
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Pax Nipponica?

"The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies" by Mike Mansfield, in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1989), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021, and "Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future" by Takashi Inoguchi in *International Affairs* (Winter 1988-89), 80 Montvale Ave., Stoneham, Mass. 02180.

Mike Mansfield, the recently retired U.S. ambassador to Tokyo (1977-89), minces no words: "The most important bilateral relationship in the world today is that between the United States and Japan." Together, the two nations account for 40 percent of the world's gross national product. He believes that the United States must avoid nasty trade disputes with its Pacific ally. Apparently, much of official Washington is not quite ready to heed him.

The Japanese themselves, writes Inoguchi, a political scientist at Tokyo University, are bewildered by their newfound global prominence. Now that they have met their postwar goal of economic security, they are groping to define a place for themselves in the world. According to Inoguchi, the Japanese are currently considering four "scenarios" for the next 25 to 50 years:

Pax Americana II. Things remain much as they are, with the United States exercising "enlightened hegemony" in the Pacific. Trade throughout the Pacific is liberalized. Japan concentrates on its own economic growth, increasing development aid to other nations but not its mili-

tary role. (Mansfield seems to favor this approach.)

"Bigemony." Japan joins the United States as a major military power in the Pacific, as advocated by former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Economic cooperation between the two powers increases.

Pax Consortis. A world of shifting alliances in which Japan exerts moral leadership to avoid wars.

Pax Nipponica. Japan plays a global role comparable to that of Britain during the 19th century, when it was the "balancer" among the continental powers. Japan uses economic, not military, power.

Which way will the Japanese go? Growing national pride, anger at the United States over trade disputes, and Japanese pacifism have increased the popular appeal of the last two scenarios. Inoguchi himself favors the eventual rise of *pax consortis*. But "a large majority of responsible Japanese leaders have found it virtually impossible to think beyond a world where the United States is of primary importance to Japan," he says, "and where the Japan-U.S. friendship is a major pillar of global stability."

Europe 1992

"After 1992: Multiple Choice" by Anthony Hartley, in *The National Interest* (Spring 1989), P.O. Box 3000, Dept. N.I., Denville, N.J. 07834.

To the degree that Americans have been thinking about the economic integration of Western Europe in 1992, they tend to wring their hands over the prospect of a protectionist Fortress Europe. They would be better advised, says Hartley, editor of Britain's *Encounter*, to worry about a disarmed and neutral Europe.

The Soviet Union, long cool to the Euro-

pean Economic Community (EEC)—the 12-nation organization whose members are melding their economies—has suddenly granted it official recognition and begun talks. Mikhail Gorbachev now speaks in dulcet tones of "our common European home."

In fact, Western Europe's economic unification poses no inherent threat to the So-