

would find themselves in a small, permanent minority, which would grow progressively smaller. That is the prospect universal suffrage holds out for South African whites too."

• *Language*: "There is no language in the world today which is spoken by a majority of its inhabitants We have the same situation in South Africa. The country has 11 major languages but not one is spoken by a majority of all its inhabitants Can you have world government without a world language? Perhaps. Can you have a national democracy without a national language? Again, perhaps, but obviously it increases the difficulties." The main obstacle to the introduction of full-fledged democracy in South Africa, Johnson says, is not "the gulf between blacks and whites," but rather "the violent chasm which separates blacks and blacks—a chasm widened by a multiplicity of languages which themselves reflect wide cultural divergences."

• *Power*: "The whites hold virtually all political, economic and military power in South Africa. Is it very different in the world as a whole?"

• *Politics*: "Like most of the world

[South Africa] is faced by intractable, or at least very difficult, problems of wealth and poverty, racial and cultural differences, and it has tried to solve them by a combination of ideology and humbug. Apartheid, which I have always termed ethnic socialism, is not essentially different from the wide variety of collectivism practiced over the last half-century by over 100 countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa itself." And like those various collectivism, he says, apartheid "is a theoretical construct which goes against the grain of nature, and it has been conclusively demonstrated to be unworkable. So South Africa, like most of the rest of the world, is now trying to feel and argue its way towards a better system."

Democracy *will* come to South Africa, Johnson believes, but it cannot be made to happen overnight. "One-man-one-vote systems have failed throughout Africa and in much of the rest of the third world because they were introduced too quickly," he argues. "True democracy, in which the rule of law plays as big a part as freely-elected parliaments, is a plant of slow growth In my view, if the process is to succeed, it will require a generation."

The Two Chinas

"'Links' and 'Exchanges': The Mainland Policy of the ROC" by A. James Gregor, in *Global Affairs* (Winter 1991), International Security Council, 1155 15th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

The leaders of the Republic of China on Taiwan used to thunder against the "rebels" on the mainland and their "illegal" regime. But no more. Since 1987, restrictions on travel to the mainland have been lifted; trade has been allowed to mushroom (to more than \$3.5 billion by 1989); mail and telephonic communications have been established; and investments by Taiwan businessmen in mainland undertakings soared to more than \$3.7 billion by the end of 1989.

All that seems a far cry from Chiang Kai-shek's hard-line anticommunism and oft-stated desire to "recover the mainland." Cynics have suggested that with the passing in 1988 of Chiang's son and political heir, Chiang Ching-kuo, Taiwan's ruling

Kuomintang, now led by Lee Teng-hui, has simply given up its longstanding political ideals in order to serve the island's economic needs. Berkeley political scientist Gregor, however, says that while economic pressures generated by financial and export problems were a factor in Taiwan's *volte-face*, the government's main purpose is still to "recover the mainland."

It was the younger Chiang himself—who, like his father, considered it "our solemn mission [to] unify China"—who initiated the new policy in 1987, when travel restrictions were relaxed, Gregor notes. After Chiang's death, the 13th Kuomintang Party Congress, meeting in July 1988, decided to continue on the new course. "The traditional anti-[People's Republic of

'We Eat One Another'

Soviet writer Tatyana Tolstaya, reviewing in the *New York Review of Books* (Apr. 14, 1991) the revised edition of *The Great Terror*, English writer Robert Conquest's classic account of Stalin's purges, ponders the unanswerable question about the horror: Why?

In Russia, in contrast to the West, reason has traditionally been seen as a source of destruction, emotion (the soul) as one of creation. How many scornful pages have great Russian writers dedicated to Western pragmatism, materialism, rationalism! They mocked the English with their machines, the Germans with their order and precision, the French with their logic, and finally the Americans with their love of money. As a result, in Russia we have neither machines, nor order, nor logic, nor money. "We eat one another and this satisfies us" Rejecting reason, the Russian universe turns in an emotional whirlwind

The enslavement of the peasants, which continued for 300 years, provoked such a feeling of guilt in the free, educated classes of Russian society that nothing disparaging could be said about the peasants Cultural taboos forbid us to judge 'simple people'—and this is typical not only of Russia. This taboo demands that a guilty party be sought 'high up.' It's possible that such a search is partly justified, but, alas, it doesn't lead to anything. Once an enemy is found 'up above,' the natural movement is to destroy him, which is what happens during a revolution. So he's destroyed, but what has changed? Life is just as bad as ever. And people begin ever new quests for enemies, detecting them in non-Russians, in people of a different faith, and in their neighbors. But they forget to look at themselves.

During Stalin's time, as I see it, Russian society, brutalized by centuries of violence, intoxicated by the feeling that everything was allowed, destroyed everything "alien": "the enemy," "minorities"—any and everything the least bit different from the "average." At first this was simple and exhilarating: the aristocracy, foreigners, ladies in hats, gentlemen in ties, everyone who wore eyeglasses, everyone who read books, everyone who spoke a literary language and showed some signs of education; then it became more and more difficult, the material for destruction began to run out, and society turned inward and began to destroy itself. Without popular support Stalin and his cannibals wouldn't have lasted for long. The executioner's genius expressed itself in his ability to feel and direct the evil forces slumbering in the people.

China] rhetoric was largely abandoned," Gregor writes, "in order to pursue a policy that would allow the [Kuomintang] the occasion to influence events and shape the future of mainland China."

Underlying the new policy was an assessment of the situation on the mainland quite different, until recently at least, from

those of Western analysts. The latter expected the Chinese regime to evolve gradually in a liberal direction. But Chinese analysts on Taiwan perceived mainland China instead to be "threatened with economic, social, and political collapse." They expected not gradual evolution, Gregor says, but "fitful shifts from liberalization to repression in a tightening spiral of violence." Hence, they were not taken completely by surprise by the June 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. And after obligatory denunciations of the "barbaric" leadership in Beijing, Taipei then continued on its new course.

Since Tiananmen, the authorities in Beijing have been unable to regain control over China's economy, and there have been reports of widespread disaffection among members of the People's Liberation Army. "Should the political leadership in Beijing lose control not only of the economy but of the security forces as well," Gregor writes, "the [People's Republic of China] could easily slip into revolutionary crisis." In that event, "the political forces that emerge could easily include those financed and directed by [Taiwan's] Kuomintang."

But even short of the communist system's complete collapse, Gregor says, Taiwan is hoping to influence developments on the mainland. With the contacts that have been developed there, he says, Taipei "has positioned itself to utilize every opportunity the uncertain future of mainland China might present."