turies there were, within the Mediterranean world, female priests and bishops—a phenomenon that Tertullian of Carthage branded "heresy." Far more common, and almost as threatening to most Church Fathers, were the many wealthy female patrons of various Christian communities and churches. Monasteries housing both men and women, such as the one founded by St. Brigit in fifth-century Ireland, and spiritual marriages between male and female celibates were but two institutions that involved women in the culture of learning.

But with the increasing militarization of the church during the Carolingian period and the reforms of Pope Gregory VII in the late 11th century (which strengthened papal authority and weakened lay influence), women were effectively cut off from the intellectual life of Western Christendom. Their exclusion was nowhere more noticeable than in the new universities of Paris, Padua, and Oxford. From the 13th century on, observed historian Friedrich Heer, "there was no satisfaction for [women's] spiritual and intellectual yearnings."

Noble tells how the anti-female bias survived among the New Philosophers, those thinkers from Francis Bacon (1561–1626) to Roger Boyle (1627–91) who retained a religious outlook even as they laid the foundations of modern science. Universities and scientific societies in the early modern world were full of such men who shared Isaac Newton's monkish horror of women's potentially corrupting influence upon the life of the mind. Yet Noble does not ignore the heterodox tendencies within late Christendom that allowed women, particularly in America, slowly to infiltrate realms deemed properly masculine. How slowly hardly needs saying. England's Mary Somerville (1780–1872), hailed as the "premier scientific lady" of her day, saw her book on astronomy adopted as a set text at Cambridge. Yet neither she nor her daughters were permitted to study within its hallowed, masculine halls.

WHEN TIME SHALL BE NO MORE:
Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture.
By Paul Boyer. Harvard. 468 pp. $29.95

"Many Arguments . . . persuade us," Cotton Mather told his Boston congregation in 1709, "that our glorious LORD will have an Holy city in AMERICA . . . ." The belief that ancient biblical prophecies would be fulfilled in America has inspired some of the best minds of this country, observes Boyer, a historian at the University of Wisconsin. As late as the 19th century, the narratives of America's then-premier historian, George Bancroft, indirectly gained momentum from his belief that the hand of God was at work in the country's affairs. But as American culture became increasingly secular, what had once been a fertile line of thinking degenerated into eccentricity and crankiness. A debased form of prophetic writing continued as if in a parallel universe. Expositors offered "scientific" readings of the Bible to explain everything from World War I to global warming. Boyer is not entirely dismissive of this thinking: The doomsday visions of environmentalists, he points out, are essentially secularized versions of the Apocalypse. Biblically inspired superstitions circulate even among America's high and mighty. Ronald Wilson Reagan was so painfully aware that the Bible assigned the number 666 to the Antichrist—and that each of his names has six letters—that at one time he had the street number of his California home changed from 666 to 668.

Arts & Letters

THE ANALYST AND THE MYSTIC:
Psychoanalytic Reflections on Religion and Mysticism. By Sudhir Kakar. Univ. of Chicago. 83 pp. $15.95

Psychoanalysis was born partly in hostile reaction to religion. In *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), Sigmund Freud dismissed the religious inclination as a regressive, infantile wish to return to the mother's breast or to the cozy womb. True to the positivistic climate in which he began writing, Freud was determined to make psychoanalysis a science. And just as the sciences treated surface phenomena as expressions of underlying laws, so psychoanalysis reduced human behavior, including religious behavior, to manifestations of biological drives.

Kakar, who practices psychoanalysis in New Delhi and teaches at the University of Chicago, offers an explanation for that early hostility:

Freud and his followers pronounced all religion anathema not because it was opposed to what they did but because it was too similar. (A decade ago, Bruno Bettelheim demonstrated that Freud's works in the original German are full of references to the soul, all of which were excised from the English translations.) Early in this century, psychoanalysis was popularly lumped with mesmerism, Christian Science, phrenology, and other fads that cloaked religious concerns in scientific trappings. For psychoanalysis, such trappings are no longer necessary, Kakar argues, because even the hardest sciences have moved beyond simple positivism. (Quantum physics, for example, challenges the positivistic notions of causality.) Someone without interest in religion might well read *The Analyst and the Mystic* as a primer of current trends in psychoanalysis, showing how the discipline has moved from a science of instinctual drives to being a study of the mental representations of relationships.

From his perspective in India, Kakar sees how even the most dissimilar analysts of the past decades—Erik Erikson, Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, and Jacques Lacan, for example—share a "common antireductionistic agenda." All have been unwilling to reduce the varieties of human behavior to underlying scientific paradigms. Kakar himself discusses the 19th-century Indian saint Sri Ramakrishna—a lovable, wise, and childlike mystic, in many ways like St. Francis—without any scientific condescension. Earlier, Ramakrishna—who passed into ecstatic trances for days at a time and who sometimes went naked or wore women's clothing—would have had every diagnostic label imaginable pasted on him. (Even the venerable Buddha had, within the psychoanalytic literature, the various diagnoses of melancholia, catatonic ecstasy, schizophrenic dementia, and apathy applied to him.) Yet here Kakar argues that Ramakrishna, with his capacity for love and work, more than passes Freud's test for mature well-being.

Representing perhaps the most complete reconciliation of religion and psychoanalysis to date, Kakar's book aims to expand the therapeutic understanding and techniques available to practitioners and laymen alike. But Kakar might have mentioned where the old scientific impulse in psychoanalysis has gone. If "relational models" represent one great trend in post-Freudian psychiatry, psychopharmacology is surely the other. Many doctors and therapists now hold that chemistry is at least as good as talk for treating most psychiatric complaints. The division that Freud struggled to prevent between humanistic psychology and science—between, as it used to be put, "salvation" and "salves"—apparently has come to pass.

MICHEL FOUCAULT. *By Didier Eribon. Trans. by Betsy Wing. Harvard. 374 pp. $27.95*

Michel Foucault (1926–84) is widely regarded as one of the 20th-century's more innovative thinkers. Eribon's biography, a best seller in France, has all the fascination of Foucault's own "archeologies," which sought to uncover the relationships between self and culture.

Not only critics but even Foucault's friends have often read his work as a rationalization of his life. "I have suffered and I still suffer from a lot of things in French social and cultural life," Foucault admitted. The young philosopher is shown here in his twenties making "several attempts at or stagings of suicide," and all his life Foucault's psychological balance remained fragile. No wonder, then, that in *Madness and Civilization* (1961) he criticized society for defining itself in contrast to those it castigated as mentally different and labeled "mad." Foucault was gay in a culture that understood homosexuality as a perversion. So of course he would write a *History of Sexuality* (3 vol., 1976–84) to argue that what passes for natural is, in fact, a social construct. But to relate Foucault's work to his life in this way is, as Eribon points out, a very un-Foucaultian way to approach it.

For Foucault, as for Nietzsche (to whom he is indebted), there is no pure knowledge or truth independent of social context. An individual's knowledge is largely an unconscious mimicking, through ideas, of the existing power structure. The intellectual's task, as Foucault defined it, is thus somehow to break out of the "hegemony" of knowledge, to reveal "the economic and political role it plays." Foucault himself investigated the history of schools and asylums, medical clinics and prisons—the institutions that embodied, in Nietzschean terms, the social will to power—that determine what we believe