

land, and Bayer and Siemens in Germany. This enables him to propose why one company succeeds while another fails.

Chandler's key concept, developed in his earlier *Strategy and Structure* (1962) and *The Visible Hand* (1977), is managerial capitalism. He explains here how massive investment "brought the separation of ownership from management. The enlarged enterprises came to be operated by teams of salaried managers who had little or no equity in the firm." Finally, says Chandler, "The new institution and the new type of economic man provided a central dynamic for continuing economic growth and transformation."

These elite managers are a far cry from the Faustian business-villains of Theodore Dreiser or Sinclair Lewis. Managerial capitalism made Germany Europe's most powerful nation before World War I, and it made America the world's most productive economy during the interwar years. But in Britain the descendants of the original founders tended to remain in control, often augmenting the fortunes of family owners at the expense of the enterprise. As a result, the world's first industrial nation rapidly declined.

If Britain is an object lesson in what to avoid, one cannot read this book without pondering the current "market for corporate control" in America. Only in his conclusion does Chandler bring his study up to the present—a present in which too many executives in the United States seem to be lacking the patience, knowledge, and drive that once made half the world's giant corporations American in origin. The corporate and financial elite in America buy businesses today intending not to increase their competitiveness but to speculate, to finance debts, or to manipulate stocks. The fact that such shuffling of assets remains practically nonexistent in Germany and Japan (a more recent practitioner of successful managerial capitalism) is all the more sobering. *Scale and Scope* puts the weight of history on the side of those who argue against betting the business.

MICHELET, HISTORIAN: Rebirth and Romanticism in Nineteenth Century France.
By Arthur Mitzman. Yale. 339 pp. $35

It is rare indeed for a contemporary historian to rate a biography. But 19th-century historians were a different breed. They wrote history on a grand scale, often to propagate national myths or to build or unite nations. And no historian of the 19th century was more widely read than was Jules Michelet in France.

Michelet (1798–1874) virtually defined the genre of romantic history: "History," he said, is a "violent moral chemistry in which my individual passions become generalities." Mitzman, the author of an earlier "psychobiography" of Max Weber, thus has ample reason for saying that "the frontier between the political and the personal was as unguarded in his [Michelet's] case as that between past and present."

Michelet's story is that of a working-class printer's son who by his own efforts and intellect swiftly rose to head the historical section of the national records office. His position gave him easy access to the numerous sources he used in his 24-volume *Histoire de France.* His own successful career gave him the almost messianic faith in the democratic process that animates his monumental work. Mitzman observes that Michelet "combined plebeian origins with bourgeois status" and thus personified the goal of the romantic radicals who wished to renew "the revolutionary alliance of plebs and elite that had made 1789 possible." What distinguished Michelet's pro-Revolutionary history was his ability to transform his emotional experiences into analytic categories: His adolescent love for Paul Poinsot, a school friend, became the model for revolutionary fraternity; his romantic liaison with a younger woman, Madame Dumesnil, the model for communal solidarity with *le peuple.* This half-

conscious identification of himself with *la patrie* made Michelet enormously popular.

After his death, however, it made him passé. Michelet was consigned to "literature," assigned to schoolchildren for his poetic power, while two generations of "scientific" historians ignored him. Yet, more recently, the trend has reversed: Historians following Lucian Febvre, Marc Bloch, and Jean Guehenno are again championing Michelet.

The literary critic Roland Barthes explained Michelet's current appeal when he observed that his subjectivity "was only the earliest form of that insistence on totality.... It is because Michelet was a discredited historian (in the scientist sense of the term) that he turns out to have been at once a sociologist, an ethnologist, a psychoanalyst, a social historian." What seemed almost the accidents of Michelet's subjective, romantic method—his interest in popular mentalities, his use of oral testimony, his scrutiny of the historian's relationship to his subject—have become standard approaches in the last decades. Recently, the important journal *Annales*, once known for dismissing the significance of individuals in history, published an editorial statement that called for "new methods" that would carry on Michelet's concern for relating "the individual to the group and the society." Thus, Mitzman comments, "the circle completes, and the grandfather's soul appears indeed to be reborn in his grandchildren."

RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: Manners in Nineteenth-Century Urban America. *By John F. Kasson. Hill and Wang. 305 pp. $22.95*

In the late 1960s rebellious youth demanded to "do their own thing," little realizing that most Americans have long claimed some variant of that right. The 19th-century transcendentalists nurtured an individualism that many took as license to construct their own unique "social" selves. Kasson, a historian at the University of North Carolina, finds that these individualistic claims have grossly distorted the way social life has operated in the United States. A study of manners, of the forms of civility and rudeness, reveals that personal behavior in America has always been circumscribed by convention.

Kasson concentrates on the 19th-century American urban-dwellers who tended implicitly to accept "the boundless market as the model for all exchange, social as well as economic." Here, in the new economic and social order of the metropolis, egalitarian ideals and marketplace realities came into serious conflict. The problem was how to allocate definitive rank without seeming to curb personal liberty. Americans, Tocqueville observed, had no use for restraints imposed by others, but needed such social distinctions if acquisitive behavior were to have meaning.

One instrument which reconciled "the requirements of a democratic polity and the demands for social distinction" was the 19th-century guidebooks on manners, which started appearing in the 1830s and came streaming off the presses after 1870. Kasson sees these etiquette guides both as instruction manuals for the insecure and as sources of authority in a land where every citizen can claim the correctness of his own opinion and way of life. Specifically, these manuals attempted to prevent "the agony of uncertainty" in a social order where role-playing had displaced feudal role-allocation. In his *Autobiography* (1771), Benjamin Franklin had earlier demonstrated how to adapt one's observable behavior to one's interest. Kasson argues that Franklin thus anticipates 19th-century etiquette, according to which appearances matter more than reality. Here, indeed, is a paradox: By instructing a person not to trust his innate impulses but to copy outward models, "the very rituals intended to fortify individual character undermined a sense of personal coherence." The guides gradually fostered a sense of inadequacy that could be compensated for only by consumption—by buying one's way into approved taste and propriety.

As for the etiquette itself, Kasson uncovers the lost arts of hat-tipping and of cutting and snubbing; of what constituted a proper smile and a proper walk, of how to dine instead of merely eating. These minute—and often comical—strictures on everyday conduct de-