Explosive Intelligence

"Bombshell" by Ronald Radosh and Eric Breindel, in *The New Republic* (June 10, 1991), 1220 19th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Diehard defenders of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and other convicted Soviet spies have long dismissed the idea that espionage might have helped the Soviet Union learn how to make an atomic bomb. Now comes confirmation that that was exactly what happened, and it comes from an unexpected source: the KGB itself. Radosh, co-author of *The Rosenberg File* (1983), and Breindel, editorial page editor of the *New York Post*, report that in a recent issue of the Soviet weekly, *New Times*, KGB Colonel Vladimir Matveyevich Chikov, a senior officer in the KGB's new public information office, discloses that espionage played a key part in the development of the Soviet atom bomb, and that American Communists were important spies.

Academician Igor Kurchatov, the late head of the Soviet A-bomb project, explicitly said, according to Chikov, that espionage "accounted for 50 percent of the project's success." The Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb on August 28, 1949, ending the U.S. monopoly on the horrendous weapon. Chikov reveals that two American Communists, Morris and Lona Cohen, had what Radosh and Breindel call "the central role" in establishing an atom bomb-related spy ring in the United States. Cohen, a New York schoolteacher, and his wife suddenly vanished after the Rosenbergs were arrested in June 1950. They were discovered in London in 1961, convicted of spying by a British court, and included in a 1967 spy swap with the Russians.

The Rosenbergs were convicted in 1951 of conspiring to commit espionage and executed two years later. The Rosenberg spy ring, Radosh and Joyce Milton concluded in their *Rosenberg File*, was "never the primary conduit of U.S. atomic secrets to the Soviets. The data stolen by David Greenglass [Ethel Rosenberg's brother who, as an Army enlisted man, was stationed at Los Alamos], while not without significance, was less important than that provided by [Manhattan Project physicist] Klaus Fuchs."

The information gathered by the Cohens, according to a 1943 memo by Soviet A-bomb project chief Kurchatov that was cited in the Chikov article, was "of tremendous, inestimable importance for our State and our science." It prompted the Soviets to "revise our views on many problems," he said, and enabled the Soviets to "bypass many laborious phases involved in tackling the uranium problem."

The Kurchatov memo, Radosh and Breindel say, corroborates what Soviet physicists who worked on the atom bomb project have told Stanford political scientist David Holloway. The physicists "were always astounded as to how, at crucial junctures, Kurchatov had come up with new methods of research and new questions, and had consistently managed to steer them in the right direction." Now they—and the rest of the world—know how he did it.

The Gulf War And Vietnam

"Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime" by Lewis Sorley, in *Parameters* (Summer 1991), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa. 17013-5050.

Last August, when President George Bush launched the first major U.S. military operation overseas since Vietnam, he promptly called up the reserves. Twenty-five years earlier, when he vastly expanded the U.S. military commitment in Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson had avoided such a move. In the difference lies a significant tale, says Sorley, a defense policy analyst. Bush, in fact, had little choice. Long before, as part of the U.S. military's own unsung efforts to prevent "another Vietnam,"

A Splendid Little War

The United States may have "kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all," as President Bush put it after the Persian Gulf War. But did the war return America to the red-white-and-blue spirit of World War II? Theodore Pappas, assistant editor of *Chronicles* (June 1991), says an earlier U.S. war offers a less happy analogy.

The Persian Gulf was recently the scene for a replay of the Spanish-American War. This time our "Manifest Destiny" was the "New World Order." Our Teddy "Rough Rider" Roosevelt was "Stormin' Norman" Schwarzkopf. Our "Butcher" Weyler was "Hitler" Hussein. Our Frederic Remington was Peter Arnett. Our "Cuban sugar" was Kuwaiti oil. Both wars were crusades for the liberation of a small and defenseless country from an oppressive, "inhuman," but weak and financially drained power, and both wars were immensely popular, shockingly short, and studded with decisive victories and few battlefield losses....

Shakespeare's King Henry V, in assessing the slaughter at Agincourt—10,000 dead French and less than 30 dead English—asked, "Was ever known so great and little loss/On one part and on th' other? Take it, God,/For it is none but thine!" The secretary of state, however, is no humble Henry: "It has been a splendid little war, begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit." That might have been James Baker or President Bush... but it was Secretary of State John Hay in 1898.

General Creighton Abrams, Army chief of staff in 1972–74, had begun to restructure the Army so that it could not again be sent to war without the reserves.

LBJ's refusal to use the reserves had baleful consequences, Sorley notes. The reserves, much to the dismay of their dedicated members, became havens for draft dodgers. And the active force, unable as it expanded to call upon experienced reserve officers and NCO's, saw the quality of its leaders diluted. Perhaps even more important, leaving the reservist husbands and fathers at home while teenaged draftees did the fighting left the public relatively detached from the war.

To prevent a recurrence, Abrams charted a path toward a thorough integration of reserve and active elements. In the mid-1970s, many support responsibilities, including such vital functions as transportation and communications, were assigned to the reserves. Also, some reserve combat units were assigned to "round out" active divisions—and were expected to deploy right along with them. By 1989, half of the Army's active divisions included reserve round-out brigades or battalions, and over two-thirds of the Army's tactical support strength was in the reserves.

The first major test of the system came in the Persian Gulf. Reserve *support* units were quickly mobilized. But, Sorley points out, no *combat* reserve forces were mobilized at first, even though two of the Army divisions sent to the desert supposedly had round-out brigades from the Army National Guard. "Abrams' fear had always been that... the political leadership would fail to call up the reserves," Sorley observes. But now, "it was the *military* leadership that did not want the combat reserves." Three round-out combat brigades eventually were called to active duty—but none were sent to Saudi Arabia.

What happened in the Gulf foreshadows

the future, Sorley thinks. Reserve combat forces will literally be held in reserve. But, just as in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he says, selected reserve *support* forces will be deployed early on. The importance of using America's military reserves is one "lesson of Vietnam" that was reinforced in the Persian Gulf.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Corporations Without Countries

"Does Corporate Nationality Matter?" by Robert B. Reich, in *Issues in Science and Technology* (Winter 1990–91), National Acad. of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Ave., Washington, D.C. 20418.

Does improving U.S. "competitiveness" mean making American-owned corporations more productive and profitable, and boosting their share of world markets? Not so much as it once did, contends Reich, of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. With U.S. corporations increasingly employing foreign workers, and foreign firms stepping up investments in this country, maintaining and enhancing Americans' standard of living, he says, now depends "less on the competitiveness of U.S. corporations than . . . on the value that the American workforce is able to add to the global economy. And what is good for the American workforce is no longer necessarily the same as what is good for the U.S. corporation."

More than 20 percent of U.S. firms' output is now produced by foreign workers on foreign soil. A majority (55 percent) of IBM's global employees now are not Americans. IBM Japan, with more than 18,000 Japanese employees, is one of Japan's major exporters of computers. Once U.S. jobs moving offshore were just low-wage, low-skill ones, Reich notes, but no longer. Texas Instruments has a software development office in Bangalore, its 50 Indian programmers linked by satellite with TI's Dallas headquarters. U.S. firms increased spending on research and development overseas by 33 percent in 1986–88—and by only six percent at home.

Much of what U.S. firms produce abroad is exported back to the United States. In fact, Reich says, that process accounts for about one-fourth of America's trade deficit. "When offshore production is taken into account, U.S. firms are no less competitive than they were in the 1960s," he believes. U.S. firms still have about the same share of global exports as they did 25 years ago—17 percent.

Foreign firms, meanwhile, now own more than 13 percent of America's manufacturing assets and employ more than eight percent of America's manufacturing workers—about three million Americans. In 1987–90, while the Big Three U.S. automakers were laying off 9,000 employees, foreign firms were hiring more than 12,000 U.S. autoworkers.

Although American shareholders do benefit from the global successes of U.S. firms, the standard of living of Americans "depends far more on what it is that they can *do* than it does on the assets they own. And what they are able to do depends, in turn, on the education and training they receive." Global corporations can give Americans good jobs that involve valuable training and experience. But American "control" of a particular global corporation, Reich says, is no guarantee that the corporation will give *Americans* good jobs. In today's global economy, "corporations are becoming global entities that are only loosely linked to nations, if at all. The U.S. competitive future depends on the one factor of production that is rooted at home: our workforce." Measures to promote U.S. competitiveness that fail to recognize this fact, he says, "may end up jeopardizing the real standard of living of Americans instead of enhancing it."