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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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*Pax Nipponica?*

"The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies" by Mike Mansfield, in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1989), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021, and "Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future" by Takashi Inoguchi in *International Affairs* (Winter 1988-89), 80 Montvale Ave., Stoneham, Mass. 02180.

Mike Mansfield, the recently retired U.S. ambassador to Tokyo (1977-89), minces no words: "The most important bilateral relationship in the world today is that between the United States and Japan." Together, the two nations account for 40 percent of the world's gross national product. He believes that the United States must avoid nasty trade disputes with its Pacific ally. Apparently, much of official Washington is not quite ready to heed him.

The Japanese themselves, writes Inoguchi, a political scientist at Tokyo University, are bewildered by their newfound global prominence. Now that they have met their postwar goal of economic security, they are groping to define a place for themselves in the world. According to Inoguchi, the Japanese are currently considering four "scenarios" for the next 25 to 50 years:

*Pax Americana II.* Things remain much as they are, with the United States exercising "enlightened hegemony" in the Pacific. Trade throughout the Pacific is liberalized. Japan concentrates on its own economic growth, increasing development aid to other nations but not its mili-

tary role. (Mansfield seems to favor this approach.)

*"Bigemony."* Japan joins the United States as a major military power in the Pacific, as advocated by former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Economic cooperation between the two powers increases.

*Pax Consortis.* A world of shifting alliances in which Japan exerts moral leadership to avoid wars.

*Pax Nipponica.* Japan plays a global role comparable to that of Britain during the 19th century, when it was the "balancer" among the continental powers. Japan uses economic, not military, power.

Which way will the Japanese go? Growing national pride, anger at the United States over trade disputes, and Japanese pacifism have increased the popular appeal of the last two scenarios. Inoguchi himself favors the eventual rise of *pax consortis*. But "a large majority of responsible Japanese leaders have found it virtually impossible to think beyond a world where the United States is of primary importance to Japan," he says, "and where the Japan-U.S. friendship is a major pillar of global stability."

*Europe 1992*

"After 1992: Multiple Choice" by Anthony Hartley, in *The National Interest* (Spring 1989), P.O. Box 3000, Dept. N.I., Denville, N.J. 07834.

To the degree that Americans have been thinking about the economic integration of Western Europe in 1992, they tend to wring their hands over the prospect of a protectionist Fortress Europe. They would be better advised, says Hartley, editor of Britain's *Encounter*, to worry about a disarmed and neutral Europe.

The Soviet Union, long cool to the Euro-

pean Economic Community (EEC)—the 12-nation organization whose members are melding their economies—has suddenly granted it official recognition and begun talks. Mikhail Gorbachev now speaks in dulcet tones of "our common European home."

In fact, Western Europe's economic unification poses no inherent threat to the So-

viet Union. But even in the age of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, the Soviets maintain a keen interest in preventing the emergence of a united Europe with a common defense and foreign policy—a long-term goal favored by some Europeans—and, as always, splitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Europe 1992 gives Gorbachev the opportunity to do both.

Already, Hungary and Poland have sought stronger ties to the EEC. Assuming a continuation of today's era of good feelings, "a request for membership by an East European country, made in the name of peace and reconciliation . . . would be difficult to reject." That would short-circuit European political union and make impossible the EEC's current political

role—"the economic base for the European end of the Atlantic alliance."

Meanwhile, Gorbachev has been courting West Germany (a member of both NATO and the EEC), where neutralist sentiment is already strong. So far, Bonn has withstood his entreaties, but a sweeping offer by Gorbachev might ultimately detach West Germany from NATO, weaken the alliance, and, again, prevent the political unification of Western Europe.

A neutral Europe "would satisfy the requirements of the Soviet Union for security and for economic improvement," says Hartley. The Europeans would be guaranteed prosperity and "a quiet life." And the United States would see its international influence much diminished.


### Getting STARTed

"START: Completing the Task" by Max M. Kampelman, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1989), 55 Hayward St. Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

Sitting on President George Bush's White House desk is a several hundred-page draft of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty. The product of seven years of U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva, the draft treaty's turgid legal language contains grand compromises on key issues and empty pages where sticking points need to be resolved. Now Bush has to decide what to do next.

Kampelman, who headed the U.S. delegation in Geneva during 1985-89, notes that the draft contains several landmark agreements: 1) a ceiling of 4,900 warheads on each side's intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; 2) a limit of 1,540 warheads on big "silo buster" ICBMs; 3) an overall 6,000-warhead limit for bombers and mis-

siles. Such weapons, which can be launched in a "first strike" attack, undermine nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, both sides are allowed to fly more bombers. These relatively slow weapons are useful only for retaliation; they thus strengthen deterrence.



After seven years, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) still face large obstacles. Even if completed and ratified, a START treaty would reduce only certain kinds of nuclear weapons.