

sion of the American spirit . . . For most people now, the Declaration means what Lincoln told us it means," which he did in order "to

correct the Constitution without overthrowing it." Because of his speech at Gettysburg, Wills concludes, "we live in a different America."

### *Bureaucracy: Grow It Must*

"The Shrink-Proof Bureaucracy" by Jonathan Walters, in *Governing* (Mar. 1992), 2300 N St. N.W., Ste. 760, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Politicians with their eyes on the mayor's office or the governor's mansion often promise to cut overgrown governments down to size. For all such campaign talk, however, state and local government employment—which now stands at more than 15 million—has risen by about 20 percent over the last dozen years. [The ranks of the 3.1 million federal civilian employees, by contrast, increased by only 0.6 percent in 1980–89.] During the '80s, such state and local growth outstripped population gains by two-to-one; in fact, in some big cities, such as Washington, D.C., public employment increased even though population was *declining*.

It is easy to see why the public payroll is such a tempting target for budget-minded politicians, observes *Governing* staff writer Jonathan Walters. According to an analysis by the Tax-Free Municipal Bond division of Dean Witter Reynolds, states would have saved \$12 billion had their personnel growth in 1980–89 only kept pace with population growth. New York State alone would have saved \$2.7 billion—more than three times its current projected deficit. Municipal finance specialist Phil Dearborn, executive director of the Washington Research Center, estimates that the state and local "bloat," nationwide, averages 5–10 percent of total payroll. So what makes it so difficult for mayors and governors to eliminate it?

To begin with, Walters points out, there are often political complications. "A huge proportion of middle managers in any city government have politically influential allies willing to go to bat for them; that is one reason they got to be managers."

Then there are the civil-service complications. When New Jersey Governor Jim Florio took office in early 1990, he thought it would

be possible, in a state work force of more than 100,000, to find 1,000 people who would not be missed. "But it turned out not to be that simple," Walters writes. "Eliminating any position, even a superfluous one, can trigger an intricate chain of civil service 'bumping,' the process by which more senior staff move down to force out less senior staff as positions are eliminated. In order to fire 1,000 people, Florio learned, he would have to send notices to 20,000 people that their jobs might be affected." Legislatures could change such rules, of course, but somehow they are never eager to do so.

Supposing the would-be bloat-buster surmounts the political and civil-service hurdles, there is still another obstacle: sheer resistance from the affected public servants. In New Jersey, for example, Walters says, some agencies "have simply ignored" Florio's latest request to identify jobs that can be eliminated. Often, the officials out to get rid of the bloat antagonize the very people they need to help them do it. "The more talk from mayors and governors of cleaning out the deadweight with shovels, the fiercer the [bureaucracy's] resistance to change," Walters notes.

Yet, despite all the obstacles, some governments do manage to trim the payroll. In New Orleans, for example, municipal employment has plummeted in the last 10 years from 12,000 to 6,000. Mayor Sidney J. Barthelemy, elected in 1986, simply had no choice: He faced a \$30 million budget deficit. Such "truly horrendous fiscal problems," Walters says, are apparently the only force strong enough "to restrain or bust bloated bureaucracy . . . Only when budgets have to be cut drastically do bureaucracies feel the bite." Otherwise, he concludes, "bloat is inevitable."

### *Ike's Hidden Hand On Civil Rights*

"Shattering the Myth About President Eisenhower's Supreme Court Appointments" by Michael A. Kahn, in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Winter 1992), 208 East 75th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower is often portrayed as having been unsympathetic to civil

rights and disappointed by the rulings of his Supreme Court appointees, particularly Chief Jus-

tice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan. According to biographer Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower privately said on a number of occasions that he wished the Supreme Court had upheld *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) instead of overturning it in *Brown v. Board of Education*, the landmark 1954 decision declaring segregation in public schools unconstitutional. After Eisenhower left office, he frequently said that his biggest mistake had been appointing Warren to the court. For his part, Warren said in his memoirs that he always believed Eisenhower "resented our decision in *Brown*." Despite all this, San Francisco attorney Michael Kahn, a member of the Center for the Study of the Presidency's national advisory council, contends that, in civil rights, Eisenhower "got exactly what he bargained for" in his Supreme Court appointments.

When Eisenhower nominated Warren to be chief justice in 1953, he was very familiar with the man and his reputation as a liberal Republican, Kahn notes. Warren, a former California governor, had been his party's vice-presidential nominee in 1948 and had competed against Eisenhower for the 1952 presidential nomination. Moreover, the president and Attorney General Herbert Brownell, who helped him select Warren, were well aware that *Brown v. Board of Education* had been argued in the 1952-53 term and scheduled for a rehearing, and that a landmark civil-rights decision was in the offing.

Hence, Kahn argues, the *Brown* ruling, at least to the extent that it was Warren's doing, should have come as no surprise.

"Southern fury against the 'northern Supreme Court's' effort to impose on the South 'northern values' and standards of equality was unabated throughout the 1950s in virulent racist and segregationist rhetoric and conduct," Kahn notes. "It was in this context that Eisenhower [appointed to the court] four Midwesterners and Northerners [John Marshall Harlan, Brennan, Charles Whitaker, and Potter Stewart], each of whom pledged—in absolute defiance of southern senatorial anger and threats of reprisals—to uphold the principles of *Brown v. Board of Education*." In the case of liberal Democrat Brennan, Eisenhower may not have known in 1956 that the jurist "would ultimately become a symbol of liberal judicial philosophy for two generations of Americans," Kahn says, but there was no doubt at all that he "would vigorously implement civil rights decisions."

During his presidency, Eisenhower did not doubt that he had been right to select Warren as chief justice. Later, however, as a result of his disapproval of the Warren Court's expansive interpretations of the rights of accused criminals and communists in the early 1960s, his feelings changed. But that, Kahn says, should not diminish President Eisenhower's great—and little recognized—accomplishment in the field of civil rights.

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## FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

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### *Ronald Reagan, Peacemaker*

The policy of containment, pursued by the United States for more than four decades, usually gets much of the credit for the West's victory in the Cold War. The knock-out punch, conservatives maintain, was delivered by the Reagan administration's firm anticommunist stance and its determined military buildup. Political scientists Daniel Deudney of the University of Pennsylvania and John Ikenberry of Princeton have a different interpretation, one that offers greater comfort to post-Vietnam liberals who feared nuclear destruction more than communism and favored a policy of ac-

commodation with the Soviet Union rather than one of confrontation.

Containment, as applied over the decades, was important in blocking Soviet expansionism, Deudney and Ikenberry acknowledge, but it was not just Western strength that finally brought the Cold War to an end. "The initial Soviet response to the Reagan administration's [military] buildup and belligerent rhetoric was to accelerate production of offensive weapons, both strategic and conventional. That impasse was broken not by Soviet capitulation but by an extraordinary convergence by Reagan and

"Who Won the Cold War?" by Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1992), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2400 N St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-1153.