

of reviving, as Richard John Neuhaus put it, "the forbidden bigotries once confused with conservatism." The presidential bid of paleocon Pat Buchanan—whom some conservatives accused of having made anti-Semitic statements—widened the rift.

Since Reagan's retirement, the conservative movement has had no agreed-upon national leader. Conservatives have been loudly discon-

tented with President George Bush. Judis suggests that this discontent is a form of self-denial. If "Bush lacks a domestic policy, and the Republicans lack what [a conservative congressman called] a 'coherent national agenda,'" Judis concludes, it is a result of the fact that "the conservatives, who provided both policy and agenda for the party over the last decade, are no longer capable of doing so."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Gulf War's 'Friendly Fire'

"Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price" by Charles R. Shrader, in *Parameters* (Autumn 1992), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa. 17013-5050.

Of a total of 467 U.S. battle casualties in the Persian Gulf War, nearly one-fourth were caused by "friendly fire." Thirty-five U.S. soldiers were killed by U.S. weapons, and 72 were wounded. While there have been "friendly fire" casualties in all wars, modern weapons have made such losses more likely, according to Shrader, a military historian and author of *Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War* (1982).

The great range of today's weapons sometimes makes it harder to tell friend from foe. The use of high-tech thermal, radar, and laser sights can make identification more difficult. In one Gulf War incident, six U.S. soldiers were killed and 25 were wounded when the crews of Abrams tanks using thermal sights in a blinding rainstorm fired on other U.S. armored vehicles. In earlier conflicts, tankers unable to sight their targets likewise would have been unable to fire.

Although there were only nine air-to-ground incidents (resulting in 11 dead and 15 wounded) in the Gulf War, they have been the most common—and most destructive—type of "friendly fire" incident in the past, Shrader observes. "The speed of modern high-performance jet aircraft equipped with area weapons such as napalm, cluster

bombs, and high-volume-of-fire cannon significantly reduce decision and reaction time for pilots."

The reporting of friendly-fire incidents was thorough during the Persian Gulf War, in part because its limited scope and duration made full investigations feasible. Commanders are often reluctant to report such incidents, however, and until 1985, U.S. Army regulations did not require it. During the Vietnam War, in fact, they provided that friendly-fire casualties be classified as "killed in action" or "result of hostile action."

During the Gulf War, Shrader notes, various



An Army sergeant grieves for a comrade, in the body bag at right, killed by friendly fire during the Persian Gulf War.

An Earlier End to the Cold War?

Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Carter's national security adviser and is now a professor at Johns Hopkins, considers in *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1992) the possibility that the Cold War could have been brought to an earlier conclusion.

The West perhaps might have won sooner, but at a higher cost and with a greater risk of war. The key opportunity for the West came in . . . 1953-56. Greater Western elasticity in 1953 might have facilitated a Soviet pullback from Germany. But the Kremlin almost certainly would have used the Soviet army to maintain its grip on Warsaw and Prague, while in the West the neutralization of Germany might have precluded the establishment of binding NATO links between America and Europe. In contrast greater Western toughness in 1956—still a time of decisive U.S. strategic superiority—might have resulted in forcing the Soviet Union out of Hungary and Poland. The communist regimes in these countries were crumbling, and the Soviet leadership itself was in a state of panic.

The Cold War, however, would not have ended. Communism was not ripe for a collapse within Russia itself, and on the global scale the ideological momentum of communism was far from spent. Communist movements were strong even in Western Europe, and the communist wave in the Far East was still cresting . . .

The only other opportunity for ending the Cold War may have existed in the early 1970s, on the basis of what might be called "the Peace of Westphalia formula" [in which each side would have retained its geopolitical and ideological realms]. But both sides would have had then to accept the status quo in Europe as fixed. The West seemed ready to do so. However, by the mid-1970s, the Soviets saw themselves as being on a historical roll . . . In effect any acceptance of the European status quo would have been for the Soviets merely a temporary expedient . . .

[The] Kremlin was in no mood to be propitiated either through arms control or an acceptance by the West of the existing division of Europe. The Cold War eventually ended because the West succeeded in combining firm containment with an active offensive on human rights and a strategic buildup of its own, while aiding the resistance in Afghanistan and Poland.

A more plausible case can be made for the proposition that the West could have spared itself a decade or so by adopting earlier an offensive ideological and strategic posture. But in real life democracies are not able to adopt a forward strategy that requires philosophical and military mobilization without overwhelming and truly threatening provocation from the other side. That provocation was apparent to some in the 1970s; to most Americans and Europeans it became evident only in the early 1980s.

"quick fixes" of the friendly-fire problem were tried, including marking vehicles with luminous paint and thermal tape and using small infrared beacons on combat vehicles. The army seems to favor a technological solution and has promised to spend \$5-10 million on research this year. But human error is almost always behind friendly-fire incidents, Shrader writes. A

greater emphasis on "training, combat conditioning, fire discipline, planning and coordination of operations, and keeping the troops informed" would make more sense.

No matter what is done, Shrader believes, friendly-fire incidents will remain, as Major General Matthew B. Ridgway once said, "part of the inevitable price of war in human life."

Ethnic Nations

"Reflections: The Absence of Empire" by William Pfaff, in *The New Yorker* (Aug. 10, 1992), 20 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

The brutal Serbian exercise in "ethnic cleansing" in what was Yugoslavia is only the most extreme manifestation of the ethnic conflicts that have broken out throughout Eastern Eu-

rope and the former Soviet Union since the collapse of communism. At the root of these conflicts, historian-journalist Pfaff argues, is a concept of nationality radically different from