

units." As a result, several thousand more positions were opened to women. Still, Bendekgey says, many more remain out of reach. Clinging to the dated notion that

women need to be "protected" is ridiculous, she believes, especially when that "protection" is meaningless and merely complicates the management of troops.

### *Gorbachev's Road Ahead*

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in his April H. J. Heinz Company Foundation Distinguished Lecture, described the obstacles confronting Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

*Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader who cannot be removed by the Communist party and who, in fact, governs according to what we in the West would consider normal governmental structure. He has a fixed term in office and a regular bureaucracy. On the other hand, in order to get where he is, he has had to set in motion processes that will be difficult, if not impossible, to manage.*

*In the Western media these processes are described as "multiparty pluralism." I do not believe that is altogether true because it depends to such an extent on what part of the Soviet Union you are talking about. In the Russian Republic, which is half the Soviet population, it has moved from one-party to*

*one-man rule. The whole process of glasnost has not yet produced one single national organization extending over the whole of the Soviet territory, which might become the nucleus of a political party. . . .*

*The only national organizations left in the Soviet Union are the army and the KGB. . . .*

*All these political processes have up to now produced in the ethnic republics organizations confined strictly to the republics and therefore implicitly hostile to Moscow. So Gorbachev's unresolved dilemma is that, in order to push economic reforms through in the face of entrenched vested interests, he must centralize authority in Moscow. Yet to break the power of the Communist Party, he has had to enlist voters who are inherently hostile to Moscow. When Gorbachev visited Lithuania, he said, "To have a divorce, you need discussions between both parties." Lithuania responded, "But we are not married." And that is the fundamental problem.*

### *Tenuous Friendship*

"America and Israel: How Bad Is It? Will It Get Worse?" by Steven L. Spiegel, in *The National Interest* (Winter 1990-91), 1112 16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Even before Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, U.S.-Israeli relations were tense. Israelis worried that the United States would abandon them; Americans were dismayed by daily reports of violence between Arabs and Jews in Israel's occupied territories. It appeared that the two allies might be nearing a major falling out.

But Spiegel, a political scientist at UCLA, argues that tension is the rule, not the exception. Historically, U.S. support of Israel has always been balanced against America's desire not to alienate oil-rich Arab nations and against other national interests. "Despite the myth of consistent amicability and unity of purpose between Washington and Jerusalem," he writes, "the path of their relationship has been a crooked and rocky road indeed."

As early as 1946, two years before Israel became a nation, President Harry S. Truman was frustrated by Zionist balking at Britain's plan for Palestine. "If Jesus Christ couldn't please them, how can I?" he once complained. In the 1956 Suez crisis, President Dwight D. Eisenhower forced the Israelis, and their British and French allies, to stop their attack on Egypt.

The U.S. warmed to Israel under presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, who sold arms to Israel as a hedge against hostile Arab states and began to speak of a "special relationship." But they sold arms to Arab states such as Jordan as well. While President Richard M. Nixon was the first to consider Israel a "strategic asset," Spiegel writes, he regarded the 1967 Six Day War as a major

setback for the United States, since many Arab nations severed relations with Washington. (Only after the 1967 war did Washington guarantee Israel's security, and then only because the French abandoned their military relationship with Israel.) The Nixon-Kissinger strategy in the Middle East called for large Israeli concessions, causing friction with Israeli leaders.

Ronald Reagan's presidency was a honeymoon period for U.S.-Israeli relations. Before the 1980s, the U.S. bond to Israel was mainly ideological. Israel's "frontier" spirit "reminded Americans of their own early achievements as a young and aspiring nation," Spiegel writes. But "this emotional attachment to Israel was usually at odds with Cold War *realpolitik*." Spiegel argues that only after the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Af-

ghanistan the same year, "was Israel really taken seriously as a possible strategic asset." Even so, Reagan sold spy planes to Saudi Arabia over loud Israeli objections and openly questioned Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights.

Spiegel concedes that we are now in a new era of U.S.-Israeli relations. The Palestinian uprising and Israel's anarchic domestic politics, among other things, have badly tarnished Israel's image in American eyes. Since August, President George Bush has kept Israel at arm's length, to avoid antagonizing the Arab states in the anti-Iraq coalition. But while the causes of the current U.S.-Israeli tension have changed, Spiegel concludes, what we are witnessing is not a major change but a post-Reagan "return to the normal ebb and flow in U.S.-Israeli relations."

## *Bombs Away*

"Do We Need Nuclear Testing?" by J. Carson Mark, in *Arms Control Today* (Nov. 1990), 11 Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Last January President George Bush declared that as long as the United States depends on nuclear weapons, it "must be free to conduct nuclear tests." The Pentagon claims that continued testing is needed to ensure that the more than 20,000 nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal will work if they are ever needed. Mark, former head of the Theoretical Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory (1947-73), finds their reasoning and their motives specious.

Over the last 20 years, the Soviets have conducted an average of 19 nuclear tests a year; the United States, 17. Testing advocates argue that one-third of all the weapon designs in the U.S. arsenal have turned out after deployment to have flaws; in 75 percent of the cases, the faults were discovered only because of nuclear tests. True, says Mark, but only because the flawed weapons were deployed, untested, during the temporary 1958-1961 U.S. testing moratorium, when the superpowers were trying to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. Now that they have been tested and repaired, no further testing is

needed. The time is ripe, Mark argues, to negotiate the long-delayed treaty.

Now, existing U.S. nuclear weapons don't have to be exploded to be effectively tested, Mark continues. Periodically, random samples of each weapon model are already removed from the stockpile and thoroughly inspected.

In reality, Mark suggests, those who oppose a comprehensive test ban are more worried about the possibility of research and development for new nuclear weapons drying up than they are about the reliability of the current stockpile. He concedes that adopting a ban would hamper the development of new weapons. "But because nuclear weapons technology is already so highly developed, a test ban treaty would not have as great an impact as it would have had in 1958." Stopping "this endless nuclear evolution" is a main purpose of such a treaty, he says. What critics really object to is that a ban would "change the way we have been going, and . . . start going a different way." In Mark's view, that is exactly what needs to be done.