

In the 1959 study in which Meyer Friedman and Ray Rosenman introduced the Type-A man to the world, they reported that men who have a sense of urgency about time and who are inclined to be competitive and hostile, are twice as likely to have a heart attack. Following up on that, Levine and his colleagues examined the rates of death from ischemic heart disease (a decreased flow of blood to the heart) for their 36 cities. After adjusting for the median age of each city's population, they found "a significant correlation" between the rates and the cities' pace-of-life scores. New York, for instance, ap-

pears to be "heart-attack city." Indeed, the correlation was greater than that usually found between heart disease and measures of Type-A behavior in individuals.

It may be, Levine speculates, that fast-paced cities attract Type-A individuals, who then sustain and promote their preferred way of life. Many of the slower, Type-B people probably recoil from the rat race and move to more congenial settings. But the Type-B's who remain in the fast-paced cities are compelled to act more like Type-A's. And the real Type-A's, meanwhile, keep striving "to accelerate the pace still more."

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**PRESS & TELEVISION**

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*Watching the White House*

"Inside the White House: Pecking Orders, Pack Journalism, and Other Stories of the People Who Cover the President" by Owen Ullmann, in *The Washingtonian* (Jan. 1991), Ste. 200, 1828 L St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

The White House is still among the most prestigious beats in journalism. But for reporters intent upon ferreting out the "inside" story, it now can also be among the most frustrating. Ullmann, after six years at the White House for Knight-Ridder Newspapers, says that in recent decades it has become very hard for reporters there to find out "what's really going on and what makes the president tick."

Part of the new difficulty is a result of the increased size of the White House press corps. When there is a major news event involving the president, several hundred reporters and photographers cram themselves into a press room built for 50. The correspondents all have access to daily briefings, written announcements, and presidential press conferences and speeches, but reporters in search of the inside story need to be able to talk more intimately with the president or his key aides. "There are so many more reporters clamoring for the attention of [the] relatively few staffers who know anything that it is a constant battle for meaningful access," *Newsweek's* White House correspondent,

Tom DeFrank, told Ullmann.

Heightened security measures also keep the press away from "what's really going on." Once White House reporters were free to roam the halls of the Old Executive Office Building, in which many presidential assistants have their offices; now journalists can enter the building only after making an appointment, and then they are escorted to their source's office.

"Because White House reporters are forced to work in a pack, they tend to produce pack-mentality journalism," Ullmann says. "Peer influence and second-guessing by editors, who can decide a story line by watching TV or reading the wire services, [encourage] conformity."

After "a small group of influential columnists and reporters" decides what to think about a political figure, everyone else pretty much falls into line. "Going against the consensus can be dangerous," Ullmann says, "because editors and colleagues begin to question your judgment." For instance, the orthodox (albeit not necessarily truly informed) opinion among White House reporters about Vice Presi-

dent Dan Quayle is that he is "a fool." As a result, Ullmann says, nearly every story about Quayle highlights his gaffes. "To treat him seriously is to invite charges that you are either crazy or in the tank with Quayle. I wrote what I thought to be a balanced article on Quayle in 1989, but a fellow reporter castigated me for a major lapse in judgment."

Few members of the huge White House pack get to see the president on a regular basis. Most rely on a rotating pool of reporters for their knowledge of what goes on at "photo opportunities" and the like.

Even some reporters who travel overseas to cover a presidential trip do not see the president in person. But gazing directly upon the presidential person is simply not a necessity any more—not when reporters can glean just as much from watching him on television. Indeed, thanks to Cable News Network and the availability of electronic transcripts of official briefings, "reporters can now cover the White House in absentia," Ullmann observes. He does not recommend the practice, but it would apparently make all too little difference in the press's coverage of the presidency.

## Radio Wars

"The Battle for the U.S. Airwaves, 1928-1935" by Robert W. McChesney, in *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1990), University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Walnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104-6220.

In retrospect, commercial broadcasters' near-monopoly over the radio airwaves seems to have been almost inevitable. But it did not seem that way back in the 1920s and early '30s, says McChesney, a journalism professor at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Although scholars have not stressed the fact, there was opposition to the network-dominated, advertising-subsidized system of radio broadcasting that was then emerging.

During much of the 1920s, most radio stations were owned and run by newspapers, department stores, or other businesses, and were used mainly just to generate favorable publicity. But there were also nonprofit broadcasters—most of them affiliated with colleges or universities. By 1925, there were more than 200 nonprofit stations—about two-fifths of all the radio stations in the country.

Few people at the time foresaw the rapid rise of the commercial networks—the National Broadcasting Company was established in 1926 and the Columbia Broadcasting System a year later—or the expanded role of commercial advertising. The Radio Act of 1927, hurriedly passed by Congress after a federal judge ruled the Commerce Department's licensing of stations unconstitutional, created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to allocate

broadcast licenses. The commission was told only to favor applicants that best served the "public interest, convenience or necessity."

When the FRC's allocation plan emerged in 1928, however, the networks were the big winners. The commission set aside 40 channels nationwide for use by powerful 50,000-watt stations, and left the other 50 available channels for simultaneous use by some 600 weaker stations across the country. Broadcasters in the same region had to share (and fight over) the frequencies. In 1927, NBC and CBS held less than seven percent of all broadcast stations; by 1931, the networks, after the number of hours broadcast and the level of power used are taken into consideration, accounted for almost 70 percent of U.S. broadcasting. And by 1934, radio commercial advertising had mushroomed to \$72 million a year.

The immediate losers in all this were the indigent nonprofit broadcasters. The FRC has "taken away all of the [broadcast] hours that are worth anything," complained the director of a station at the University of Arkansas. Between 1927-34, the number of nonprofit stations fell by two-thirds.

As this was happening, the "displaced and harassed" nonprofit broadcasters, par-