transformation of the Muslim peoples under the influence of nationalism, secularism, the industrial revolution, and European imperialism. Hubristic as it is, Lapidus's approach illuminates continuities. One learns how Islamic societies redefined "pre-Islamic institutional forms in Muslim cultural terms" and how religious and state institutions cooperated right up until the European intervention. Errors in a book of this scope are inevitable: The Crimean War broke out in 1853, not 1854. Ottoman rule did not "perpetuate" the social structures of the Balkan population; it radically altered them. Such flaws apart, this is a sound introduction—particularly to the Islamic society Lapidus knows best, the Arab Middle East.

Contemporary Affairs

REASON, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS *by Shawn Rosenberg. Princeton, 1988. 255 pp. $37.50*

Traditional liberal political theory since Francis Bacon's day (1561–1626) rests upon a clear distinction between ideology and reason. The former is shaped by the individual's beliefs, irrational commitments which themselves are products of cultural conditioning or internal drives ("passions," the Enlightenment philosophers called them). Arrayed against ideology is reason—a neutral process of logical deduction based on clear, unbiased observation. The mature political thinker, according to this tradition, is one who subjects his beliefs to the cool light of reason. Rosenberg, a political scientist at the University of California, Irvine, is not the first to challenge the simplistic dichotomy of reason and ideology. But he has cleverly enlisted the ideas of psychologist Jean Piaget to show that ideology is "not a set of attitudes" but itself "a way of thinking," indeed of reasoning. Rosenberg, although a graceless writer, sets forth a useful typology. He defines three sorts of political reasoners—the sequential, the linear, the systematic—and explains how each constructs his understanding of the political arena. Then, in three different studies, he shows the various types in action. The reader is not surprised to find that Rosenberg judges systematic reasoners (who resemble political scientists in their ability to think abstractly about political matters) the most evolved. But he leaves one wondering how well a nation comprised only of such individuals would fare.

THE OTHER PATH: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World *by Hernando de Soto. Harper & Row, 1989. 256 pp. $22.95*

In 1985, 69 percent of the new houses in Lima, Peru, were built in defiance of strict regulations and codes. The strategies involved in this underground entrepreneurial effort are, according to economist de Soto, typical of a large "informal" movement underway in Peru and other parts of the Third World. De Soto not only describes the practices of the "informals" but also argues that they offer the most hopeful alternative to over-regulated, state-directed economies that exist throughout the underdeveloped world. Such regimes benefit only the powerful few who can influence the system. In the aggregate, however, the economies of such nations stagnate, as abundant evidence shows. But while lauding the successes of "informals" (in 1984, 91 percent of the buses in Lima were run by this renegade sector), de Soto finds that tremendous energy and money is wasted in their struggle against officialdom. Thus de Soto makes an eloquent plea for jettisoning bad laws and red tape, and making sure that laws are promulgated democratically and serve the interests of the majority. His proposals will almost certainly be an issue in Peru's 1990 presidential election: Novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, a likely presidential candidate, is one of their more vigorous proponents.

HEARTS AND MINDS: A Personal Chronicle of Race in America *by Harry S. Ashmore. Seven Locks Press, 1988. 513pp. $14.95.*

White liberals were rare birds, especially on newspaper staffs, in the racially-segregated South during the 1950s. Notable among them was the *Arkansas Gazette*'s Ashmore, born in Greenville, S.C. Ashmore won the Pulitzer Prize for his editorials on the stormy integration (by U.S. paratroopers) of Little Rock's Central High in 1957. Revised since its first appearance in

1982, his rich, readable "personal chronicle" ranges widely, reflecting his experience as newsman and activist. His sketches of important but now almost forgotten figures, both white and black (remember Malcolm X?), in the early battles for racial equality would supplement any analysis of Southern society and politics at mid-century. He remembers Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society for both its successes and follies. Reflecting on present trends, he emphasizes the growing importance of education and family stability in the destinies of individual black Americans, North and South. He views the Reagan Administration as blind to the true costs of ignoring the black urban underclass. He finds less hope for social progress in Jesse Jackson's activism than in the potential, as yet untested, of the emerging black middle-class and its ability to form political coalitions with middle-class whites. "The record of my time," he concludes, "demonstrates that it is possible to change hearts and minds—not by exhortation, or coercion, but through governance that recognizes the possibilities, as well as limitations, of our pluralistic heritage."

Arts & Letters

THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF KENNETH BURKE AND MALCOLM COWLEY, 1915–1981 *edited by Paul Jay. Viking, 1988. 448 pp. $29.95*

Friends at Pittsburgh's Peabody High School, Burke and Cowley went on to become two of America's foremost literary critics. And at least one virtue of this sampler of their 66-year correspondence is its demonstration of how varied the critical enterprise can be. From the beginning, Burke (who dropped out of Columbia to become "Flaubert" in Greenwich Village) was the more theoretical. By contrast, Cowley (Harvard, '20, after a wartime stint in the American Ambulance Service) was drawn to the flesh and blood of literary history. Burke became known for such cerebral studies as *A Grammar of Motives*; Cowley made his name with histories of American writers, including that of the "lost generation," *Exile's Return*. Candor is the hallmark of their correspondence, Burke at one point insisting that "a friend is none other than that person whom one treats with all the shabbiness and dilatoriness that he scrupulously rules out of his business relationships." True to his principles, he told Cowley that his work was too much "journalism and diarism, and not enough criticism." Such carping seemed only to strengthen their underlying loyalty to each other, and to sharpen their thinking as well as their prose. Nor did they ever cease to share their common obsession. As Burke wrote late in life, "Ailments, ailments, ailments. But what to do, when one considers literature even at its best, an ailment, surpassed only by that much severer ailment, the lack of literature?"

LAW AND LITERATURE: A Misunderstood Relation *by Richard A. Posner. Harvard, 1988. 371. pp. $25*

A literary work and a legal document must both stand the same test of greatness—survival over time. Posner, a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, casts a solonic eye on the many illuminating, if problematic, connections between the two ancient disciplines. In addition to analyzing a range of writers who have dealt with legal themes, from Shakespeare to Kafka to Twain, he also subjects legal texts to the methods of literary criticism. Posner provides a fresh approach to established literary works, and, along the way, refines our notions about the proper province of law: "The idea that law, despite or maybe because of its commitment to reason, misunderstands life is one that *The Brothers Karamazov* shares with [Camus's] *The Stranger*, but in the earlier and greater novel it is seen to reflect the inherent limitations of human reason and to argue for religious values, while in the later one it is equated with the persecution of nonconformists by a nasty bourgeoisie." Elsewhere, he admires Chief Justice Holmes's use of rhetoric (rather than strict logic) to support his brilliant dissenting opinion on *Lochner v. New York* (1905), which overturned a statute limiting work hours in bakeries. "The reason why rhetoric or style is important in law," Posner notes, "is that many questions cannot be resolved by logical or empirical demonstration." Posner resists making overly large claims for the interdisciplinary study of law and literature; in fact, he