viet Union. But even in the age of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, the Soviets maintain a keen interest in preventing the emergence of a united Europe with a common defense and foreign policy—a long-term goal favored by some Europeans—and, as always, splitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Europe 1992 gives Gorbachev the opportunity to do both.

Already, Hungary and Poland have sought stronger ties to the EEC. Assuming a continuation of today's era of good feelings, "a request for membership by an East European country, made in the name of peace and reconciliation... would be difficult to reject." That would short-circuit European political union and make impossible the EEC's current political

Getting STARTed

Sitting on President George Bush's White House desk is a several hundred-page draft of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty. The product of seven years of U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva, the draft treaty's turgid legal language contains grand compromises on key issues

and empty pages where sticking points need to be resolved. Now Bush has to decide what to do next.

Kampelman, who headed the U.S. delegation in Geneva during 1985–89, notes that the draft contains several landmark agreements: 1) a ceiling of 4,900 warheads on each side's intercontinental and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles; 2) a limit of 1,540 warheads on big "silo buster" ICBMs; 3) an overall 6,000-warhead limit for bombers and missiles.


In essence, the treaty forces the Soviet Union to reduce its ICBMs by about role—"the economic base for the European end of the Atlantic alliance."

Meanwhile, Gorbachev has been courting West Germany (a member of both NATO and the EEC), where neutralist sentiment is already strong. So far, Bonn has withstood his entreaties, but a sweeping offer by Gorbachev might ultimately detach West Germany from NATO, weaken the alliance, and, again, prevent the political unification of Western Europe.

A neutral Europe "would satisfy the requirements of the Soviet Union for security and for economic improvement," says Hartley. The Europeans would be guaranteed prosperity and "a quiet life." And the United States would see its international influence much diminished.

"START: Completing the Task" by Max M. Kampelman, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1989), 55 Hayward St. Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

50 percent. Such weapons, which can be launched in a "first strike" attack, undermine nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, both sides are allowed to fly more bombers. These relatively slow weapons are useful only for retaliation; they thus strengthen deterrence.



After seven years, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) still face large obstacles. Even if completed and ratified, a START treaty would reduce only certain kinds of nuclear weapons.

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PERIODICALS

The chief criticism of START is that, despite the ICBM reductions, the United States would be more vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. The Soviets now have three ICBM warheads for every one of the 1,000 U.S. Minuteman III and MX silos; after START they would have four for each of the remaining 300-400 U.S. silos. However, Kampelman says, nothing in START forbids the United States from replacing some big multiple-warhead missiles with a larger number of single-warhead missiles, shifting the odds again. But in reality virtually nothing can be done, with or without START, to make these missiles invulnerable again.

Such paradoxes, says Kampelman, un-

derscore the reality that popular euphoria about 50 percent cuts in nuclear arsenals is unfounded. If the treaty is completed and approved, the United States will still have to invest in the modernization of its nuclear forces, possibly building singlewarhead missiles or new nuclear submarines. A post-START nuclear war would still devastate the planet. START would moderate the arms race and make it more difficult for one side to gain the upper hand—not the stuff of dramatic TV "sound bites," notes Kampelman, but vitally important. He hopes that the Bush administration will resist the urge to tinker with START's compromises and begin resolving the remaining issues.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Zoned Out

Jack Kemp, the new Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, may be the only bona fide activist in the Bush cabinet. So it is a safe bet that federal "enterprise zones," Kemp's panacea for the nation's blighted inner-city neighborhoods, will become reality before too long.

The problem, contends Osborne, the author of *Laboratories of Democracy* (1988), is that enterprise zones have already been tried by the states and found wanting.

The theory behind the zones is appealing: By slashing business taxes and regulations in selected areas, government can encourage a thousand entrepreneurial flowers to bloom, providing jobs for many inner-city residents. The reality is that some 30 states have created between 500 and 700 enterprise zones—with mixed results at best. The state of Connecticut, for example, claims that it has created or saved 10,000 jobs in enterprise zones; an independent study found that the zones had suffered a loss of 250 jobs. Meanwhile, zone-less Massachusetts became the star of

"The Kemp Cure-All" by David Osborne, in *The New Republic* (April 3, 1989), 1220 19th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

the Rust Belt's revitalization during the 1980s. Studies of enterprise zones in Maryland, Illinois, and Louisiana have found little or no impact.

What's wrong, Osborne argues, is that the zones offer benefits of relatively little real importance to businessmen. When employers in two Maryland enterprise zones were asked what had attracted them, they ranked "financial inducements" 12th out of 13 factors. Notes John Sloan, president of the National Federation of Independent Businesses: "No amount of 'less government' can create money, security, or a market where none exists."

True, says Osborne, Washington can offer much greater financial incentives than state governments can. But even if Kemp's plan nourishes new businesses in the ghettos, it may not help the people it is supposed to assist. Indiana has created 10 relatively successful enterprise zones, but the chronically unemployed local residents have remained just that—they claimed only 6.3 percent of the new jobs.

Help people, not places, urges Osborne.

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