lenge the Republicans successfully because, Phillips thinks, they have been too busy imitating them. The Democrats collaborated on both the Gramm-Rudman budget act and the 1986 tax reform, and thus could not take advantage, in 1988, of public dislike of a tax policy that both favored the wealthy and created unprecedented deficits. Even so, Bush's 53 percent was the weakest Republican presidential victory in a two-way election since 1908; a switch of a half-million votes in 11 states "could have elected even Dukakis." Although Phillips finds Jesse Jackson "limited by both race and Third World rhetoric," he believes that if the Democratic candidates appropriate Jackson's thunder in 1992, the way Nixon stole George Wallace's in 1968, the White House is theirs.

Exactly how plausible are Phillips's prophecies? So far, there's been little sign of any new populist majority emerging. Phillips's statistics on income inequality may be correct, but Americans in the middle ranges are not significantly worse off. And while those in the bottom third are, they are not heavy voters. In 1968, Phillips drew up a strategy that let Nixon capture white voters hostile to race-fraught issues such as busing and welfare. Yet the same tensions still polarize American politics. It will require more than populist rhetoric to unite the majority that Phillips proposes—blacks, whites, liberals, workers, the homeless, and the middle class—behind a single cause. Even the wizard Phillips has yet to locate such a unifying program in his famous crystal ball.

CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada. *By Seymour Martin Lipset. Routledge. 337 pp. $29.95*

To the casual observer, the United States and Canada pass for fraternal twins: a little hard to tell apart. But take a second look, says Lipset, a Harvard sociologist and political scientist, and striking differences emerge. America has twice as many policemen (per capita) as Canada— which may not be a bad idea, since four times as many Americans are murdered annually. A greater percentage of Americans go to church. A greater percentage of Canadians vote in elections. Canada resembles a European country,

with its third parties, socialized medicine, and strong trade unionism. In the United States, union allegiance is declining, third parties are ineffectual, and socialized medicine is largely untried. What do such differences, when added up, amount to? And given the similarity of the two countries' backgrounds, how did the differences arise in the first place?

Borrowing from Max Weber, Lipset sets up a chain of causality: Certain historical events happen, they establish social values, and those values in turn cause distinctive national behaviors. The event that culturally divided the upper North American landmass, Lipset argues, was the American Revolution. Canada, never experiencing a revolution, remained "Tory"— conservative, monarchical, ecclesiastical— while the United States embarked on its populist "Whiggish" adventure in individualism and egalitarianism. The mottoes of the two counties encapsulate their differences: Americans are dedicated to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," while Canadians want "peace, order, and good government."

Peace, order, and good government enumerate fairly practical goals, whereas liberty and happiness represent transcendent ideals. In pursuing them, one almost enters the realm of religion. Indeed, Lipset's main thesis is "that becoming an American was a religious—that is, ideological—act." He quotes Richard Hofstadter: "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one." During World War II, Winston Churchill opposed the outlawing of the English Communist Party because it was made up of Englishmen, and he did not fear an Englishman. In Canada, as in England, nationality is related to community, to common history. One cannot become un-English or un-Canadian. But "being an American," Lipset says, "is an ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American values"—communists, for example—"are un-American."

The timing of *Continental Divide* is fortuitous, coming as the Cold War ends and when many journalists and politicians are speculating about America's role in the world. Lipset holds up Canada as a sort of fun house mirror to America: It shows what America might look like with one distinctive element removed from the image—our ideological mission.