

ing off now in search of President George Bush's New World Order, he argues, the United States should abandon internationalism and start thinking in terms of "purely national interests."

U.S. foreign policy since World War II, in Tonelson's view, has had the utopian purpose of transforming the world "into a place where the forces that drive nations to clash in the first place no longer exist." Internationalism, he says, has encouraged Americans "to think more about the possible world of tomorrow than about the real world of today." All questions of the risks and costs of foreign entanglements have been avoided, he claims, and the nation's economic and social problems have been badly neglected.

Under the policy that he champions, the United States would seek to secure and protect its "truly vital" interests, such as physical survival and the maintenance of its democratic institutions. But all other major foreign-policy objectives would be subjected to the test of whether the benefits outweighed the costs and risks. Thus, "the lack of democracy, development, and social justice in Central America—however unfortunate for people who have to live there—has never appreciably affected U.S. fortunes." The United States should no longer try to reform these countries, Tonelson argues. Its sole interest is to keep hostile foreign powers out, and it should do this with force, if necessary.

U.S. foreign policy, Tonelson says,

should *not* be "a vehicle for spreading American values, for building national character, for expressing any individual's or group's emotional, philosophical, or political preferences, or for carrying out any . . . overseas missions that, however appealing, bear only marginally on protecting and enriching the nation." Such marginal missions include: "promoting peace, stability, democracy, and development around the world; protecting human rights; establishing international law; building collective security; exercising something called leadership; creating a new world order; [and] competing globally with the Soviets (or whomever) for power and influence."

America's security, he says, should be "decoupled" from that of its allies, and "the automatic nuclear risks built into the alliances" should be eliminated. All U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, and most conventional forces, should be unilaterally withdrawn. "Strategic and economic disengagement from the Third World, which has already begun, should be allowed to continue unimpeded."

All this does not add up to isolationism, Tonelson insists. Foreign intervention would not be ruled out on principle. "[The] only rule of thumb would be 'whatever works' to preserve or enhance America's security and prosperity and—provided that Americans are willing to pay the bills—what the country collectively wishes to define as its psychological well-being."

JFK's Missiles

"Nuisance of Decision: Jupiter Missiles and the Cuban Missile Crisis" by Philip Nash, in *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (Mar. 1991), Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., Gainsborough House, Gainsborough Road, London E11 1RS, England.

When President John F. Kennedy in October 1962 made the stunning announcement that the Soviet Union was placing nuclear missiles in Cuba, he left out one uncomfortable fact: The United States had nuclear missiles in Turkey, close to the Soviet Union. Others soon pointed out the parallel, and it complicated U.S. efforts to resolve the crisis. Standard histories have it that a blameless Kennedy had ordered

the obsolete Jupiter missiles removed from Turkey months before, only to discover during the crisis that the federal bureaucracy had not carried out his order. But Nash, an Ohio University historian, says that there is no hard evidence that Kennedy had explicitly ordered the Jupiters removed.

Kennedy indeed had been concerned about the missiles in Turkey, and with

good reason, the historian notes: "They were . . . provocative, vulnerable, and practically useless." The original decision to deploy the missiles had been made in 1957, after the launching of the Soviet *Sputnik* aroused Europe's fears about the depth of U.S. commitment to its defense. But the Jupiters were not actually deployed until after Kennedy took office in 1961. While he was inclined to cancel deployment, his advisers feared that after the tense June summit meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna such a move might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Also, Ankara strongly opposed cancellation. "[T]here is no reason to doubt that deployment went ahead with Kennedy's approval," Nash says.

On Aug. 23, 1962, after the Soviet military build-up in Cuba had begun, but before the Soviet missiles were discovered

there, Kennedy's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, asked the Defense Department what could be done about getting the Jupiters out. Contrary to some claims, this was not an "order" to remove the missiles, Nash says. Kennedy's subordinates all along seem to have understood "that they were being instructed *to consult* the Turks regarding removal, and *not* being ordered *to remove* the missiles."

During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and his advisers "consistently strained" in public to dismiss the analogy between the Jupiters and the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In the end, the Soviets withdrew their missiles after receiving secret assurances that the Jupiters would be removed within five months. The last Jupiter in Turkey was dismantled in April 1963; the official story, that there had been no trade, lasted much longer.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

The Global Job Market

"Global Work Force 2000: The New World Labor Market" by William B. Johnston, in *Harvard Business Review* (Mar.-Apr. 1991), Boston, Mass. 02163.

Labor has long been considered the least mobile factor in production. But thanks to a global mismatch between labor supply and demand, the movement of workers across national borders is going to accelerate dramatically in the future. So predicts Johnston, a Senior Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute and author of the widely cited 1987 report, *Workforce 2000*.

While the focus of attention in the United States and other industrialized nations has been on looming labor shortages, the world's work force has been growing rapidly. Between 1985 and the year 2000, Johnston says, an increase of 600 million workers is projected, with 95 percent of them in the developing countries. In Pakistan and Mexico, for example, the work force is expected to grow by about three percent a year, while in the United States and Canada the rate will be closer to one percent. In Japan, growth will be only 0.5

percent, and in Germany the work force will actually shrink.

Although the industrialized nations still educate higher proportions of their youths, the developing countries have been producing a fast-increasing share of the world's high-school and college graduates. Their share of college students, for example, jumped from 23 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 1985 and is expected to reach 60 percent by the year 2000.

During the 1990s, Johnston says, "workers who have acquired skills in school will be extremely valuable in the world labor markets. And if job opportunities are lacking in their native lands, better jobs will probably be only a plane ride away."

"Although most governments in industrial nations will resist these movements of people for social and political reasons," Johnston says, "employers in the developed world are likely to find ways around