good reason, the historian notes: "They were . . . provocative, vulnerable, and practically useless." The original decision to deploy the missiles had been made in 1957, after the launching of the Soviet *Sputnik* aroused Europe's fears about the depth of U.S. commitment to its defense. But the Jupiters were not actually deployed until after Kennedy took office in 1961. While he was inclined to cancel deployment, his advisers feared that after the tense June summit meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna such a move might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Also, Ankara strongly opposed cancellation. "[T]here is no reason to doubt that deployment went ahead with Kennedy's approval," Nash says.

On Aug. 23, 1962, after the Soviet military build-up in Cuba had begun, but before the Soviet missiles were discovered there, Kennedy's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, asked the Defense Department what could be done about getting the Jupiters out. Contrary to some claims, this was not an "order" to remove the missiles, Nash says. Kennedy's subordinates all along seem to have understood "that they were being instructed *to consult* the Turks regarding removal, and *not* being ordered *to remove* the missiles."

During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and his advisers "consistently strained" in public to dismiss the analogy between the Jupiters and the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In the end, the Soviets withdrew their missiles after receiving secret assurances that the Jupiters would be removed within five months. The last Jupiter in Turkey was dismantled in April 1963; the official story, that there had been no trade, lasted much longer.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

The Global Job Market

"Global Work Force 2000: The New World Labor Market" by William B. Johnston, in *Harvard Business Review* (Mar.–Apr. 1991), Boston, Mass. 02163.

Labor has long been considered the least mobile factor in production. But thanks to a global mismatch between labor supply and demand, the movement of workers across national borders is going to accelerate dramatically in the future. So predicts Johnston, a Senior Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute and author of the widely cited 1987 report, *Workforce 2000*.

While the focus of attention in the United States and other industrialized nations has been on looming labor shortages, the world's work force has been growing rapidly. Between 1985 and the year 2000, Johnston says, an increase of 600 million workers is projected, with 95 percent of them in the developing countries. In Pakistan and Mexico, for example, the work force is expected to grow by about three percent a year, while in the United States and Canada the rate will be closer to one percent. In Japan, growth will be only 0.5 percent, and in Germany the work force will actually shrink.

Although the industrialized nations still educate higher proportions of their youths, the developing countries have been producing a fast-increasing share of the world's high-school and college graduates. Their share of college students, for example, jumped from 23 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 1985 and is expected to reach 60 percent by the year 2000.

During the 1990s, Johnston says, "workers who have acquired skills in school will be extremely valuable in the world labor markets. And if job opportunities are lacking in their native lands, better jobs will probably be only a plane ride away."

"Although most governments in industrial nations will resist these movements of people for social and political reasons," Johnston says, "employers in the developed world are likely to find ways around government barriers." Even unskilled jobs "may become more internationalized in the 1990s," he says. During the 1970s and '80s, large numbers of relatively low-skilled workers immigrated—Turks to West Germany, Algerians to France, Mexicans to the United States—to take jobs natives did not want. Among the industrialized nations, only Japan, with "its commitment to preserving its racial homogeneity," is likely to reject increased immigration.

Spreading The Wealth

"American Family Fortunes as Economic Deadweight" by Sidney L. Carroll, in *Challenge* (May–June 1991), 80 Business Park Dr., Armonk, N.Y. 10504.

A mere one percent of all Americans own nearly one-third of the nation's wealth—$3.7 trillion in 1986. Roughly one-half of their considerable fortunes were inherited. And much of that inherited wealth is not put to imaginative use. On the contrary, asserts Carroll, an economist at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, massive inherited fortunes are typically locked away in estate trusts, which are cautiously managed in accordance with the wishes of the dead by banks, attorneys, financial advisers, and accountants.



"You promised me the company on my sixtieth—and I don't think you're being a very nice daddy and I hate you."

Some heirs to great wealth are unable to free themselves from their "welfare" dependency.

That, Carroll believes, is good neither for the U.S. economy nor even for many of the heirs, who remain dependent. A change in the tax system, he says, could fix the problem.

Under existing laws, enacted in 1912, wealth is subject to an estate tax. When an individual dies, the estate's worth in excess of $600,000 is subject to taxation and the wealth is then transferred. This allows the rich to pass on large fortunes relatively intact. Carroll proposes substituting a new tax on individual inheritors. The first $1 million received would be tax-free. But bequests above that would be taxed on a sliding scale, with everything over $4 million completely taxed away. The rich therefore would tend to spread their assets around—in fact, an estate of any size could be distributed entirely tax-free, so long as no single bequest was too large. Wealth could be spread among many heirs. And control of the assets would pass "not to a trust, not to a bank, but to a person." Many of the heirs would be young and more inclined than their elders to be "creative risk-takers." Not all the funds would be put to good use, of course, but the overall effect, Carroll maintains, would greatly benefit the economy—and the inheritors themselves.

Taps For Bureaucracy?

"Can Business Beat Bureaucracy?" by Charles Heckscher, in *The American Prospect* (Spring 1991), P.O. Box 7645, Princeton, N.J. 08543-7645.

Pop social critics love to decry the soul-deadening effects of working for large, bureaucratic organizations. Now, notes Heckscher, a Harvard Business School professor, even some buttoned-down corporate CEOs have joined in.