

More than four decades ago, in the historic elections of April 18, 1948, the Italian people decisively chose alignment with the West and rejected the Communists' bid for power. Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi's Christian Democrats and their allies won more than three-fifths of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the Communists and their allies were held to 31 percent of the vote. That, in essence, remained the pattern during the ensuing decades (with the Socialists holding the balance of power after 1963). But keeping the Communists out of power all that time had a price. Because the anti-Communist parties had to govern together, Sacco notes, they could not confront each other in elections with opposing programs. Nor could they take turns exercising power. The voters could never really "throw the rascals out," but instead had to put up with rule by party bosses. For nearly a half-century, Codevilla observes, "cabinets have risen and fallen, policy has lurched left or right, careers and fortunes have been made and lost, strictly by deals made among factional potentates. The voters have been spectators." Now, however, that seems to be changing.

On May 9, 1991, then-President Francesco Cossiga, a Christian Democrat who urged people not to fear the term *second republic*, declared that the government had become a "cosa nostra" of the parties. As Codevilla observes, Cossiga "thereby legitimized the

harshest criticism of the regime—that the government serves as a conduit of organized crime and that its activities are often indistinguishable from the crime syndicates." A referendum a month later on a minor change in the electoral law was transformed into a symbolic contest between "defenders of the 'democratic' constitution against chaos or worse," who favored a "no" vote, and "advocates of people power and morality," who urged a "yes" vote. More than 62 percent of the electorate went to the polls and an astounding 95.6 percent voted yes. "Nothing in Italian politics has ever been plainer," says Codevilla. The status quo "has very few defenders."

Some blame the ills of the party-dominated system on proportional representation: The voter casts his ballot for a party, and parties divide the seats in parliament in proportion to the votes they get. Reformers such as Mario Segni, a young Christian Democrat, have urged increasing the use of direct election. Various other reforms have been proposed, and reformist rhetoric dominated the campaign leading up to the April 5, 1992 elections, in which the governing coalition retained only a slender majority of parliamentary seats. So far, however, Sacco writes, "no real choice of valid and truly different programs has been offered" to the disaffected electorate. Little is clear now, concludes Codevilla, except "that the first Italian republic is all but dead."

Zambia's Example

"Zambia Starts Over" by Michael Bratton, in *Journal of Democracy* (Apr. 1992), 1101 15th St. N.W., Ste. 200, Washington, D.C. 20005; "Zambia: A Model for Democratic Change" by Richard Joseph, in *Current History* (May 1992), 4225 Main St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19127.

A landmark event for Africa took place in Zambia on October 31, 1991. Voters there, in free and fair elections, overwhelmingly chose trade-unionist Frederick Chiluba as the nation's president, gave his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 125 out of 150 seats in the National Assembly, and so brought to an end the 27-year reign of President Kenneth Kaunda, the country's founding father, and his United National Independence Party (UNIP). Zambia thus became the first English-



A stunning 76 percent of Zambia's voters agreed last year to put opposition leader Frederick Chiluba in the country's driver's seat.

Selective Outrage

Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, in *Bostonia* (Summer 1992), ponders "the hidden feelings of guilt and bad conscience" that have burdened celebrations of the Quincentenary of that turning point in world history, Christopher Columbus's 1492 voyage.

Our age may be one of tremendous events but it is also one of intellectual confusion Ideology has become the lay religion of our time and its dogmas, stereotypes, commonplaces, and excommunications continue to contaminate the intelligentsia of the Western worlds.

The condemnations, the discomfort, and the silence of so many intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the Quincentenary can be explained by the fear of praising the moral or material achievements of our democracies and thereby losing the politically correct credentials so necessary for success in the cultural establishment of the First and Third Worlds

Those who express dismay about the crimes and cruelties of the conquistadors against Incas and Aztecs have good reason to feel solidarity for those people who suffered in the past. They should, however, be equally outraged about the crimes and cruelties of Incas and Aztecs against the thousands of peoples they subjugated. But they are not. Academics have been itemizing every single crime committed by Europeans with remarkable meticulousness, but they have not shed a single tear for the thousands, the hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of Indian men and women who were sacrificed in wars of conquest and in barbarous Inca, Maya, Aztec, Chipcha, or Tolteca ceremonies

I am not arguing against those who wish to remember the arrival of the Spaniards as a bloody period of history in which countless and inexcusable brutalities were committed. I do object, however, to the jump many have made from moral outrage about historical events to the utopian assumption that we must somehow reestablish pre-Columbian civilizations as the Europeans found them. It is a proposal which leads invariably to actions that make us recoil with horror, [such as] the atrocities of the Shining Path movement in Peru. I also find it unrealistic to forget that all Americans, north and south, regardless of their color or origin, are products of this saga and its aftermath, for better or worse. I believe [that] it was mostly for the better, because those hard, greedy, and sometimes fanatical men brought along to America not only a hunger for wealth and the cross but also a culture that has been ours ever since. A culture that makes us heirs of a Cervantes and of a Shakespeare no more and no less than an inhabitant of Madrid or London. A culture that introduced to human civilization those codes of politics and morality that allow us to condemn powerful nations that abuse the weak, to reject imperialism and colonialism, [and] to stand up for human rights wherever they are violated.

speaking nation on the continent to make a peaceful transition from one-party rule to political pluralism. Ironically, Michigan State University political scientist Michael Bratton points out, this achievement was due in large part to Kaunda's own "genuine, albeit reluctant, acceptance of the demands made by a united opposition front." He sought to ride the wave of democratic reform and, against the advice of hard-liners in his party, made a series of major concessions to the opposition. When it became clear that he had lost the elections, he promptly stepped aside.

Neither Kaunda nor Zambia was unfamiliar with political pluralism. In 1964, when Zambia won full independence from Britain and Kaunda became president, the new nation had a republican constitution. In 1973, however, faced with the possible loss of his parliamentary majority, Kaunda turned Zambia into a one-party state.

Zambia was one of the wealthiest African nations at independence, writes Emory University political scientist Richard Joseph, but "stagnant agricultural growth and government mismanagement of the country's vast copper deposits led to a sustained deterioration in the standard of living." The economy's relentless decline during the 1980s and the collapse of world prices for copper, he says, bred opposition to Kaunda. Food riots erupted in June 1990 in Lusaka, the capital, after the lifting of price controls on maize meal, the country's staple. On June 30, an attempted coup brought thousands of Zambians into the streets to celebrate; although the coup failed, the dissatisfaction of the public was clear.

Kaunda eventually yielded to pressure for a national referendum on democratic pluralism, but after the MMD's coalition of trade unions, businesses, and civic groups was formed in July 1990, it decided that a referendum had become unnecessary. The outcome was foreordained. Huge crowds gathered in Zambia's major cities, chanting, "The hour has come!" In September 1990, Kaunda agreed to multiparty elections. He appointed a commission to draft a new constitution; in December, independent political parties were made legal again. At a July 1991 "summit meeting" with Chiluba, Kaunda agreed to incorporate certain opposition demands into the new constitution.

The opposition also wanted international observers to monitor the elections. Kaunda disparaged the idea, Joseph notes, but he "was once again made to reverse himself—and not only because of popular pressure." The government's strength was sapped by the increased reluctance of the International Monetary Fund and other foreign creditors to keep bailing out the economically troubled government.

"The message of the Zambian transition that has come through most loudly and clearly," Joseph writes, "is that Africa is ready for multiparty democracy." If Zambia's experiment in democracy is successful, many other African nations may be induced to follow its example.

Japan's Elusive National Interest

"The Economic Sources of Japan's Foreign Policy" by Bill Emmott, in *Survival* (Summer 1992), International Inst. for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London WC2E 7NQ.

Japan has been walking a little taller in international affairs in recent years. It has become, along with the United States, a top donor of overseas aid (\$9.3 billion in 1990). It has also stepped up its contributions to the International Monetary Fund and other international agencies and opened up its checkbook to help pay for the multinational military operation in the Gulf War. It is easy to see these moves as part of a foreign-policy juggernaut intended to advance Japan's economic strategy, observes Emmott, the *Economist's* business affairs editor, but that would be a mistake. The Japanese find it extremely difficult to reach a consensus about what the Japanese national interest is. Japan's foreign policy can hardly be to implement the national economic strategy, he adds, because Japan does not really have one.

Even the Japanese finance ministry is divided over economic strategy. Its budget bureau, the architect of the nation's fiscal policy, has since the early 1980s pushed to keep the government's budget in surplus, or at least balanced. But the ministry's vice minister, who acts as Japan's chief financial diplomat, favors budget deficits, which would stimulate the economy and increase imports, thus allowing him to appease foreign critics of the nation's huge trade imbalances, especially in the United States.

Outside the ministries, there are also divergent outlooks and interests. Big business generally seeks to expand its share of world markets. But business groups bitterly resist Tokyo's efforts to curry favor overseas by opening up particular domestic markets to foreign competition. Because of opposition to liberalized

trade from the powerful Japanese farm lobby and politicians in the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Japan has been unable to play a leading role in the current negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT is now one of Tokyo's most useful tools in preserving relatively open world markets for Japanese industry.

Garnering domestic support for actions that may well be in the national interest is no easy matter in Japan, Emmott observes. Although a stronger role in the United Nations could ease the pressure on Japan to increase military spending or take decisive political actions, the notion that Japan should have a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council has been discussed far more outside Japan than inside.

"Japan's foreign policy needs... have very little weight domestically," Emmott says. "The 'national interest' is not a notion that arises clearly or straightforwardly from domestic political processes," which "are concerned exclusively with sectional interests." This failure to create a sense of the national interest is partly due to the absence of a truly pluralistic political system, he says. But more important has been the paucity of genuine threats to Japan's national interest since 1945. That is unlikely to change significantly as long as Japan can count on the United States to deal with any urgent security problems.

"Japan already exerts a powerful influence, economically and politically, around the world," Emmott concludes. "It will not, however, take on a strong leadership role for one simple reason: It does not have to do so."