An end to the Cold War was in sight.