

own humanity." Moreover, aides and advisors struggle over every word the candidate is supposed to utter, and speechwriting becomes a bureaucratic battle, as it eventually did in the Carter White House.

Because of the growing importance of TV news, however, their struggles are increasingly irrelevant. Working for Senator John Glenn (D.-Ohio) in 1983, Anderson wrote a long, dull speech announcing Glenn's candidacy for the Democratic nomination. It was a carefully calculated risk, intended to show Glenn as a substantive thinker rather than a glamorous ex-astronaut. But Glenn gave the speech in his Ohio hometown, and TV newscasters

chose to cover it as a heartwarming Hero Goes Home story. "Our dreary speech didn't matter a whit," says Anderson.

During the 1988 primaries, Anderson played a minor role in Senator Albert Gore's (D.-Tenn.) campaign. But Gore gave his all to "debate prep" and paid little attention to his speeches. "To the media, and thus to the candidates, the primary-season debates promised conflict, drama, news; speeches were a bother, a yawn, an afterthought."

Since political rhetoric does not really matter anymore, Anderson jestingly proposes a ban on speechwriters. Perhaps that would force our leaders to learn again how to speak to the American public.

### *Turning Crimson?*

The Bush administration as dissected by Dinah Wisenberg of the States News Service, in *Common Cause Magazine* (Sept.-Oct. 1989).

*In the heat of [the 1988] presidential campaign, George Bush attacked Michael Dukakis for espousing liberal policies "born in Harvard Yard's boutique." And he boasted to a Houston audience last June, "when I wanted to learn the ways of the world, I*

*didn't go to the Kennedy School [at Harvard]. I came to Texas."*

*One year later, President Bush's Harvard-bashing days seem to be behind him. Of the 200-plus appointments made by the Yale-educated president, more than four dozen are Harvard University graduates or faculty members. Some Texans may also be surprised that several high-ranking White House aides have ties to Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government.*

### *The Dark Side Of Federalism*

Much of the initiative in government during the past decade has shifted from Washington to the nation's state houses and city halls. And liberals and conservatives alike seem to applaud the growth of governments "closer to the people." The "people," however, may be paying a high price.

Witt, a staff writer for *Governing*, reports that federal criminal indictments of state, city, county, and other local officials have grown tenfold over the past 20 years. In

"Is Government Full of Crooks, Or Are We Just Better at Finding Them?" by Elder Witt, in *Governing* (Sept. 1989), 1414 22nd St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037, and "The Effectiveness of State Economic Development Policies: A Time-Series Analysis" by Margery Marzahn Ambrosius, in *The Western Political Quarterly* (Sept. 1989), Univ. of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112.

1970, there were 36 officials under federal indictment; in 1987, there were 348. No reliable data exist on state and local prosecutions.

Yet more indictments do not necessarily mean that there is more corruption. As Witt notes, ethics laws have proliferated madly; what was legal, or at least overlooked, 20 years ago could put a local official behind bars today. More important, she says, is the growing aggressiveness and

technological sophistication of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and federal prosecutors since the 1980 Abscam investigation. In Mississippi, for example, 60 county supervisors went to jail recently for taking kickbacks after the FBI mounted a sophisticated "sting" operation. The FBI used high-tech "body wires" to build airtight cases—the supervisors' own words—on tape.

Still, Witt concedes, new laws and technology are not entirely to blame. Corruption always seems to follow money, and state and local officials now control a great deal of money: Their budgets total some \$900 billion, eight times what they were in 1960.

Bigger budgets also seem to guarantee more plain-old pork-barrel legislation. Ambrosius, a political scientist at Kansas State University, studied the economic development programs that many states have started in recent years. Through such

measures as bond-financed construction subsidies, various targeted tax breaks, and other incentives, the states now spend billions annually to promote the growth of industry. Ambrosius put all the numbers for eight kinds of economic development programs through a computer. Her question: What impact did these programs have on the states' unemployment and industrial output between 1969 and 1985? The answer: near zero. (Tax breaks on land and capital improvements, she found, *may* have helped ease unemployment slightly.)

Ambrosius does not mention corruption. Her point is that business interests have more influence at the state level than in Washington. How else to explain billions in state spending that does no discernible good? In any event, neither Witt nor Ambrosius seems to offer much encouragement to partisans of the "new federalism."

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## FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

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### *A Fall From What?*

"Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony" by G. John Ikenberry, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1989), 475 Riverside Dr., Ste. 1274, New York, N.Y. 10115-0012.

Along with "endism" [see p.14], "declinism" has been a hot topic recently among foreign affairs specialists. Since the publication of Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987), they have been seeking to gauge just how badly American power has ebbed since World War II.

Ikenberry, a Princeton political scientist, looks at the question from a very different angle: How great was American power to begin with?

The conventional view, he notes, is that the United States has fallen far from the heights it occupied immediately after World War II. And there is no denying that by many measures America was a colossus. In 1948, for example, it produced nearly half of the world's industrial goods. But Ikenberry argues that "in terms of the

ideals and plans it originally articulated [during the war], the United States got much less than it wanted; in terms of direct involvement in leading the postwar Western system, it got much more involved than it wanted."

During the war, for example, U.S. officials believed that a system of multilateral free trade, embracing even the Soviet Union, was essential to ensuring the peace. But the wretched state of Europe's economies (and its governments' pleas for continued trade protection), along with rising East-West conflict, prevented Washington from fulfilling much of its plan.

American officials also wanted to minimize direct U.S. involvement in Europe. As George F. Kennan wrote in 1947: "It should be a cardinal point of our policy to see to it that other elements of indepen-